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Introduction
Overview
Today’s energy markets face great challenges. The liberalisation of the European elec-
tricity markets started at the end of the 1990s. At about the same time the use of
intermittent renewable energies, i. e., wind and solar power, started to increase signif-
icantly. This led to serious doubts concerning the security of supply for two reasons:
First, concerns regarding the ability of the electricity system to cope with the variable
feed-in of renewable energies. And second, doubts that the liberalised (energy only)
market will send sufficient investment incentives for dispatchable capacity – especially
since full load hours of conventional power plants have decreased driven by renewables.
Until today, the debate concerning the appropriate design of electricity markets is con-
troversial.
Although great efforts are undertaken to increase the share of renewable energies in all
sectors, large parts of the global economy still depend on natural resources. The markets
for these resources, e. g., coal, oil and gas, are characterised by a high concentration on
the supply side. This poses the threat of an abuse of market power. Regulatory bodies
try to address this thread by competition law but face various challenges: First of all,
it is difficult to evaluate market behaviour and detect violations against competition
law. Furthermore, the effects of market regulations are difficult to anticipate due to
the frequently complex market structures involving demand and supply sides across the
world.
This thesis deals with both areas – market design in electricity markets and strategic
behaviour in natural ressource markets – and consists of the following four essays:
• Flexibility in Europe’s power sector – A necessary good or an inevitable comple-
ment? (based on Bertsch et al., 2016)1
• On the interaction effects of market failure and capacity payments in intercon-
nected electricity markets
1Available here: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.eneco.2014.10.022.
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• Assessing market structures in resource markets – An empirical analysis of the
market for metallurgical coal using various equilibrium models (based on Lorenczik
and Panke, 2016)2
• Modeling strategic investment decisions in spatial markets (based on Lorenczik
et al., 2017)3
The four essays are divided into two parts. In the first part, consisting of the first
two essays, market design issues in electricity markets are discussed. Part two deals
with strategic behaviour in spatial natural resource markets. In all papers that where
developed with co-authors the researchers contributed in equal parts.
Part 1: Market design in electricity markets
The first part of this dissertation addresses market design issues in electricity markets.
More precisely, it deals with the two earlier sketched concerns regarding security of
supply: First, the concerns regarding the availability of sufficiently flexible power plants.
And second, the consequences of insufficient investments signals in energy only markets
in interconnected electricity markets.
The first essay (chapter 1) focuses on the flexibility requirements. The central finding
is that the flexibility requirements of an electricity system with an increasing share of
variable renewable energies – more specifically the ramping capabilities and balancing
power provision – can be dealt with by the changing mix of conventional capacity that
evolves from the changing residual load pattern. Additional targeted mechanisms do not
appear to be required – provided that either an energy only market exists which pro-
vides sufficient investments signals or alternatively some kind of complementary capacity
remuneration mechanism (CRM) is in place.
The second essay (chapter 2) is complementary to the first one – this time the absolute
level of installed capacity is addressed. More precisely, the effects of insufficient price
signals on welfare in single markets, but also in particular in interconnected markets are
analysed. The main finding is that insufficient price signals in one market have only
a very limited effect on neighbouring markets if those do not have price restrictions
themselves. The negative domestic effects of distorted prices is amplified by trade. This
renders capacity mechanisms to counter market failure the more necessary.
In the following both essays are outlined in greater detail.
2Available here: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.eneco.2016.07.007.
3Available here: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ejor.2016.06.047.
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Chapter 1: Flexibility in Europe’s power sector – A necessary good or an inevitable
complement?
The European Union has ambitious targets concerning the reduction of greenhouse gases.
To achieve these targets the share of renewable energies is supposed to increase signifi-
cantly in the next decades. Given a large deployment of wind and solar capacities, there
are two major impacts on electricity systems: First, the electricity system has to be
flexible enough to cope with the volatile renewables generation, i. e., ramp up or down
demand or supply on short notice. Second, sufficient back-up capacities are needed for
times of low intermittent renewables generation.
This paper analyses the question if the expected future increase of intermittent renewable
energy capacities imposes special requirements on the market design. More specifically,
is there a need for additional investment incentives for flexible system components? For
this purpose, the development of the European electricity markets up to the year 2050 is
simulated by deploying a linear investment and dispatch optimisation model. Flexibility
requirements are implemented in the model via ramping constraints and requirements
for the provision of balancing power.
The existing literature on the necessity for taking into account flexibility in the design of
capacity mechanisms is rather scarce – the predominant focus in the debate concerning
capacity mechanisms is on the totally installed capacity. Nonetheless, some papers
identify the need for a market with products for flexibility. The analysis in this essay
extends the previous literature by considering a broader range of flexibility options in
the electricity system including demand side response. Additionally, the ambitious long-
term renewable targets of the EU are taken into account which pose further challenges
concerning flexibility on the electricity system.
The analyses show that the increase in intermittent renewables has a significant impact
on the volatility of the residual load. Consequently, the demand for flexibility increases.
However, least cost generation capacity investments result in a sufficiently flexible power
plant fleet. Additional incentives for flexibility are not needed. The main trigger for
investing in flexible resources are the achievable full load hours and the need for backup
capacity. Due to a steeper residual load curve more power plants with low investment but
high variable costs are included in the cost-efficient technology mix. Those technologies,
e. g., gas-fired power plants, provide flexibility as a by-product. Thus, flexibility never
poses a challenge in a cost-minimal capacity mix.
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Chapter 2: On the interaction effects of market failure and capacity payments in inter-
connected electricity markets
The second essay of this dissertation adds to the ongoing discussion concerning capacity
remuneration mechanisms (CRMs) in electricity markets. It builds on the prevailing
view that energy only markets do not provide sufficient investments incentives as whole-
sale electricity markets are characterised by certain market failures (and regulatory
inefficiencies) that render some form of external investment incentive necessary.
This paper focuses on the interaction effects of market failures in adjacent markets.
For reference, we start by analysing the equilibrium market outcome assuming that no
market failure and no capacity mechanism is in place. Subsequently, at first a price cap
representing market failure and then an adjacent market is introduced. The analyses are
complemented by the introduction of capacity payments. The comparison of the effects
in isolated as well as in connected markets enables the assessment of cross-border effects
as well as incentives for free-riding.
The discussion in the literature mainly focuses on the necessity of CRMs and discusses
the properties of market design options on a national basis. Cross-border effects are
frequently neglected. The essay adds to the literature by paying special attention to
the influence of trade on the effects of market failure. In particular, it deals with the
following questions: What effect does an insufficient level of capacity in one market have
on neighbouring markets? Do markets with insufficient domestic capacity incentives
benefit from CRMs in neighbouring markets? And what effects do exaggerated efforts
to increase domestic capacity have on interconnected markets?
The results show that the negative implications of price caps in energy only markets
worsen in interconnected markets: Installed capacity and ultimately welfare decrease
to a larger extent. In addition, capacity payments are less efficient in countering these
effects than in isolated markets. Price caps do not appear to have a (significantly)
harmful effect on adjacent markets. But as domestic market failures have only little
effect on neighbouring markets, so do capacity mechanisms: Capacity payments in one
market do not appear to significantly support neighbouring markets and thus provide
no incentive for free-riding.
Part 2: Strategic behaviour in spacial natural resource markets
Strategic behaviour and the exertion of market power have always been a matter of
concern in energy markets, especially in natural resource markets. The exertion of
market power can result in deadweight losses – regulatory bodies try to address this by
market regulations aiming for a welfare maximising market outcome. The first problem is
to detect collusive behaviour as available data is frequently limited. The second question
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is how regulatory decisions may influence the market outcome. This is especially relevant
in resource markets as demand and supply regions are usually located in different parts
of the world and therefore subject to conflicting interests.
The third essay deals with the question how collusive behaviour and underlying market
structures can be detected. The most accessible data in most cases is historic market
data – which also this essay relies on in the analysis. Various mathematical models
are developed and applied to the metallurgical coal market. Thereby, two new market
structures are identified which appear at least as likely as the cases that were previously
considered in the literature.
The fourth essay complements and expands the previous analysis in two aspects: First,
the focus shifts from the analysis of different varieties of oligopolies to the analysis of
alternative market designs. More specifically, the effects of a switch from trade based on
short-term contracts to long-term contracts is analysed. Second, investment decisions in
production capacity are included in the market models. Again, the models are applied
to the metallurgical coal market.
In the following both essays of part 2 are outlined in greater detail.
Chapter 3: Assessing market structures in resource markets –
An empirical analysis of the market for metallurgical coal using various equilibrium
models
Resource markets are frequently characterised by a high concentration on the supply
side and a low demand elasticity. This raises concerns that market results may be
the product of explicit collusion between producers. But the actual market structure
is usually unknown. Common models used to investigate the market structure try to
replicate the market outcomes by applying economic models representing competitive
markets, strategic Cournot competition and Stackelberg structures (usually limited to
one leader).
For this essay three mathematical models including the mentioned Cournot and Stackel-
berg market representations were developed. Additionally, a multi-leader multi-follower
market model was included in the analysis. The models are used to simulate four spatial
market set-ups with varying market conduct of the individual players. The models are
applied to the international market for metallurgical coal using input data for the years
2008 until 2010. Using several statistical measures the most likely market structures are
identified.
The essay contributes to the literature on applied industrial organisation and, more
specifically, the analysis of the international market for metallurgical coal. Previous
5
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studies are expanded by applying an Equilibrium Problem with Equilibrium Constraints
(EPEC), a mathematical programme used to model multi-leader-follower settings, to a
spatial market, i. e., a market with multiple, geographically disperse supply and demand
nodes. This way, the essay adds to the literature by extending the scope of possible
market structures under scrutiny.
The essay demonstrates the multiplicity of underlying market structures that result in
the observed outcomes concerning trade flows and market prices. By analysing addi-
tional data, more distinctive conclusions were drawn. This demonstrated the need for
comprehensive market analyses in order to achieve reliable conclusions. Especially omit-
ting specific market configurations – unknowingly due to a lack of market insights or
knowingly due to analytical restrictions – might result in premature and false assess-
ments.
Chapter 4: Modeling strategic investment decisions in spatial markets
In oligopolistic markets production capacities are often a key factor for the strategic
interaction between oligopolists. This essay expands the scope ot the previous essay by
adding an investment phase to the models. Additionally, the focus shifts from various
oligopoly set-ups to the analysis of different market designs. It thereby takes into account
the recent steps taken towards a spot market based trade instead of long-term contracts.
Different market structures and designs influence oligopolistic capacity investments and
thereby affect supply, prices and rents. The models used in the analysis comprise an
investment stage and a supply stage in which players compete in quantities. Three
models are compared: A perfect competition and two Cournot models. In the Cournot
models, the product is either traded through long-term contracts or on spot markets.
The models are applied to the international metallurgical coal market.
The essay adds to the literature by explicitly taking into account the separation between
long-term investment and short-term production decisions. This multi-stage market
representation is new to the analysis of spatial resource markets. It takes into account a
market design with spot market based trade and enables the comparison of spot market
based trade and long-term contract. In contrast to the prevalent literature, the implicit
assumption of simultaneous investment and production decisions is lifted. Applied to
the metallurgical coal market, possible consequences of the ongoing regime switch from
long-term contracts to a more spot market based trade are analysed.
The essay demonstrates the importance of an appropriate market representation: The
frequently used one-stage approach has more convenient mathematical properties com-
pared to a bi-level approach and can therefore be solved more easily. But, depending on
the actual market structure, the results might be misleading. In the application at hand
6
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– although the total welfare is only slightly affected – the distribution between producer
and consumer surplus differs substantially. The current shift from long-term contracts to
spot market trade benefits consumers, to the disadvantage of the production companies.
Numerical modeling: Limitations and further research
Although addressing different research questions and dealing with separate markets, in
all essays numerical approaches are used to solve the economic models. This illustrates
the wide range of topics and the flexibility of today’s energy market models. None of the
analyses would have been possible twenty years ago, either due to limited computational
power (in case of the linear optimisation problems), a lack of readily available solvers
(in case of MPECs) or any general solution strategies for reasonable sized problems at
all (in case of EPECs).
The advancements in solving economic models by using numerical methods – rather
than solving them analytically – have made them increasingly interesting to economists.
But even given these improvements, different areas for improvements remain. They
can broadly be categorised into three groups: First, the dependency on accurate input
data. Second, the ability to represent real world systems. And third, the space for
misinterpretations. Some limitations will be outlined in the following – more certainly
exist.
In contrast to closed-form solutions, numerical model results provide less general insights.
But real world models can hardly be solved analytically given the complex nature of
many economic problems. Thus, numerical approaches have to be applied. As these
approaches rely on specific data, the quality of the model results hinges on the accuracy
(and availability) of the input data. This is especially true for data that cannot be
observed directly but has to be estimated. In this dissertation, this was in particular
relevant for the analysis of market conduct in the metallurgical coal market (chapter
3). As the aim of the analysis was to replicate historic market outcomes, accurate input
data was crucial. Although having an extensive dataset that has proven itself to provide
reasonable model results in previous analyses, key parameters remained uncertain. This
was first of all the case for the elasticity of demand – especially as the literature provides
arguments for a wide range of realisations. We addressed this uncertainty by using a
variety of different values. As this did not lead to conflicting conclusions, additional
confidence in the findings was built. The results did not allow for a definite conclusion
concerning the market structure. Additional analysis is needed, but hampered by a lack
of available data. Given that economic research provides valuable insights, a stronger
engagement for more transparency by regulatory authorities is desirable.
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Even more difficult than a retrospective analysis is the task to model a scenario for a
future development. Although economists (usually) do not claim to make predictions
of the future, scenarios are meant to provide guidance by quantifying possible devel-
opments given alternative circumstances. It is vitally important to design consistent
scenarios in order to get meaningful results. This frequently confronts economists trying
to model real world scenarios with two contradicting objectives: First, paying attention
to a detailed model representation of particular aspects. And second, taking into ac-
count interaction effects with adjacent markets. The first objective usually requires a
partial equilibrium model in which certain variables are treated as being exogenous and
therefore fix. The second objective demands for general equilibrium models which usu-
ally lack a detailed representation of individual aspects. More work is needed in the area
of combining both approaches in order to identify consistent scenarios, interactions of
parameters and to gain a better understanding of model results. A connection of Gen-
eral Equilibrium Models (CGE) with detailed partial energy market models promises
additional insight in future research.
Despite the recent progress in computational power, today’s economic models have some
(common) limitations which have to be kept in mind in order to draw meaningful con-
clusions. The causes for most limitations and simplifications can be categorised into two
groups. They are either chosen to limit the computational burden in terms of calcula-
tion speed or simplified models due to the absence of ready to use solution techniques.
This is not only true for the more sophisticated MPEC and EPEC models used in this
dissertation (chapters 2, 3 and 4) but also for relatively – in terms of available and ready
to use solvers – simple linear models (chapter 1). Two of the most prominent limitations
even in linear models are the assumptions of perfect foresight and perfect information
(which also applies to all models in this dissertation). The issue of perfect foresight has
frequently been addressed – especially in linear models – by using stochastic modelling.
But still a trade-off has to be made between modelling accuracy, e. g., concerning the
technical properties of power plants, and relieving the perfect foresight assumption. Per-
fect information has very rarely been bypassed in numerical models but is – depending
on the specific set-up – certainly a strong assumption.
When it comes to more sophisticated models with respect to the market behaviour of
individual players, the sacrifices that have to be made become bigger. Simple Cournot
competition models for a medium sized number of players, time steps and markets that
are formulated as mixed linear complementarity problems (MLCPs) can reliably be
solved with standard tools. If the question at hand requires a bi-level representation
of market interaction (e. g., in Stackelberg games as in chapter 3 or with separate in-
vestment and dispatch decisions as in chapter 4), even solving medium sized problems
can be challenging. If only one optimisation problem has to be solved at the first level
8
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the model constitutes a so called Mathematical Programs with Equilibrium Constraints
(MPECs). As the feasible region is not necessarily convex, usually non-linear solvers
have to be applied. In most cases, only local optima can be guaranteed. Alternatively,
mixed-integer approaches are common in the literature which approximate the optimal
solution (as has been done in this dissertation). The most challenging models to solve
are multi-level models with each stage requiring an equilibrium outcome. Although oc-
casionally examples exist in the literature, reasonable sized models are usually restricted
to two stages. For equilibrium problems with equilibrium constraints (EPECs) no easily
accessible solution approach yet exists. In addition, there may not exist an equilibrium
solution or there might as well be multiple solutions. In general, it cannot be determined
how many solutions exist. Early approaches try to systematically search for different
equilibria, but further research is needed to increase their reliability.
Even if the challenging tasks of obtaining reliable data as well as formulating and solving
the appropriate model have been completed, the interpretation of model results may not
be straightforward. At first, economic models that are solved numerically are frequently
very complex and take into account a large number of influencing factors. Due to
this complexity, the disentangling of cause and effect and the deduction of universal
conclusions is challenging. In addition, and especially in complex and more realistic
multi-stage models, multiple solutions might exist that differ significantly from each
other. Additional research is needed concerning equilibrium selection mechanisms in
the context of numerical models.
Numerical models tend to seduce their users into possibly misleading conclusions – espe-
cially if the results appear to match expectations or historical data. In the dissertation
at hand this can be observed in the analysis of the metallurgical coal market (see chap-
ter 3): The market structure allows several assumptions concerning the market conduct
of producers. Previous analyses concluded that – based on the numerical models that
represented some of the alternatives – some set-up are (more) likely (than others). By
adding further (and more complex) set-ups to the potpourri of economic models, addi-
tional likely cases were identified – probably more exist. This highlights the necessity to
explore and expand the range of economic models that can reliably be solved in order
not to miss reasonable conclusions. Additionally, this illustrates the bias towards models
(and therefore also conclusions) that are more easy accessible. This is especially true for
investment models as simplifying single-level models are still predominant in real world
applications – which can significantly influence results and conclusions (see chapter 4).
In summary, the improvements in the field of numeric models do not come without
stumbling blocks. Economists need to keep an open mind and should constantly seek to
improve and question their models and model results.
9
Part I
Market design in electricity
markets
Flexibility in Europe’s power sector –
A necessary good or an inevitable com-
plement?
By 2050, the European Union aims to reduce greenhouse gases by more than 80 %. The
EU member states have therefore declared to strongly increase the share of renewable
energy sources (RES-E) in the next decades. Given a large deployment of wind and
solar capacities, there are two major impacts on electricity systems: First, the electricity
system must be flexible enough to cope with the volatile RES-E generation, i. e., ramp
up supply or ramp down demand on short notice. Second, sufficient back-up capacities
are needed during times with low feed-in from wind and solar capacities.
This paper analyzes whether there is a need for additional incentive mechanisms for
flexibility in electricity markets with a high share of renewables. For this purpose,
we simulate the development of the European electricity markets up to the year 2050
using a linear investment and dispatch optimization model. Flexibility requirements are
implemented in the model via ramping constraints and provision of balancing power.
We find that an increase in fluctuating renewables has a tremendous impact on the
volatility of the residual load and consequently on the flexibility requirements. However,
any market design that incentivizes investments in least (total system) cost generation
investment does not need additional incentives for flexibility. The main trigger for
investing in flexible resources are the achievable full load hours and the need for backup
capacity. In a competitive market, the cost-efficient technologies that are most likely to
be installed, i. e., gas-fired power plants or flexible CCS plants, provide flexibility as a
by-product. Under the condition of system adequacy, flexibility never poses a challenge
in a cost-minimal capacity mix. Therefore, any market design incentivizing investments
in efficient generation thus provides flexibility as an inevitable complement.
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1.1 Introduction
By 2050, the European Union aims to reduce greenhouse gases by more than 80 %. The
EU member states have therefore declared to strongly increase the share of renewable
energy sources (RES-E) in the next decades. The vast majority of renewable energy is
expected to come from wind and photovoltaics (PV). These sources, however, depend
on local weather conditions, leading to an increase in stochastic electricity generation.
Given a large deployment of wind and PV capacities, weather uncertainty results in two
major impacts on electricity systems: First, the capacity mix must be flexible enough to
cope with the volatile RES-E generation, i. e., ramp up supply or ramp down demand on
short notice. Second, sufficient back-up capacities are needed to provide secure supply
during times with low feed-in from wind and solar capacities. Otherwise, sharp decreases
or increases in renewable production may lead to price spikes on the wholesale market
and, if supply and demand do not meet, to potential black-outs. The provision of back-
up capacity has been intensely discussed in the literature in recent years (for instance
Cramton and Stoft, 2008, Joskow, 2008). Concerning flexibility, the discussion is rather
new and previous literature is scarce. Lamadrid et al. (2011), an exception, argue that
as volatility increases, additional incentives to invest in flexible resources should be
implemented in market design. Meanwhile, the Californian system operator (CAISO)
has already started to implement ramping products in market design to ensure flexibility
(Xu and Threteway, 2012).
This paper analyzes whether there is a need for additional incentive mechanisms for flex-
ibility in electricity markets with a high share of renewables.4 One challenge of analyzing
the role of flexibility in electricity markets is accounting for the possible contributions
of all parts of an electricity system. First, the supply side is able to complement volatile
RES-E generation with highly flexible gas-fired power plants or upcoming technologies
such as power plants with a detachable carbon capture and storage unit. Second, the
demand side can contribute flexibility by improving demand side management. Third,
storages can restrain the volatility of the residual load for both the demand and supply
side. Therefore, an integrated analysis of all flexibility possibilities is needed to answer
the question of how an electricity system can adapt to an increasing share of renewables.
From that, one can deduce whether flexibility requirements necessitate a special market
design.
For this purpose, we simulate the development of the European electricity markets up
to the year 2050 using a linear investment and dispatch optimization model account-
ing for all mentioned flexibility options. We assume investments in renewable energies
4The discussion concerning the necessity of capacity mechanisms is beyond the scope of this paper.
12
1.1 Introduction
lead to an 80 % renewable share of total electricity generation in Europe in 2050. The
model determines the cost-efficient capacity mix, ensuring adequate capacity and fulfill-
ment of flexibility requirements.5 These requirements result from load variation and the
provision of balancing power, which are necessary due to the stochastic in-feed from re-
newable generation. Flexibility of power plants, however, is restricted by minimum load
and start-up constraints. Due to the importance of flexibility provision on short notice,
the calculations are supplemented by using a dispatch model for 8760 hours for selected
years (2020, 2030, 2040 and 2050). CO2 emission costs may have effects on installed
capacity (or generation) of base or peak load and storage capacities. Thus, impacts on
the optimal capacity mix, flexible resources and flexibility provision are further analyzed
by calculating an alternative scenario differing in CO2 emission costs serving as a sensi-
tivity analysis. The model results can be interpreted whether additional incentives for
flexibility will be required or if flexibility will come as a complement given a competitive
system.
Previous literature on integrated analyses of flexibility in electricity systems can be
divided into static (dispatch only) and dynamic (dispatch and investment) analyses. In a
static analysis, Denholm and Hand (2011) use a reduced-form dispatch model to analyze
the effects of higher flexibility requirements on the capacity mix. They state that in an
isolated system, flexible resources, i. e., elimination of must-run technologies, are crucial
for the utilization of fluctuating renewable generation. A unit-commitment approach,
focusing on the operational integration, is chosen in Ummels et al. (2006). These authors
find that flexibility (in terms of ramp rates) does not pose a problem for the Netherlands
in 2012. However, they identify the need for wind curtailment due to minimum load
restrictions. Lamadrid et al. (2011) conclude from their analysis of an optimal dispatch
with varying capacities and ramping cost configurations that there is a need for a market
for ramping products. In a dynamic analysis, Mo¨st and Fichtner (2010), Nicolosi (2010)
and De Jonghe et al. (2011) analyze investment decisions under operational constraints
to determine an optimal capacity mix. They find that operational constraints tend to
change the optimal capacity mix compared to when only considering achievable full load
hours from base-load to mid- or peak-load capacities. By comparing model runs with
and without operational constraints, Nicolosi (2012) states that utilization rather than
operational constraints determines the investments of peak load capacities. However,
previous research neglects the ambitious renewable targets of the EU, especially in the
long term when flexibility becomes a greater issue for the electricity system. Moreover,
demand side reactions to high wholesale prices in case of low renewable production or to
5The objective of the model is to minimize total system costs of the electricity supply for the ex-
ogenously defined electricity demand. Total system costs include investment costs, fixed operation and
maintenance costs, variable production costs (which comprise fuel and CO2 costs) as well as costs due
to the start ups of thermal power plants.
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volatile wholesale prices in general have not yet been analyzed. We therefore contribute
to this literature by considering the long-term developments in transitioning to a mostly
renewable electricity system in Europe, especially with regard to a renewable-dependent
provision of balancing power. Furthermore, previously not considered flexibility options
on the supply (flexible CCS plants) and demand side (demand side management) are
considered.
We find that an increase in fluctuating renewables has a tremendous impact on the
volatility of the residual load and therefore on flexibility requirements. However, any
market design that incentivizes investments in least (total system) cost generation does
not need additional incentives for flexibility. Under the assumption of perfect com-
petition the challenges of volatility and therefore flexibility are met by an increase in
peak-load and a reduction in mid- and base-load capacities. Neither hourly load changes
nor the provision of balancing power poses a challenge. Moreover, at every point in time
of the simulation, the provision of balancing power is never a binding constraint, indi-
cating excess flexibility provision. Therefore, the main trigger for investing in flexible
resources are the achievable full load hours and the need for backup capacity. In a com-
petitive market, the cost-efficient technologies most likely to be installed, i. e., gas-fired
power plants or flexible CCS plants, provide flexibility as a by-product. Under the con-
dition of system adequacy, flexibility never poses a challenge in a cost-minimal capacity
mix.
As renewable support is currently discussed and partly reduced in various EU countries,
the future development of renewable deployment is rather uncertain. Assuming a re-
alization of the EU 2050 goals, however, can be seen as an upper bound of flexibility
demand in a very high RES-E share energy system. Our results show that even in such
an optimistic RES-E scenario, flexibility does not become an issue of system adequacy.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: Section 1.2 defines the used concept
of flexibility and flexibility options in electricity systems, Section 1.3 presents the applied
methodology and underlying assumptions. In Section 1.4, results with regard to the
change in flexibility requirements and the adaption of the electricity system are analyzed.
Section 1.5 concludes and discusses policy implications.
1.2 Flexibility in electricity systems
In electricity systems demand and supply have to be balanced at any time. Flexibility on
the supply side was in previous decades mainly necessary, because inelastic demand was
subject to fluctuations, following daily, weekly and seasonal patterns. Recently and with
14
1.3 Methodology and assumptions
increasing importance the source-dependent volatile electricity generation by renewable
energies becomes relevant for the evaluation of needed flexibility.
One can – depending on the considered time period – distinguish two kinds of flexibility.6
On the one hand, variability relates to longer time frames (larger than 1 h) and especially
to the need of thermal power plants to adapt to changing residual load (i. e., demand
minus generation by renewable energies such as wind and solar).7 Renewables do not
cause variable generation costs and are thus usually dispatched prior to thermal plants
(and depending on market regulations even required to do so). With the increasing share
of fluctuating electricity generation from renewables, the demand served by thermal
plants is thus subject to a higher variation.
On the other hand, in the shorter time span up to about 1 h, the need for flexibility
options mainly arises from the deviation between forecast renewable generation and
actual outcome (forecast errors of demand are of minor magnitude). As this deviation
occurs on short notice, the electricity system has limited options to adapt, as for instance
older power plants need more time to adapt their electricity output, especially if they
have to start up first.
1.3 Methodology and assumptions
Due to the expected structural changes in electricity systems, historical data cannot be
used to analyze the effects of a high share of renewables on the optimal capacity mix and
on the future role of flexible resources. This renders an econometric analysis impossible.
Nevertheless, an integrated analysis is necessary due to the possible contribution from
all parts of the electricity system to flexibility. For this analysis, we apply the electricity
market model (DIMENSION) of the Institute of Energy Economics at the University of
Cologne, as presented in Richter (2011).8
The model optimizes investments and dispatch of conventional, nuclear, storage and
renewable technologies up to 2050 via cost minimization. Demand is assumed to be
fixed (excepted for the option to shift demand of DSM-processes). Moreover, competitive
markets are assumed. Investment and generation decisions are based on perfect foresight.
The model balances demand and supply in every considered market for every hour of
the year. Imports and exports can contribute fully to the balancing but only partly
6A more detailed elaboration on the definition of flexibility in electricity systems can be found in,
e. g., IEA (2011a).
7The electricity grid also provides some kind of flexibility as it spreads demand and renewable power
generation over a broader geographical area. Grid extensions are not part of the optimization model but
exogenous, however their contribution is incorporated through the trade between markets.
8See also Fu¨rsch et al. (2011), Nagl et al. (2011), Fu¨rsch et al. (2012) or Ja¨gemann et al. (2012).
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to the peak demand constraint. In addition to the need to cover demand at all times,
a peak-load constraint has to be fulfilled. This constraint requires sufficient (secured)
capacity to be available to cover a historic peak-demand (including a security margin),
with interconnector capacities being partially credited.
Further equations include constraints on electricity generation and technologies (such
as general availability due to revisions or existing nuclear construction restrictions),
storage level restrictions and net transfer capacities. All technologies are subject to an
hourly availability, which allows us to model a fluctuating feed-in structure of renewable
wind and solar technologies. For every hour and region, there is maximum feed-in
derived from solar irradiation and wind speeds. The model therefore can decide not
to use the full amount of RES-E generation available, i. e., curtail RES-E generation.
The available feed-in of RES-E is calculated for every market via underlying subregions
(47 for onshore, 42 for offshore and 28 for photovoltaics) to account for geographical
patterns.9 The regional focus of the model in Europe is due to the expected integrated
European market. Given the expected integration, changes concerning the electricity
system in one country have high influence on neighboring countries. This is especially
relevant for the deployment of a large amount of RES-E since this produces significant
changes in the supply structure.
Within the investment model a typical day approach is used, capturing seasonal, weekly
and daily patterns for demand and RES-E generation. In the detailed dispatch calcu-
lation, a 8760 h time series is used. The investment model and the dispatch calculation
are linked via capacities. The capacities of the investment model are fed into the high
resolution dispatch model, wherein time series effects and more possible dispatch situa-
tions can be modeled. The equations used for the dispatch are the same in both models,
only the parameters of the time series differ.
Stochastic influences (short-term) are accounted for by the procurement of balancing
power for the adjustment of forecast errors of renewables generation. The development
of installed renewable energy capacities is exogenous as it is mainly driven by political
will rather than a result of market dynamics. To account for long-term uncertainty we
analyze two scenarios as described in Section 3.6. As we focus on flexibility options we
restrict the display of more detailed modeling aspects in the following to renewables,
start-up restrictions of thermal power plants, storages (including DSM) and detachable
CCS units.10 These options are relevant for short-term balancing of supply and demand
and comprise the major model improvements.
9Cf. Fu¨rsch et al. (2011) for more detail.
10Flexible CCS power plants may not contribute much to the needed flexibility in absolute terms,
however, observing when this ability is used, can be highly relevant for the interpretation of flexibility
within the modeling approach.
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1.3.1 Model description
The following table provides an overview of the most important model sets, parameters
and variables:11
Table 1.1: Model abbreviations including sets, parameters and variables
Abbreviation Dimension Description
Model sets
a ∈ A Technologies
k ∈ A Subset of a Technologies starting-up within 1 h
l ∈ A Subset of a Technologies starting-up in more than 1 h
s ∈ A Subset of a Storage technologies
r ∈ A Subset of a RES-E technologies
f ∈ A Subset of a CCS technologies with attached CCS unit
g ∈ A Subset of a CCS technologies with detached CCS unit
w ∈ A Subset of a Wind technologies
m ∈ M DSM processes
c ∈ C Countries
e ∈ C Subset of c Subregions
d ∈ D Days
h ∈ H Hours
y ∈ Y Years
Model parameters
aca e 2010/MWh Attrition costs for ramp-up operation
ana e 2010/MW Annuity for technology specific investment costs
avd,hc,a % Availability
ded,hy,c MW Demand
dry % Discount rate
efa t CO2/MWhth CO2 emissions per fuel consumption
fca e 2010/MW Fixed operation and maintenance costs
fuy,a e 2010/MWhth Fuel price
cpy e 2010/t CO2 Costs for CO2 emissions
pdd,hy,c MW Peak demand (increased by a security factor)
ηa % Net efficiency
τd,hy,c,a % Capacity factor
dud,hy,c MW Acquired positive balancing power
ddd,hy,c MW Acquired negative balancing power
dv % Maximum deviation between RES feed-in and forecast
lld,hy,m MW Lower limit of demand of DSM process
uld,hy,m MW Upper limit of demand of DSM process
mla % Minimal load
sua hours Inverse of start-up time
pra hours Precision of start-up representation
Model variables
ADy,c,a MW Commissioning of new power plants
CUd,hy,c,a MW Online capacity
CUPd,hy,c,a MW Capacity switched-on
CDOd,hy,c,a MW Capacity switched-off
GEd,hy,c,a MW Electricity generation
IMd,hy,c,c′ MW Net imports
INy,c,a MW Installed capacity
LVLd,hy,c,a MWh Storage level
STd,hy,c,s MW Consumption in storage operation
TCOST e 2010 Total system costs (objective value)
11If not stated otherwise, MW are MWel.
17
1.3 Methodology and assumptions
The objective of the model (Eq. 1.1) is to minimize discounted total system costs while
meeting demand at all times:
min TCOST =
∑
y∈Y
∑
c∈C
∑
a∈A
[
dry ·
(
ADy,c,a · ana + INy,c,a · fca
(1.1)
+
∑
d∈D
∑
h∈H
(
GEd,hy,c,a ·
(
fpy,a + cpy · efa
ηa
)
+ CUd,hy,c,a ·
(
fpy,a + cpy · efa
ηa
+ aca
)))]
Total system costs include investment, fixed operation and maintenance, variable pro-
duction and thermal power plant start up costs. Investment costs are annualized with
a 5 % interest rate for the technology-specific depreciation time. Fixed costs occur for
staff, insurance and maintenance. Variable production costs consist of costs for fuel and
CO2, and depend on the emission factor and net efficiency of the several technologies.
Start up costs include costs of attrition and co-firing. Combined heat and power plants
(CHP) are able to generate revenues from heat production and therefore reduce total
costs.
1.3.2 Renewable-dependent provision of balancing power
Due to a high share of fluctuating RES-E, balancing power (i. e., essentially tertiary
reserve) must be available to quickly balance electricity supply and demand if necessary.
In contrast to the current common practice to contract a fixed amount of balancing power
for whole days, weeks or even months, we assume the required balancing power to be
dependent on the hourly changing requirements and thus adjust the demand according
to wind and solar generation. That way, we can deduce the actual scarcity of flexibility
options rather than a shortage due to an (arbitrarily) high magnitude of balancing power
acquisition. We assume that the system has to be able to balance potential forecast
errors of at least 10 % of expected wind and solar generation at all times. The quality
of short-term prediction of wind and solar feed-in has improved in recent years due to
improved forecast models. As stated in Giebel et al. (2011), relative forecast errors were
reduced on average from about 10 % in 2000 to 6 % in 2006. However, in order to be
able also to balance large forecast errors, high flexibility is nevertheless still needed (cf.
Holttinen, 2005, Holttinen and Hirvonen, 2005).
Constraint (Eq. 1.2) was added to the model to ensure sufficient short term flexibility
in order to increase production at all times. The parameter du represents the potential
need for positive balancing power, which is set to 10 % of available wind and photovoltaic
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feed-in for each hour in every country.
dud,hy,c ≤
∑
l∈A
(
CUd,hy,c,l −GEd,hy,c,l
)
+
∑
k∈A
(
avd,hc,k · INy,c,k −GEd,hy,c,k
)
+
∑
s∈A
ST d,hy,c,s
+
∑
w∈A
(
(1− dv) ·
(
avd,hc,w · INy,c,w −GEd,hy,c,w
))
(1.2)
+
∑
f∈A
(
GEd,hy,c,f ·
(
ηg
ηf
− 1
))
+
∑
m∈M
(
lld,hy,c,m −GEd,hy,c,m + ST d,hy,c,m
)
Table 1.2 gives an overview of available options to provide positive as well as negative
balancing power in the electricity system.
Table 1.2: Overview of flexibility options
Positive flexibility Negative flexibility
• Ramping of thermal power plants
in part load operation
• Open cycle gas turbines able to
start operation within 15-20 min-
utes
• Switching off CCS unit to increase
power output
• Utilization of stored energy or stop
of storage
• Shifting through demand side man-
agement (reduction)
• Utilization of previously curtailed
wind power
• Thermal power plants in operation
(ramping down)
• Storage technologies
• Curtailment of wind power
• Shifting through demand side man-
agement (increase)
Positive balancing power can be provided by thermal power plants in several ways: Tech-
nologies that need more than 1 h to start-up (l) are limited to increase their production
by the amount of capacity currently in part load, i. e., online capacity minus current
production. Highly flexible technologies, especially open cycle gas turbines, can start
within 1 h (k) and thus can potentially provide balancing power even if currently not in
operation. They can increase production until reaching installed and available capacity.
Advanced CCS plants can, by switching off their CCS unit and thus accepting higher
emissions, increase generation quickly. The maximum additional production can be cal-
culated by multiplying the fraction of both efficiencies (with and without CCS) minus
one with the current power generation of plants with applied CCS (cf. Section 3.3; see
Davison, 2009; Martens et al., 2011).
Storage units (e. g., pump storage, compressed air storage or batteries) are in general very
flexible and can by either increasing generation or reducing storage operation provide
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positive balancing power. Demand side management acts very similar from a system
perspective as a reduction in electricity demand is comparable to generation and in-
creased demand to consumption. Compared to classic storage, DSM processes usually
have a limited time span in which shifts in demand have to be compensated and are
restricted by the minimum power demand (GE indicates decreasing and ST increasing
regular demand).
The last option for balancing electricity generation is withdrawing curtailment of wind
production.12 The available capacity is restricted to 90 % of the expected and therefore
curtailed power (to account for forecast errors). As this is not associated with any costs
(neglecting transaction costs) this should be usually the first option taken.
The following constraint represents the need for negative flexibility where dd is equal to
10 % of expected feed-in by photovoltaics:13
ddd,hy,c ≤
∑
l∈A
(
GEd,hy,c,l −mll · CUd,hy,c,l
)
+
∑
k∈A
GEd,hy,c,k
+
∑
s∈A
(
avd,hc,s · IN sy,c,a −GEd,hy,c,a
)
+
∑
w∈A
GEd,hy,c,w (1.3)
+
∑
g∈A
GEd,hy,c,g ·
(
ηf
ηg
)
+
∑
m∈A
(
uld,hy,c,m − ST d,hy,c,m +GEd,hy,c,m
)
The options for providing negative balancing power, i. e., in the case of excess electricity
generation, are ramping down thermal power plants, increasing storage or decreasing
turbine operation of storage (including DSM) and curtailing wind generation. Run-
ning power plants that cannot shut-down operation on short notice are only able to
reduce production to minimum load. Highly flexible plants (e. g., gas turbines), on the
contrary, can stop production completely. Storage can, in addition to reducing produc-
tion, increase power consumption. Measures taken by thermal plants as well as storage
usually reduce system costs (by fuel cost savings and the option to use (free of cost)
stored electricity at other times respectively) and are thus chosen previously to wind
curtailment. Flexible CCS power plants that are not using their CCS units can switch-
on CO2 segregation and thus reduce efficiency and production. DSM processes can
increase consumption until their maximum demand is reached.
12By assumption other renewable energy sources – for instance photovoltaic panels – are not consid-
ered for withdrawing of curtailment as the installations are usually small in size, no technical steering
possibilities are installed and thus the effort to activate sufficient capacity comparably high. But as wind
generation is generally sufficiently available in case any curtailment took place, this does not change any
results.
13An underestimation of wind feed-in can be balanced by wind curtailment, thus there is no additional
need for negative flexibility.
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1.3.3 Power plants with a detachable CCS unit
CCS technologies may become an important technology in the capacity mix in the future.
Technologies with (captured) high emissions, i. e., lignite- and coal-fired power plants,
might therefore still be supplying electricity in a low-carbon electricity system. Lignite-
and coal-fired are considered base and mid-load and lack the flexibility of, e. g., open
cycle gas turbines. Hence, an additional flexibility option for these power plants, might
give insights into the deployment of base-load technologies which are simultaneously
able to provide flexibility.
Flexible CCS plants have the option to switch off their capture unit and thereby increase
power output, while simultaneously emitting more CO2 into the atmosphere. This can
be done on short notice and is thus suitable for the provision of short-term flexibility.
CSS plants are thus able to provide both, short-term flexibility and required backup
capacity to serve peak-demand. Depending on their dispatch they therefore allow some
insights concerning the tightness of both requirements.
These units were modeled with the same constraints as conventional power plants, but
with the possibility to switch between operation modes within 1 h. This was implemented
by adding a new technology g for every power plant f with a CCS unit, where g represents
the share of capacity f whose CCS unit is switched off.14
The following constraint ensures that the total online capacity of technology f (CCS
switched on) and its counterpart g (same technology with CCS switched off) does not
exceed the total available capacity. By multiplying the ramped-up capacity of g with
the fraction of the efficiencies of f and g, the increased net efficiency of power plants
with switched-off CCS can be taken into account by:
CUd,hy,c,f + CU
d,h
y,c,g ·
ηf
ηg
≤ avd,hc,f · INy,c,f (1.4)
Additional modifications for power plants with a detachable CCS unit have to be made
when modeling start-up behavior. These will be pointed out in the following subsection.
1.3.4 Start-up of thermal power plants
The maximum and minimum operational capacities in one point in time are dependent
on the plants’ statuses of the previous hours. Time periods are freely selectable and by
considering more points in a given time period more realistic start-ups of power plants
14The technical details of this process were taken from Davison (2009) and Finkenrath (2011).
21
1.3 Methodology and assumptions
can be modeled. Starting up capacity (variable CUP ) is considered in the objective by
a cost parameter which approximates co-firing costs, attrition costs etc.15
Equation 1.5 makes use of the variables CUP and CDO, which symbolize capacity that
was started and shut-down from the previous hour to the current one:
CUd,hy,c,a = CU
d,h−1
y,c,a + CUP
d,h−1
y,c,a − CDOd,h−1y,c,a (1.5)
The restriction on the maximum online capacity of technologies with a flexible CCS
unit (represented by f if CCS switched on, and g if CCS switched off) is similar to an
ordinary power plant:
CUd,hy,c,f + CU
d,h
y,c,g = CU
d,h−1
y,c,f + CU
d,h−1
y,c,g + CUP
d,h−1
y,c,f − CDOd,h−1y,c,f (1.6)
As the online capacities of f and g belong to the same technology and since switching
the CCS unit on and off can be done within 1 h, the two can be combined.
The maximum start-up of capacities from 1 h to the next depends on the overall available
capacity, the capacity already in operation and the technology’s start-up time (inverse
of sua). The model is taking into account the capacity that was started-up in previous
hours:
CUP d,hy,c,a ≤
avd,hc,a ∗ INy,c,a − CUd,hy,c,a + i<h∑
i=h−pra
CUP d,ty,c,a
 · sua (1.7)
If power plants of one technology were starting-up in the previous hour, e. g., after all
plants had been shut-down completely, then, under the assumption of a linear start-up
trajectory, all plants are able to start-up with the same magnitude in all hours until
reaching their maximum online capacity. On the contrary, if there was not any ramping
activity in the previous hours, only the capacity currently not in operation is able to
start-up. Parameter pr represents the precision of the modeling of start-up behavior
(0 ≤ pra ≤ 1sua ).
The constraint has to be altered slightly for technologies with a detachable CCS unit by
linking technology f with its counterpart g:
CUP d,hy,c,f ≤
avd,hc,f ∗ INy,c,f − CUd,hy,c,f − CUd,hy,c,g + i<h∑
i=h−prf
CUP d,ty,c,f
 · suf (1.8)
15Depending on the different technologies, these costs are set to about 1/5 of the variable cost.
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The restriction for shutting-down technologies can be enhanced analogously by replacing
the original constraint with the following:
CDOd,hy,c,a ≤
CUd,hy,c,a + i<h∑
i=h−pra
CDOd,ty,c,a
 · sua (1.9)
And equivalently for technologies with detachable CCS unit:
CDOd,hy,c,f ≤
CUd,hy,c,f + CUd,hy,c,g + i<h∑
i=h−prf
CDOd,ty,c,f
 · suf (1.10)
1.3.5 Storages and DSM
Storages (e. g., pumped-storage plants, reservoirs and CAES) and demand side manage-
ment (DSM) processes can be modeled similarly with the latter possessing additional
restrictions to account for the maximal time span demand can be shifted.
The basic equation for storages keeps track of the current storage level which is computed
from the electricity consumption (taking into account efficiency loss), production and, if
applicable, natural inflow (respectively outflow) with generation and consumption being
restricted to the available capacity:
LV Ld,hy,c,a = LV L
d,h−1
y,c,a + ST
d,h
y,c,s · ηa −GEd,hy,c,a + infd,hy,c,a (1.11)
In the case of DSM, these limits are not solely depending on the installed capacity but
also depend on the specific hour. Therefore, we account for variations in the utilization
of the processes. In the considered period total consumption and production have to be
balanced. For DSM processes this constraint can be be more restrictive (depending on
the kind of process):
d=d′,h=h′,y=y′∑
y,d,h
ST d,hy,c,s · ηa −GEd,hy,c,a + infd,hy,c,a = 0 (1.12)
d′, h′, y′ indicate the relevant time span in which consumption and production have to
be balanced. This way, e. g., cooling systems can be forced to catch up on electricity
consumption within 4 h to avoid any damage to cooled goods (see Table 1.9).
We take into account 28 different DSM processes for each region, grouped by sectors
(see Table 1.8 in the Appendix). Technical specifications include the balancing interval,
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i. e., the time a deviation from original electricity consumption has to be recovered,
efficiency, which represents losses due to rescheduling, and maximum reduction and
increase of demand (see Table 1.9 in the Appendix). The latter figures represent limits
for demand adjustments due to the time dependent consumption of the processes. Table
1.10 (Appendix) displays assumed DSM capacities for each considered year.
1.3.6 Assumptions and scenario setting
Assumptions for the simulation include the regional electricity demand development,
net transfer capacities between regions, capacities of existing power plants, technical
and economic parameters for power plant investments as well as fuel and CO2 prices.
Installed capacities of renewable energies are exogenous. The development and allocation
between different technologies reflect current national and European policies as well as
regional investment costs and potentials. Where available, national targets have been
considered (e. g., national renewable energy action plans (NREAP) for EU member
states). As official long-term plans are not available, assumptions based on available
studies have been made for the subsequent time span (see Table 1.7 in the Appendix
for installed capacities in 2050). Electricity generation from renewables reaches 75 %
over all countries in 2050 (see also section 1.4.1). RES-curtailment does not impose any
costs.
The setting chosen for this analysis is only one possible development and should not
be interpreted as a forecast. The assumptions are based on several sources such as
Capros et al. (2010), Prognos/EWI/GWS (2010), IEA (2011), ENTSO-E (2011) and
Fu¨rsch et al. (2011) and represent a trade-off between their projections. The underlying
assumptions used in the scenario analysis can be found in the Appendix A.
The analyzed scenarios A and B only differ regarding assumed CO2 prices. Thus they
reflect and aggregate divergent expectations for influencing factors like the ambitiousness
of CO2 reduction, economic growth and emissions in other sectors. Since CO2 emission
costs may have effects on installed capacity (or generation) of base or peak load and
storage capacities, a sensitivity analysis with a higher CO2 price is performed. The
underlying assumption is that in Scenario A CO2 prices increase up to 50 EUR2010/t
CO2 in 2050 and in Scenario B up to 100 EUR2010/t CO2 in 2050. In addition to
CO2 emission costs no additional restrictions (i. e. CO2 targets) are imposed. Table 1.3
depicts the assumed CO2 emission prices from 2020 to 2050.
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Table 1.3: Assumed CO2 emission prices [EUR2010/t CO2]
2020 2030 2040 2050
CO2 price in Scenario A 22.6 31.8 40.9 50.0
CO2 price in Scenario B 35.1 56.8 78.4 100.0
1.4 Results
In this section, the results from the analysis are presented. First, the impacts of an
increasing share of RES-E on the residual load are discussed with examples of selected
European electricity systems up to 2050. Note, that these examples rather reflect a
possible development of electricity systems with certain characteristics (e. g., integration
into the European electricity grid or renewables mix) than a projection of future devel-
opments for the shown countries. Second, the adaption of the system to the increasing
share of renewables with regard to capacity and generation mix focusing on flexible re-
sources is discussed. Third, aspects of the different flexibility requirements in terms of
modeling constraints are analyzed in detail. Finally, an overview of the implications for
market design is given.16
1.4.1 Impacts of an increasing share of RES-E
Due to the negligible variable costs of RES-E, they can be integrated on the left-hand
side of the merit order. This means they are usually dispatched before other supply tech-
nologies. The impact of an increasing share of renewables can thereby best be discussed
by analyzing the residual load to be covered by other technologies. The impact is two-
fold, on the one hand the (residual) load duration curve is affected and the achievable
full load hours for other technologies reduced. On the other hand, the hourly changes
of residual load possibly impose additional flexibility of the other supply technologies.
Furthermore the provision of balancing power becomes more relevant due to possibly
increasing absolute forecast errors.
Based on simulation assumptions, the RES-E share on gross electricity demand in Europe
increases from 34 % in 2020 to 54 % in 2030, and to 75 % in 2050. In the short term
(until 2020), hydro-power (39 % of RES-E generation) and onshore wind (26 % of RES-E
generation) are the most deployed renewable energy sources. Due to the assumed large
deployment of on- and offshore wind turbines, more than 50 % of the renewable energy
is provided by wind power in 2050. Solar technologies – mainly deployed in southern
16Detailed numerical data can be found in the Appendix. This section highlights the developments
relevant to the topic of the paper.
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Europe – generate about 22 % of the renewable energy. We illustrate the effects of such
a high share of renewables with the examples of Germany and the UK. Both countries
are chosen due to their geographical position within Europe and the assumptions on
renewable deployment. The examples should be thought of as illustrative case studies
rather than forecasts for the development of the two countries. While Germany is well-
connected to its neighboring countries, the UK only has few interconnections and is
closer to an insular system. For Germany, the renewable technologies, i. e., wind and
photovoltaics, are by assumption diversified, whereas the renewable capacities in the UK
consist mostly of on- and offshore wind capacities, which lead to greater challenges due
to the fluctuating nature of wind. In 2050, Germany has a renewable generation share
of 61 % of gross electricity consumption, of which about 64 % is wind and 20 % PV. The
UK has a renewable share of about 76 % with over 90 % wind.
1.4.1.1 Residual load
The high share of renewables has significant effects on the residual load as shown for
Germany and the UK in Figure 1.1.17
-40
-20
0
20
40
60
80
100
1 8760
R
e
s
id
u
a
l 
lo
a
d
 [
G
W
]
Load duration
GER 2011 GER 2020 GER 2050
-40
-20
0
20
40
60
80
100
1 8760
R
e
s
id
u
a
l 
lo
a
d
 [
G
W
]
Load duration
UK 2020 UK 2050
Figure 1.1: Residual load duration curve for Germany(left) and UK (right)
From the historical 2011 data to the assumed feed-in in 2020, the residual load duration
curve for Germany changes slightly due to the assumed increase in electricity consump-
tion and in deployed renewables. The residual load duration curves for Germany and
the UK are steeper in 2050. The number of hours with negative residual load increases
and occurs for nearly half the hours in the UK, where renewable electricity generation
exceeds actual demand by up to 40 GW. Despite these developments, hours with high
17Data source for 2011 load in Germany is ENTSO-E. Wind and photovoltaic generation data for
2011 is from the European Energy Exchange (EEX). For the UK, no data for the renewable feed-in was
available.
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load levels remain. This means that achievable full load hours for conventional gener-
ation are reduced, but backup capacities for hours with high levels of residual load are
still needed. The effects on the residual load depend on the installed renewable tech-
nology. In Italy and the Iberian Peninsula, for example, the shape of the residual load
curve in 2050 is similar to the curves in 2020 due to the high shares of CSP plants with
integrated thermal storages. CSP smoothes residual load by using its thermal storage
unit and reduces the effects of fluctuating generation.
1.4.1.2 Volatility of residual load
The volatility of residual load is analyzed on an hourly basis. Figure 1.2 depicts the
boxplots for Germany in 2011, 2020 and 2050 and for the UK in 2020 and 2050.
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Figure 1.2: Box plot of hourly changes for Germany and the UK 2020 and 2050
Two main developments can be identified. First, the extreme values grow larger with a
higher share of fluctuating renewables. Still, in 2020, only a few hours with an absolute
change of more than 10,000 MW occur in any country. In 2050, all countries with a
residual load of more than 40 GW face hourly changes (positive and negative) greater
than 10,000 MW. In countries with high demand and high penetration of renewables,
hourly fluctuations up to 40,000 MW (UK) in residual load occur more often. The power
systems in Germany, France, Scandinavia and the Iberian Peninsula still face hourly load
changes of around 20,000 MW. Smaller countries, like Denmark, may have to deal with
smaller changes in absolute amounts but experience extreme hourly changes relative to
the residual load level. For the electricity system, large changes in times of low or nega-
tive residual load are especially challenging. Due to a high share of renewable generation
in these hours, no conventional capacity is running and must therefore be started up.
This requires sufficient flexible resources that are able to start up quickly. The second
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development is that there is a more widespread distribution of hourly changes. While in
Germany the quartiles increase by about 50 %, in the UK these values double. Absolute
hourly changes therefore increase tremendously, indicating an increased need for flexi-
ble resources able to adapt generation rapidly. These developments are also confirmed
by analyzing means and standard deviation of positive and negative hourly changes as
shown in Table 1.4. The means change in the same manner as the analyzed quartiles.
The standard deviation changes significantly, indicating more widely distributed hourly
changes.
Table 1.4: Mean, maximum and standard deviation of hourly load changes for Ger-
many and the UK [MW]
Germany UK
2011 2020 2050 2020 2050
Mean positive 2,242 3,083 4,105 2,345 4,619
Standard deviation positive 2,148 2,572 3,373 2,229 4,739
Max positive 11,396 14,106 22,775 12,545 40,286
Mean negative -1,853 -2,604 -3,656 -1,977 -4,661
Standard deviation negative 1,420 1,922 2,727 1,724 4,891
Max negative -8,016 -12,069 -18,984 -10,186 -38,631
1.4.1.3 Provision of balancing power
Together with the higher feed-in of fluctuating renewables, forecast errors and therefore
balancing power increase in absolute amounts as long as prediction is not improved.
Figure 1.3 shows the duration curve of balancing power for renewables when 10 % of
renewable generation must be provided as balancing power.18
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Figure 1.3: Required positive balancing power in Germany and the UK in 2050
18It seems reasonable to assume a variable balancing power provision, because the requirements for
the conventional utilization of balancing power is assumeably not going to change. Therefore, only
the renewables forecast errors have to be balanced, for which it seems reasonable to implement a bal-
ancing power market with a renewable-dependent quantity relatively close to physical dispatch. The
introduction of quarter-hourly intra-day markets fulfills more or less this functionality.
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For Germany and the UK, up to 10,000 MW is needed as provision of balancing power
only for renewables. Compared to current values this is significantly higher (e. g. for
Germany with around 2,000 MW for the minute reserve). Therefore, the requirement
for flexible resources to provide balancing power to backup forecast errors or failures of
RES-E increases.
1.4.2 Adaptation of the electricity system
The changing residual load leads to changes in the electricity system. This section
describes the development of capacity and generation mix with special focus on flexible
resources.
1.4.2.1 Development of the capacity mix
The capacity mix changes significantly in both scenarios up to 2050 due to the large
deployment of renewables. By assumption, RES-E capacities are primarily increased by
onshore wind until 2020/2030, offshore wind from 2030 onwards and solar plants after
2030. Due to the low secured capacity of intermittent renewable technologies and an
assumed increase in electricity demand, total gross capacity more than doubles by 2050.
Renewables capacity amounts to 1.5 TW in 2050.19
Figure 1.4 depicts the gross electricity conventional capacities in Scenario A for the years
2020, 2030, 2040 and 2050 on the left side and for Scenario B on the right side. As can
be seen, the difference of the two scenarios is rather small.
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Figure 1.4: European gross conventional capacity mix up to 2050
The overall conventional capacity in both scenarios remains relatively constant, but the
share of base- and mid-load capacities decreases from 64 % in 2008 to 36 % in 2050. At
the same time the share of gas-fired capacities (open and combined cycle) increased from
19For detailed figures on different technologies please consult the Appendix.
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36 % to 64 %. Higher CO2 prices in Scenario B lead to a small increase of nuclear and
CCS capacities. However, this has little effect on the general mix between base/mid
(33 %) and peak load (67 %) capacities. Storage is mainly deployed in countries with
high amounts of negative residual load. An additional 22 GW of storage capacities are
installed in Scenario A. In Scenario B, wind and solar curtailment is associated with
higher costs due to higher costs of fossil fuel generation, making additional storage
(4 GW) cost-efficient.
Hence, we observe that flexible resources, namely gas-fired power plants (and to a certain
extent storage), contribute largely to a cost-efficient capacity mix with a high share of
renewables.
1.4.2.2 Development of the electricity generation
The electricity generation from all conventional power plants decreases with the addi-
tional RES-E generation in both scenarios. The RES-E generation for whole Europe
amounts to about 3,000 TWh.20 Figure 1.5 depicts the gross conventional electricity
generation in Scenario A for the years 2020, 2030, 2040 and 2050 on the left side and
for Scenario B on the right side.
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Figure 1.5: European gross conventional electricity generation up to 2050
Higher CO2 prices in Scenario B lead to a coal-to-gas switch. In Scenario B, about
200 TWh of electricity are generated in combined and open-cycle gas turbines instead of
hard coal and lignite power plants. This includes 60 TWh of electricity generation from
gas-fired CHP plants. More than 470 TWh of electricity is generated in coal and gas-
fired power plants equipped with CCS units in 2050. Due to CO2 prices of 100 EUR/t
CO2 in Scenario B in 2050, almost all conventional generation takes place in nuclear
or fossil power plants equipped with CCS in the long term. CO2 emissions in 2050
account to about 400 million tons in Scenario A and 152 million tons in Scenario B. For
20See the Appendix for detailed figures on the different technologies.
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the emissions of the electricity system this means a reduction of 68 % (88 %) compared
to 1990. More than 140 TWh of possible wind and solar generation, which represents
about 7 % of total wind and solar generation, is curtailed in both scenarios in 2050. The
main reason is the excessive feed-in due to the increased generation capacities. Load is
already covered and it is not cost-efficient to build more storage capacities. This can
also be seen by comparing the two scenarios: Storage capacities are slightly higher in
Scenario B because of the additional opportunity costs of curtailment. Conventional
generation is more expensive and therefore more RES-E generation is stored. However,
the utilization rates of neither storage nor DSM technologies are significantly different
in the scenarios. This indicates that smoothing of residual load due to storage rather
depends on the costs of conventional generation rather than the capacity and generation
mix.
By looking at the utilization rates of the conventional technologies in Table 1.5 , it can be
seen that conventional generation decreases more than capacity, which can be explained
by the sunk costs of capacities.
Table 1.5: Full load hours of conventional technologies [h]
2020 2030 2040 2050
Scenario A Nuclear 7271 6987 6373 5307
Lignite 6252 4926 4688 4337
Coal 5277 6365 5873 4837
Gas 2908 1889 1037 678
Scenario B Nuclear 45 -7 -77 131
(compared to A) Lignite 5 -87 894 1083
Coal -1021 -643 -671 -549
Gas 685 171 87 29
The utilization rate of gas-fired power plants decreases more than the rates of base and
mid-load power plants. This is remarkable, especially given that the installed capacities
are increasing. The reason for this could be that gas-fired peak load plants are used as
backup capacity. However, the observation of low utilization rates alone does not allow
a final conclusion that gas-fired capacities as flexible resources are installed mainly as
backup capacities. Even with low utilization rates, the increased amount of gas-fired
and storage capacities might be part of the cost-efficient capacity mix due to their high
flexibility. To analyze this issue further, the modeling and the fulfillment of flexibility
requirements in the model have to be considered.
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1.4.3 Fulfilling flexibility requirements
In the analysis of the system adaption, the most remarkable result regarding flexibility
options in the electricity system, was the increase of gas-fired capacities (especially
open-cycle turbines) with a simultaneous, disproportionately high decrease of utilization
rates. From the development of storage and DSM utilization, no conclusion about the
importance of flexibility in the system could be drawn. However, the development of
the gas-fired capacities deserves a closer look.
To analyze this effect further, some modeling aspects have to be considered. First, recall
that flexibility requirements in the model stem from the flexible resources needed for
load-following, i. e., mainly start-up constraints, and from the provision of balancing
power. As Nicolosi (2012) already showed, ramping constraints alter the capacity mix
to a certain extent towards more flexible resources. However, if we compare the two
scenarios, we see that the conventional capacity mix changes towards CCS-technologies
due to the high CO2 prices. Wind curtailment becomes more costly, so additional
storage is built to prevent wind curtailment from excessive generation and to smooth
load following. The amount of additional storage however is small compared to the
effects of the switch to CCS-technologies. We even see an increase of utilization rates of
base-load (lignite) and a decrease in mid-load (coal) while the peak load (gas) utilization
rates remain relatively constant. So even with a strong increase in the opportunity costs
of curtailing wind and load following, the conventional capacity mix does not become
more flexible due to ramping constraints, since the amount of gas-fired capacities does
not change significantly.
Another possibility for the expansion of gas-fired capacities could be the provision of
balancing power. From conventional generation, only online capacity or quickly started
up capacity (open cycle gas turbines) can contribute to the provision. However, the
constraint for providing balancing power never becomes relevant. Even in the peak
load hours where there is nearly no renewables feed-in and all available conventional
capacity is running (under consideration of the security margin). The marginal costs of
providing an additional megawatt of balancing power are zero and hence there are always
flexible resources available. So, why is this balancing power provision not important in
terms of flexibility? For illustration purposes Fig. 1.6 shows the availability of negative
balancing power for a summer week in Germany in 2020. The black line symbolizes the
renewable-dependent provision, i. e., 10 % of the feed-in from wind and photovoltaics.
As can be seen, the provision requirement corresponds to the RES-E feed-in. Hence, if
RES-E generation can be curtailed, the provision of negative flexibility resulting from
the RES-E feed-in is easily fulfilled. In times with low available capacities to provide
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Figure 1.6: Availability of negative balancing power in June 2020 in Germany
negative flexibility, the demand for provision is also low due to the low renewables feed-
in. In times with low feed-in, the availability is low, but barely any negative flexibility
is needed since strong negative deviations cannot occur. With the rising share of wind
capacities and the possible curtailment, sufficient negative balancing power is always
available.
Figure 1.7 shows the availability of positive balancing power in the same week as demon-
strated before in Germany 2020.
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Figure 1.7: Availability of positive balancing power in June 2020 in Germany
Again, the available capacity corresponds to the provision requirement. During hours
with high requirements, sufficient capacity for providing additional generation on short
notice is sufficiently available. This is due to the fact that conventional generation is
replaced by renewable generation, therefore capacities are idle and contribute to the
availability of balancing power. Up to 2050, the availability of positive balancing power
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changes according to the source, i. e., there are more gas-fired power plants (OCGT) and
less capacities in part-load.
Since positive and negative balancing power requirements never pose any challenge in
any country considered, we conclude that the backup effect of the gas-fired capacities
is significantly more relevant. Apparently, the gas-fired capacities are built because
they are needed as a backup capacity rather than for providing flexibility during other
hours. This finding is backed up by a closer look at the behavior of flexible CCS power
plants. These power plants have the ability to shortly increase output by detaching their
CCS unit. However, the only use of this ability is found in hours with scarce capacity,
not in hours with high balancing power provision requirements or in hours with steep
changes in residual load. This means that in a cost-efficient capacity mix the realizable
full load hours matter more than flexibility issues. The main reason is surely the fact,
that conventional capacity which is cost-efficient with low realizable full load hours, i. e.,
open cycle gas turbines with low capital costs and high variable costs, is highly flexible.
Therefore, flexibility comes as a complement of a cost-efficient capacity mix in electricity
systems with a high share of RES-E.
1.4.4 Implications for market design
For a proper discussion of the implications for market design on base of the performed
analysis, three major points deserve closer consideration.
First, we assumed an exogenous deployment of RES-E, which may or may not reflect
future European policies. However, this assumption is more in favor of our argumenta-
tion since it imposes stronger distortion for the electricity system, especially regarding
the requirements for flexibility. The purpose of this paper was to take a closer look on
flexibility in systems with a high share of renewables. Of course, all results are subject
to the current information, e. g. the cost structure of renewables. However, as long as
the renewables, which are deployed in the electricity system are not dispatchable, the
full-load hour argument still holds.
Second, the scenario assumption about CO2 prices is rather high compared to current
trends. We do not know how the CO2 prices develop and hence, we cannot finally con-
clude whether current price levels are a good estimation for future price levels. However,
we can estimate the impacts of lower CO2 prices for the model results. The differences
of the scenarios with prices of 50e/t emitted CO2 (2050 in Scenario A) and 100e/t in
2050 in Scenario B led to a fuel-switch from coal to gas and to more deployment of CCS
capacities. If we assume lower prices for CO2, there would be no significant changes in
the capacity mix, since the merit order of the generation technologies does not change
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compared to Scenario A.21 The general conclusions from the results will not be altered.
What will change, however, is the relative value of renewables curtailment. Conventional
generation will be cheaper and hence, less storage will be built. But since the difference
of storage investments between the two scenarios is low, it will presumably have little
impact if the CO2 price is lower than in Scenario A.
Third, the result of the model due to the chosen approach is always an adequate, cost-
efficient electricity system, implicitly assuming perfect competition and neglecting other
distortions. The capacities built in the model are per definition profitable, and hence
the discussion about Energy-Only-Market and capacity markets is irrelevant. For our
approach, the only relevant issue is whether the market design produces a cost-efficient
capacity mix. It does not matter, how this capacity mix is achieved. Hence, we can
neglect the discussion of suitability of Energy-Only-Markets.
At the same time, the dependency of our results on a cost-efficient capacity mix means
that any policies distorting this capacity mix could alter our results. For example,
guaranteed payment for nuclear in the UK could increase the base load capacities and
therefore change the capacity mix. As a consequence this could influence the availability
of flexible resources. The other way round this implies that distorting the cost-efficient
capacity mix by forcing certain technologies into the market, might create negative
externalities with respect to available flexibility.
What we can draw as a conclusion for market design – with the stated limitations
– is therefore, that assuring system adequacy is more important than introducing any
additional incentives for flexibility. If even balancing power does not pose any challenges
with a high share of renewables, additional instruments for incentivizing investments
into flexible resources despite the existing spot and balancing market are certainly not
necessary.
1.5 Conclusions
Electricity systems with a high share of renewables are confronted with an increasing
requirement for flexibility. If the market does not provide sufficient flexibility and re-
quires additional incentives, market design may be affected. In this paper, we analyzed
this issue for the European electricity system. In an integrated system analysis, a lin-
ear investment and dispatch model is used to simulate the development of electricity
markets in Europe up to 2050. The model was extended by including constraints for
the provision of balancing power provision depending on renewable feed-in, demand-side
21We counter-checked this result by analyzing the fuel-switch induced by lower CO2 prices than 50e/t.
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reactions, start-up processes of conventional power plants and flexible CCS power plants
with a detachable CCS unit.
The results of the integrated analysis show that achievable full load hours of conventional
capacities are reduced as renewable generation increases. Depending on the fluctuating
renewable share, the volatility of the residual load increases and significantly impacts
the electricity system. In 2050, when, e. g., for Germany and the UK with 50 % and
70 % of fluctuating renewables respectively, the spread of hourly changes increase by
50 % in Germany and doubles in the UK. Extreme values of hourly changes occur more
often and reach up to 40,000 MW in the UK due to the high wind penetration. In
other countries with a more balanced renewable portfolio, values around 20,000 MW
still occur. Provision of balancing power for forecast errors increases and, given a 10 %
provision of renewable feed-in, reaches over 10,000 MW in some hours.
The system adapts to the reduced achievable full load hours by adding more peak-
load capacities, i. e., gas-fired power plants. Due to the relatively low investment costs,
they serve as cost-efficient backup technologies. With higher CO2 prices, the general
case does not change: only more conventional capacity is equipped with CCS. Due to
different storage investments in Scenario A and B, storages seem mainly to be built
to prevent renewable curtailment, rather than to provide flexibility. This conjecture is
confirmed by the fact that the provision of balancing power is never a binding constraint
throughout the whole simulation. Therefore, at every point in time, excess capacity is
able to ramp up within 15 minutes, allowing the electricity system to deal with any
flexibility requirement. This finding is supported by the analysis of the utilization of
flexible CCS power plants. The ability of these plants to provide generation in short
time is only beneficial if renewable feed-in is low during peak-times – but not for the
purpose of providing flexibility in hours with high volatility. Therefore, we conclude that
the main trigger for investments in flexible resources such as gas-fired power plants or
flexible CCS plants is system adequacy. Flexibility is a by-product of the cost-efficient
adaptation to the reduced achievable full load hours under system adequacy.
Under the condition of system adequacy, flexibility never poses a challenge in a cost-
minimal capacity mix. Therefore, any market design incentivizing investment in efficient
generation thus provides flexibility as an inevitable complement.
Our results, however, depend on our assumption on current costs and technological
progress. Disruptive innovations and changes in national energy policies might alter the
future demand of flexibility. It seems, however, rather unlikely that such changes will
increase the demand for flexibility beyond the level assumed in our analysis.
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1.6 Appendix
1.6.1 Appendix A: Model assumptions
Table 1.6: Net electricity demand [TWhel] and potential heat generation in CHP
plants [TWhth]
2020 2030 2040 2050
Austria (AT) 65.3 41.2 70.0 41.5 74.3 41.8 78.5 42.0
BeNeLux (LU) 221.6 129.9 237.6 130.8 252.2 131.5 266.5 132.3
Czech Republic (CZ) 69.9 55.1 78.8 55.7 88.3 56.4 98.5 57.0
Denmark (DK) 40.5 54.7 43.4 55.1 46.0 55.4 48.6 55.7
Eastern Europe (EE) 151.9 132.6 171.1 134.2 191.8 135.7 214.0 137.2
France (FR) 480.0 31.6 514.6 31.8 546.4 32.0 577.2 32.2
Germany (DE) 567.0 192.4 584.2 192.9 584.2 192.9 584.2 192.9
Iberian Peninsula (IB) 354.5 72.9 409.4 73.9 470.5 75.0 538.0 76.0
Italy (IT) 362.9 169.2 419.1 171.7 481.6 174.1 550.7 176.5
Poland (PL) 140.0 93.3 157.8 94.4 176.9 95.5 197.3 96.6
United Kingdom (UK) 415.5 68.1 445.6 68.6 473.0 69.0 499.7 69.3
Scandinavia (SK) 365.4 98.1 391.8 98.8 415.9 99.4 439.4 99.9
Switzerland (CH) 65.4 3.0 70.1 3.0 74.5 3.0 78.7 3.0
Table 1.7: Gross installed capacities of renewable energies in 2050 [GW]
Biomass Biomass-CHP Wind onshore Wind offshore PV CSP Geothermal
Austria 1.7 0.7 4.4 0.0 9.0 0.0 0.4
BeNeLux 5.8 3.1 14.0 35.7 2.2 0.0 1.3
Czech Republic 3.4 1.5 16.7 0.0 10.1 0.0 0.6
Denmark 3.7 1.6 4.4 10.5 0.0 0.0 0.3
Eastern Europe 9.8 4.3 31.2 0.0 31.1 0.0 0.4
France 6.7 2.9 71.5 62.0 62.4 27.3 0.6
Germany 11.4 5.0 63.4 48.9 91.8 0.0 2.2
Iberian Peninsula 4.7 2.1 74.1 5.4 28.0 49.9 1.4
Italy 6.4 2.8 53.2 19.3 52.1 49.9 4.1
Poland 5.7 2.5 42.1 26.9 11.9 0.0 0.4
United Kingdom 9.8 4.3 53.4 93.8 2.7 0.0 1.3
Scandinavia 6.5 2.8 19.4 36.6 0.0 0.0 1.8
Switerland 3.5 1.5 1.2 0.0 3.8 0.0 0.3
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Table 1.8: Considered demand side management processes
Sector Processes
Industry
aluminum-electrolysis, cement mills, paper machine, pulp refining,
paper coating / calendaring, recycled paper treatment, electric arc furnace,
chlorine-alkali-electrolysis (membrane), ventilation, compressed air
Service
medium and large water heaters (>30 l), air conditioning, ventilation,
cold storage houses, walk-ins / chillers / freezers
Domestic
refrigerator, freezer, washing machine, dryer, dish washer,
medium and large water heaters (>30 l), air conditioning,
night storage heating, circulation pumps
Transport e-mobility
Municipal pumping, aeration
Others heat pumps
Table 1.9: Technical specifications for demand side management processes
Technologies
Balancing Efficiency Max. Max.
interval [h] [%] demand demand
reduction [%] increase [%]
ventilation, compressed air,
2 95 24-90 75-90circulation pumps, heat pumps,
air conditioning
medium and large water heaters (>30 l),
4 95 90 50-90
cold storage houses, freezer, pumping
dish washer 12 100 90 90
washing machine, dryer, night storage
24 100 25-90 25-90
heating, e-mobility, aeration
aluminium-electrolysis, cement mills,
8760 100 15-90 50
paper machine, paper coating /
calendaring, pulp refining, recycled
paper treatment, electric arc furnace,
chlorine-alkali-electrolysis (membrane)
Table 1.10: Development of DSM-capacities in Europe until 2050 [MW]
2020 2030 2040 2050
Developed Existing Developed Existing Developed Existing Developed Existing
Industry 11,268 15,565 13,226 16,111 14,531 16,657 15,996 17,254
Service 681 13,619 2,151 14,338 4,269 14,229 7,167 14,334
Domestic 1,891 63,020 6,177 61,772 11,455 57,273 18,648 53,281
Transport 589 589 1,342 1,342 3,019 3,019 5,717 5,717
Municipal 106 1,056 310 1,035 558 1,014 745 994
Other 173 3,466 494 3,292 941 3,137 1,499 2,998
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Table 1.11: Overnight investment costs [EUR2010/kW]
2020 2030 2040 2050
Nuclear 3,157 3,157 3,157 3,157
Lignite 1,850 1,850 1,850 1,850
Lignite CHP 2,350 2,350 2,350 2,350
Lignite CCS - 2,896 2,721 2,652
Lignite CCS (flexible) - 3,041 2,842 2,764
Lignite - innovative 1,950 1,950 1,950 1,950
Lignite - innovative CCS - 2,996 2,821 2,752
Lignite - innovative CCS (flexible) - 3,145 2,945 2,867
Lignite - innovative CHP and CCS - 3,396 3,221 3,152
Hard coal 1,500 1,500 1,500 1,500
Hard coal CHP 2,650 2,342 2,135 2,030
Hard coal CCS - 2,349 2,207 2,152
Hard coal CCS (flexible) - 2,459 2,298 2,236
Hard coal - innovative 2,250 1,904 1,736 1,650
Hard coal - innovative CCS - 2,753 2,443 2,302
Hard coal - innovative CCS (flexible) - 2,894 2,560 2,410
Hard coal - innovative CHP and CCS - 3,191 2,842 2,682
CCGT 700 700 700 700
CCGT - CHP 1,000 1,000 1,000 1,000
CCGT - CCS - 1,127 1,057 1, 030
CCGT - CCS (flexible) - 1,189 1,109 1,078
CCGT - CHP and CCS - 1,409 1,341 1,314
OCGT 400 400 400 400
Compressed air storage 850 850 850 850
Biomass gas 2,398 2,395 2,393 2,390
Biomass gas CHP 2,597 2,595 2,592 2,590
Biomass liquid 1,700 1,700 1,700 1,700
Biomass solid 3,297 3,293 3,290 3,287
Biomass solid CHP 3,497 3,493 3,490 3,486
Concentrated solar power 3,989 3,429 3,102 2,805
Geothermal (hot dry rock) 10,504 9,500 9,035 9,026
Geothermal (high enthalpy) 1,050 950 904 903
PV ground 1,796 1,394 1,261 1,199
PV roof 2,096 1,627 1,471 1,399
Wind onshore 1,221 1,161 1,104 1,103
Wind offshore 2,615 2,365 2,249 2,247
39
1.6 Appendix
Table 1.12: Techno-economic figures for generation technologies [as indicated]
Net efficiency Availability FOM costs Lifetime Minimum Ramp-up
[%] [%] [EUR2010/kWa] load[a] [%] times [h]
Nuclear 33 84.5 96.6 60 45 48
Lignite 43 86.3 43.1 45 30 3 - 12
CHP 22.5 86.3 62.1 45 30 3 - 12
CCS 33.5 86.3 70.3 45 30 3 - 12
CCS (flexible) 32.9 86.3 71.6 45 30 3 - 12
innovative 46.5 86.3 43.1 45 30 3 - 12
innovative CCS 37 86.3 70.3 45 30 3 - 12
innovative CCS (flexible) 36.4 86.3 71.6 45 30 3 - 12
innovative CHP and CCS 20 86.3 89.3 45 30 3 - 12
Hard coal 46 83.8 36.1 45 30 1 - 6
CHP 22.5 83.8 55.1 45 30 1 - 6
CCS 36.5 83.8 59 45 30 1 - 6
CCS (flexible) 35.9 83.8 60.2 45 30 1 - 6
innovative 50 83.8 36.1 45 30 1 - 6
innovative CCS 40.5 83.8 59 45 30 1 - 6
innovative CCS (flexible) 39.9 83.8 60.2 45 30 1 - 6
innovative CHP and CCS 20 83.8 78 45 30 1 - 6
CCGT 60 84.5 28.2 30 40 0.75 - 3
CHP 36 84.5 40 30 40 0.75 - 3
CCS 52 84.5 46 30 40 0.75 - 3
CCS (flexible) 51.6 84.5 50.5 30 40 0.75 - 3
CHP and CCS 33 84.5 57.9 30 40 0.75 - 3
OCGT 40 84.5 17.2 25 20 0.25
Biomass gas 40 85 120 30 30
Biomass gas CHP 30 85 130 30 30
Biomass liquid 30 85 85 30 30
Biomass solid 30 85 165 30 30
Biomass solid CHP 22.5 85 175 30 30
Concentrated solar power - - 120 25
Geothermal (HDR) 22.5 85 300 30
Geothermal 22.5 85 30 30
PV ground - - 30 25
PV roof - - 35 25
Run-off-river hydropower - - 11.5 100
Wind onshore - - 41 25
Wind offshore - - 128 25
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Table 1.13: Fuel costs [EUR2010/MWhth]
2008 2020 2030 2040 2050
Uranium 3.6 3.3 3.3 3.3 3.3
Lignite 1.4 1.4 1.4 1.4 1.4
Hard coal 17.3 13.4 13.8 14.3 14.7
Oil 44.6 99 110 114 116
Natural gas 25.2 28.1 31.3 33.2 35.2
Hydrogen - 46.7 47.4 48.2 48.9
Bioliquid 53.2 - 94.3 57.1 - 101.1 61.8 - 109.4 61.8 - 109.4 61.8 - 109.4
Biogas 0.1 - 70.0 0.1 - 67.2 0.1 - 72.9 0.1 - 78.8 0.1 - 85.1
Biosolid 15.0 - 27.7 15.7 - 34.9 16.7 - 35.1 17.7 - 35.5 18.8 - 37.5
1.6.2 Appendix B: Detailed scenario results
Please note that the numbers for storage contain pump storage as well as Compressed
Air Energy Storage (CAES).
Table 1.14: Gross installed capacities in Europe in [GW] (%)
Scenario A Scenario B
2008 2020 2030 2040 2050 2020 2030 2040 2050
Nuclear 135 (17) 109 (10) 95 (7) 69 (4) 60 (3) 109 (10) 100 (7) 88 (5) 75 (4)
Lignite 51 (7) 45 (4) 29 (2) 15 (1) 9 (0) 36 (3) 20 (1) 5 (0) 0 (0)
Lignite-CHP 0 (0) 6 (1) 3 (0) 1 (0) 0 (0) 6 (1) 3 (0) 1 (0) 0 (0)
Lignite-CCS 0 (0) 0 (0) 32 (2) 48 (3) 48 (2) 0 (0) 42 (3) 46 (3) 46 (2)
Lignite-CHP-CCS 0 (0) 0 (0) 3 (0) 4 (0) 4 (0) 0 (0) 4 (0) 4 (0) 4 (0)
Coal 128 (16) 83 (8) 19 (1) 3 (0) 0 (0) 82 (7) 19 (1) 3 (0) 0 (0)
Coal-CHP 0 (0) 50 (5) 39 (3) 38 (2) 32 (2) 40 (4) 23 (2) 14 (1) 7 (0)
Coal-CCS 0 (0) 2 (0) 17 (1) 27 (2) 27 (1) 2 (0) 26 (2) 32 (2) 32 (2)
Coal-CHP-CCS 0 (0) 0 (0) 0 (0) 0 (0) 0 (0) 0 (0) 0 (0) 0 (0) 0 (0)
Gas 158 (20) 177 (16) 239 (17) 296 (17) 328 (16) 189 (17) 232 (17) 285 (16) 324 (15)
Gas-CHP 0 (0) 37 (3) 13 (1) 0 (0) 0 (0) 38 (3) 13 (1) 0 (0) 0 (0)
Gas-CCS 0 (0) 0 (0) 0 (0) 0 (0) 0 (0) 0 (0) 0 (0) 0 (0) 0 (0)
Gas-CHP-CCS 0 (0) 0 (0) 0 (0) 0 (0) 0 (0) 0 (0) 9 (1) 12 (1) 12 (1)
Oil 72 (9) 19 (2) 5 (0) 0 (0) 0 (0) 19 (2) 5 (0) 0 (0) 0 (0)
Oil-CHP 0 (0) 5 (0) 0 (0) 0 (0) 0 (0) 5 (0) 0 (0) 0 (0) 0 (0)
Storage 50 (6) 47 (4) 52 (4) 57 (3) 64 (3) 47 (4) 50 (4) 64 (4) 68 (3)
Hydro 92 (12) 172 (16) 172 (12) 172 (10) 172 (8) 172 (16) 172 (12) 172 (10) 172 (8)
Biomass 9 (1) 29 (3) 39 (3) 55 (3) 79 (4) 29 (3) 39 (3) 55 (3) 79 (4)
Biomass-CHP 0 (0) 12 (1) 17 (1) 24 (1) 35 (2) 12 (1) 17 (1) 24 (1) 35 (2)
Wind onshore 49 (6) 160 (14) 284 (21) 368 (21) 449 (21) 160 (15) 284 (21) 368 (21) 449 (21)
Wind offshore 1 (0) 51 (5) 123 (9) 218 (13) 339 (16) 51 (5) 123 (9) 218 (13) 339 (16)
PV 5 (1) 82 (7) 138 (10) 222 (13) 305 (14) 82 (7) 138 (10) 222 (13) 305 (15)
CSP 0 (0) 7 (1) 38 (3) 91 (5) 127 (6) 7 (1) 38 (3) 91 (5) 127 (6)
Geothermal 1 (0) 2 (0) 11 (1) 13 (1) 15 (1) 2 (0) 11 (1) 13 (1) 15 (1)
Others 26 (3) 11 (1) 11 (1) 11 (1) 11 (1) 11 (1) 11 (1) 11 (1) 11 (1)
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Table 1.15: Gross electricity generation in Europe [TWh] (%)
Scenario A Scenario B
2008 2020 2030 2040 2050 2020 2030 2040 2050
Nuclear 955 (28) 794 (21) 665 (16) 442 (10) 321 (7) 799 (21) 695 (17) 552 (12) 409 (9)
Lignite 315 (9) 310 (8) 130 (3) 64 (1) 37 (1) 251 (7) 16 (0) 4 (0) 0 (0)
Lignite-CHP 0 (0) 7 (0) 5 (0) 1 (0) 0 (0) 9 (0) 0 (0) 0 (0) 0 (0)
Lignite-CCS 0 (0) 2 (0) 180 (4) 231 (5) 208 (4) 2 (0) 291 (7) 284 (6) 246 (5)
Lignite-CHP-CCS 0 (0) 0 (0) 19 (0) 24 (1) 25 (1) 0 (0) 25 (1) 25 (1) 25 (1)
Coal 543 (16) 407 (11) 104 (3) 12 (0) 1 (0) 308 (8) 57 (1) 5 (0) 0 (0)
Coal-CHP 0 (0) 290 (8) 252 (6) 232 (5) 167 (4) 207 (6) 145 (4) 47 (1) 16 (0)
Coal-CCS 0 (0) 15 (0) 120 (3) 157 (4) 120 (3) 15 (0) 186 (5) 200 (4) 154 (3)
Coal-CHP-CCS 0 (0) 0 (0) 0 (0) 0 (0) 0 (0) 0 (0) 0 (0) 0 (0) 0 (0)
Gas 747 (22) 512 (14) 444 (11) 308 (7) 223 (5) 643 (17) 401 (10) 275 (6) 194 (4)
Gas-CHP 0 (0) 111 (3) 35 (1) 0 (0) 0 (0) 174 (5) 66 (2) 0 (0) 0 (0)
Gas-CCS 0 (0) 0 (0) 0 (0) 0 (0) 0 (0) 0 (0) 0 (0) 0 (0) 0 (0)
Gas-CHP-CCS 0 (0) 0 (0) 0 (0) 0 (0) 0 (0) 0 (0) 60 (1) 61 (1) 44 (1)
Oil 91 (3) 0 (0) 0 (0) 0 (0) 0 (0) 0 (0) 0 (0) 0 (0) 0 (0)
Oil-CHP 0 (0) 0 (0) 0 (0) 0 (0) 0 (0) 0 (0) 0 (0) 0 (0) 0 (0)
Storage 67 (2) 17 (0) 36 (1) 55 (1) 75 (2) 15 (0) 36 (1) 62 (1) 77 (2)
Hydro 466 (13) 497 (13) 491 (12) 487 (11) 464 (10) 497 (13) 492 (12) 487 (11) 462 (10)
Biomass 88 (3) 26 (1) 66 (2) 92 (2) 99 (2) 44 (1) 89 (2) 110 (2) 116 (2)
Biomass-CHP 0 (0) 67 (2) 94 (2) 117 (3) 134 (3) 78 (2) 101 (2) 125 (3) 138 (3)
Wind onshore 117 (3) 335 (9) 599 (15) 728 (16) 821 (17) 335 (9) 599 (15) 732 (16) 823 (17)
Wind offhore 0 (0) 180 (5) 444 (11) 751 (17) 1107 (23) 180 (5) 444 (11) 753 (17) 1110 (23)
PV 7 (0) 86 (2) 152 (4) 247 (6) 335 (7) 86 (2) 152 (4) 248 (6) 334 (7)
CSP 0 (0) 26 (1) 138 (3) 319 (7) 427 (9) 26 (1) 138 (3) 319 (7) 427 (9)
Geothermal 6 (0) 10 (0) 58 (1) 68 (2) 75 (2) 10 (0) 58 (1) 68 (2) 74 (2)
Others 67 (2) 57 (2) 57 (1) 57 (1) 57 (1) 57 (2) 57 (1) 57 (1) 57 (1)
DSM (0) 14 (0) 22 (1) 32 (1) 49 (1) 14 (0) 22 (1) 33 (1) 50 (1)
Table 1.16: Renewable curtailment [TWh] (%)
2020 2030 2040 2050
Scenario A
Wind onshore 0.7 (0.2) 5.0 (0.8) 44.3 (6.1) 103.0 (12.6)
Wind offshore 0.0 (0.0) 1.7 (0.4) 15.3 (2.0) 46.7 (4.2)
Solar power 0.1 (0.1) 0.2 (0.1) 2.6 (1.1) 10.0 (3.0)
Scenario B
Wind onshore 0.7 (0.2) 5.4 (0.9) 40.1 (5.5) 101.1 (12.3)
Wind offshore 0.0 (0.0) 1.4 (0.3) 13.3 (1.8) 43.9 (4.0)
Solar power 0.1 (0.1) 0.3 (0.2) 2.4 (1.0) 10.2 (3.0)
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On the interaction effects of market fail-
ure and capacity payments in intercon-
nected electricity markets
The ongoing debate on the necessity of capacity remuneration mechanisms (CRMs) to
ensure sufficiency of generation capacity primarily focuses on a national perspective. The
research concerning possible spill-over effects, positive or negative, in adjacent markets
is lagging behind. This is the case for the effects of CRMs as well as for the effects of
market failures. We address both topics in this paper.
Specifically, we analyse the effects of price caps in two interconnected markets. Addi-
tionally, we analyse the effects of capacity payments meant to counter the deadweight
losses triggered by the price restrictions.
Although we find no indication that price caps or capacity payments in one market have
(serious) negative effects on neighbouring markets, being connected to other markets can
worsen the deadweight losses induced by market inefficiencies. Also capacity mechanisms
might be less effective than in isolated markets. Finally, in the analysed set-up we find
no indication that capacity efforts in one market support neighbouring markets with
insufficient generation capacity.
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2.1 Introduction
The question about whether or not capacity remuneration mechanisms (CRMs) are nec-
essary to ensure security of supply and maximise welfare as well as their concrete design
has been widely discussed for many years.22 The prevailing view is that energy only
markets do not provide sufficient investment incentives as wholesale electricity markets
are characterised by certain market failures (and regulatory inefficiencies) that render
some form of external investment incentive necessary. The most dominant arguments
in favour of market interventions are the insufficient elasticity of demand in times of
scarcity of supply, regulatory interventions preventing sufficient price signals and risk-
averse investment behaviour.
Although many countries in Europe have already implemented some form of capacity
support scheme (or several, as a recent sector inquiry on capacity mechanisms by the
European Commission (EC) points out)23 the debate concerning the appropriate mar-
ket design continues. The German government for example only recently renewed its
commitment to free price formation in the electricity market – assuming that this would
trigger sufficient investments. Nonetheless, a capacity reserve for unexpected events is
planned.24
Whereas the prevalent literature on capacity remuneration mechanisms mainly focuses
on single markets, against the sketched background of numerous and various regulations
and market designs the question arises if and how markets with different capacity levels,
market interventions and CRMs interact. Correspondingly, concerns have been raised,
e. g., by the EC, that CRMs may distort price signals in domestic as well as foreign
markets which could have a negative impact on investment decisions (see European
Commission, 2016a) and potentially endanger the functioning of the European internal
market (see ACER, 2013, European Commission, 2013).
On the other hand, national regulators pursue market interventions to support capacity
investments with diverse mechanisms and varying intensity. That is why suspicions
aroused that some markets may free-ride on the efforts of others.
Given the outlined background and concerns we address the following research questions:
First, do market failures in isolated markets have different effects than in interconnected
markets? Additionally, what effect does an insufficient level of capacity in one market,
22See, e. g., Borenstein and Holland (2005), Cramton and Ockenfels (2012), Cramton and Stoft (2005,
2006), Hogan (2005), Joskow and Tirole (2007), Joskow (2006, 2008). A recent overview is provided by
Cramton et al. (2013).
23See European Commission (2016a)
24As stated in the electricity market law ‘Gesetz zur Weiterentwicklung des Strommarktes (Strom-
marktgesetz)‘, 26th of July 2016, BGBl. 2016 I, nr. 37, p. 1786, 1796-1797.
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caused by a malfunctioning energy only market, have on adjacent markets? Second, do
CRMs, in our case capacity payments (CP ), behave differently in interconnected than in
isolated markets? And third, do markets with insufficient domestic capacity incentives
benefit from CRMs in neighbouring markets, i. e., do incentives to free-ride exist?
The existing literature about CRMs is mostly focusing on a national perspective. This
is the case for the negative welfare effects of market failures rendering CRMs necessary
in the first place as well as the efficiency and effectiveness of mechanisms designed to
counter those effects.
Rare examples analysing the interaction of capacity mechanisms in adjacent countries
are Cepeda and Finon (2011), Elberg (2014) and Meyer and Gore (2014). Cepeda and
Finon (2011) deploy a system dynamics model to simulate varying market designs in two
markets. They conclude that a CRM in one market can result in negative externalities by
impeding the performance of adjacent energy only markets. They state that harmonised
approaches (whether energy only markets or CRMs) are mutually beneficial. Elberg
(2014) as well as Meyer and Gore (2014) consider the presence of market failure as given
and therefore focus on the comparison of mechanisms. The former concludes, using
an analytical model, that capacity payments, although equally efficient as a strategic
reserve in isolated markets, are a dominant strategy in interconnected markets. Meyer
and Gore (2014), using a simulation model, conclude that unilateral capacity mechanisms
can have negative cross-border effects worsening the problem of insufficient investments
in neighbouring markets. However, if both regions introduce a mechanism, welfare is
increased in the given example.
In this paper we contribute to the previous research by analysing the effects of market
failure and CRMs in interconnected markets using a equilibrium model. Thus, we can
identify market equilibria rather than relying on simulation results as in Cepeda and
Finon (2011). Additionally, we model the complex interaction of adjacent electricity
market using real world data (in contrast to Elberg (2014) and Meyer and Gore (2014)
who assume equal demand at all times). This way, a more realistic estimation of the
magnitude of effects can be made. Our results contradict the previous literature as our
findings do not indicate any serious negative cross-border effects of CRMs.
For the analysis of cross-border effects in electricity markets the joint distribution of
demand as well as the generation of renewable energies are critical. This complex and
market-specific dependency renders a theoretical analysis difficult. We thus develop a
mathematical model, more specifically a Mixed Complementarity Problem (MCP), to
calculate equilibrium market outcomes. We use 2015 data for the demand and renewable
generation patterns for Germany and France. As generators we take into account one
base and one peak load technology. Market failure is represented by a cap on electricity
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prices. Such a cap does not necessarily require an explicit (regulatory) cap but may also
be inflicted on the market by undue market interventions meant to secure security of
supply. To analyse the effects of CRMs, we focus on capacity payments as one possible
alternative.25 We assume that those payments are made for all (conventional) capacity
in the market and paid as a lump sum.
The main findings are as follows: First, and in line with the existing literature, our
results show that – in an isolated market – the disadvantages of insufficient price signals
induced by a cap can be cured by capacity payments (leaving problems concerning the
determination of their appropriate level aside).
Second, the negative implications of price caps worsen in interconnected markets: In-
stalled capacity and ultimately welfare decrease to a larger extent. The artificially low
prices result in additional exports during peak demand and thus do not (fully) bene-
fit domestic consumers. In addition, more capacity recedes as imports partly replace
the missing domestic generation which hinders prices to reach the equilibrium level. A
higher interconnector capacity worsens the negative effects of price caps.
The third finding is that a price cap in one market does not appear to have a negative
impact on welfare in neighbouring markets. On the contrary, the price cap results in
imports from the market having the cap which benefits the market without (or a higher)
cap. These benefits exceed the disadvantages of decreasing generation capacity due to
the additional imports that are dampening market prices.
Forth, capacity payments are less efficient in interconnected than in isolated markets.
This is due to price distortions that are not targeted by CP : Inefficient price signals
persist and result in inefficient trade. But although some welfare losses persist, our
results indicate that most of the losses can be recuperated.
Finally, capacity payments in one market do not appear to greatly support neighbouring
markets that have a price cap: Losses might be slightly reduced given less restrictive
caps. For more restrictive caps CP might even be harmful for adjacent markets. The
additional capacity triggered by the support scheme in one market pushes back capacity
in the other market which outweighs the benefits of imports. If neighbouring markets
both have a price cap, the optimal welfare level can almost be restored if both markets
introduce capacity payments. Remaining deadweight losses are due to inefficient price
signals caused by the price caps which result in an inefficient allocation of capacity and
supply.
25Assuming an omniscient regulator, capacity payments and capacity auctions are equivalent with
respect to the resulting market outcome.
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A few things have to be mentioned concerning our findings: We assume that the markets
and therefore also trade are not limited or regulated other than by – depending on the
scenario – price caps. This means that exports are not restricted when the price cap is
reached. If caps are explicitly intended in market regulations exports might be limited
in order to strengthen domestic consumption. But as this would interfere with the free
trade in the European internal market we refrain from considering this option in the
analysis at hand.
The second assumption underlying the analyses is that demand is flexible: A power
outage is not a problem caused by (foreseeable) imbalances of demand and supply. In
fact, over the last five years no reliability problems occurred in continental Europe
in the ten EU member countries mentioned in the EU Commission’s sector inquiry –
although some expect problems in the future.26 Assuming that demand is actually (at
least partially) inflexible could result in an inability of the market to match demand and
supply. In this case the European transmission system operators (TSOs) are required
to execute countermeasures to restore system stability – including (involuntary) load
shedding as a last resort. This emergency measures might cause additional welfare
losses which are not taken into account in this paper. Concerning our findings the
general trend remains unchanged but may have a greater order of magnitude. Also the
effects on neighbouring countries would only slightly change as they are driven by a
change in trade flows rather than the influence on capacity.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows: In section 2.2 the mathematical
programme for the subsequent analyses is presented. Section 2.3 first outlines the sample
data followed by the quantitative analyses of the effects of market failure and capacity
payments. Section 2.4 concludes.
2.2 Market model
2.2.1 Model formulation
The model represents interconnected electricity markets m.27 Markets are regulatory in-
dependent regions connected by limited transmission capacity. We analyse investments
ym,n in production technology n with variable costs vn and annual investment (plus other
fixed) costs kn. In the context of this paper, technologies always refer to conventional
power plants; renewable energies are treated separately. A single investment period
is followed by several production periods t with production xtm,n in each time period.
26See European Commission (2016a).
27The terms market, region and country are used interchangeably throughout this paper.
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Production of renewable energies (wind and photovoltaics) rtm is curtailed if produc-
tion exceeds demand. We model each year individually, i. e., we do not account for
investments over time. Investment and production decisions are made simultaneously.
Perfect competition of generators is assumed, i. e., generation capacity is utilised until
market prices equal variable costs or capacity is exhausted. Investment in generation
capacity takes place until profits are zero. Countries are connected by a transmission
line with limited capacity l¯m,−m. Actual trade is denoted by lm,−m and indicates the
electricity trade from region m to another region −m. Transmission capacity is utilised
to maximise total welfare, i. e., until prices in both markets are equal or the capacity is
exhausted.
Market interventions in terms of capacity mechanisms take place prior to investment
and generation decisions. They influence investment costs via capacity payments cm
which are subtracted from the investment costs.
The basic notations are listed in Table 2.1, additional symbols are explained where
applicable.
Table 2.1: Model sets, parameters and variables
Abbreviation Description
Model sets
m Markets
n ∈ N Technologies
t ∈ T Time index
Model parameters
kn R+ Marginal investment costs
vn R+0 Variable production costs
atm R
+
0 y-intercept of the demand curve
b R+ Linear slope of the demand curve
Kr R+0 Total investment costs of wind and photovoltaics
rtm R
+
0 Wind and photovoltaics production
l¯m,−m R+0 Transmission capacity
Model variables
ym,n R+0 Capacity investments
xtm,n R
+
0 Production
ptm R
+
0 Market price
cm R+0 Capacity payments per unit of capacity
ltm,−m R[−l¯,l¯] Trade
In the following we present the mathematical programme that is used to solve the model
sketched above. We start with the equilibrium model representing the competitive mar-
ket. Afterwards, we present the calculation of welfare based on the results of this model.
We start by formulating the market outcome as an optimisation problem which is sep-
arated into investment and production decisions of a generation company and trade
conducted by a transmission system operator (TSO).
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The objective function of the generation company represents a profit maximising investor
who maximises revenues minus variable and investment costs. The optimisation problem
is as follows:
max
xtm,n,ym,n
∑
t,m,n
(ptm − vm,n)xtm,n −
∑
m,n
ym,n(kn − cm) (2.1)
subject to
ym,n − xtm,n ≥ 0 (λtm,n) (2.2)
ptm = a
t
m − b
(∑
n
xtm,n −
∑
−m
(ltm,−m − lt−m,m) + rtm
)
(2.3)
ym,n ≥ 0, xtm,n ≥ 0. (2.4)
The first constraint limits the hourly electricity generation to the installed capacity.
Equation (2.3) represents the assumed linear demand function. Finally, non-negativity
constraints are listed. Related dual variables are listed in brackets next to each equation.
The influence of capacity mechanisms is represented by capacity payments cm. This
optimisation problem for competitive generators is equivalent to the following Karush-
Kuhn-Tucker (KKT) conditions:28
vm,n + λ
t
m,n − ptm ≥ 0 (2.5)
kn − cm −
∑
t
λtm,n = 0 (2.6)
0 ≤ ym,n − xtm,n ⊥ λtm,n ≥ 0 (2.7)
(2.3)− (2.4) (2.8)
with the perp operator (⊥) meaning that the product of the expressions to the left and
to the right has to equal zero. The first equation reflects the first order condition for
the optimal choice of production and links the market price, variable production costs
and the marginal value of capacity.
The second equation states the first order condition for investments: Annual investment
costs for generation companies, i. e., nominal investment costs k minus capacity payments
c, have to equal the sum of the marginal values of capacity λ. Equation (2.7) limits
production to installed capacity and links the associated dual variable.
28As we assume competitive generators the conjectural variation parameter is set to zero (see, e. g.,
Murphy and Smeers, 2005).
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We assume a profit maximising, competitive TSO. The objective function of the TSO
consists of the profits from trade calculated as the price difference between both regions
times the trade volume:
max
ltm,−m
∑
t,m,−m
ltm,−m(p
t
−m − ptm) (2.9)
subject to:
l¯m,−m − ltm,−m ≥ 0 (pitm,−m) (2.10)
l¯m,−m + ltm,−m ≥ 0 (µtm,−m) (2.11)
(2.3) (2.12)
The first and second constraint represent the upper and lower bound of transmission
between regions. The linear demand function is equal to the one for the generation
company.
This optimisation problem is equivalent to the following KKT conditions:
ptm − pt−m + pitm,−m − µtm,−m = 0 (2.13)
0 ≤ l¯m,−m − ltm,−m ⊥ pitm,−m ≥ 0 (2.14)
0 ≤ l¯m,−m + ltm,−m ⊥ µtm,−m ≥ 0 (2.15)
(2.3) (2.16)
The first order condition (2.13) postulates that the price difference between two regions
equals the marginal value of the transmission capacity. The following two complemen-
tarity conditions (2.14) and (2.15) enforce the transmission limits and link the associated
dual variables.
Simultaneously solving equations (2.5) - (2.8) and (2.13) - (2.15) provides the competitive
market outcome. Due to the quasi-concave objective function and the convexity of
restrictions, the KKT conditions are necessary and sufficient for an optimal solution.
A cap on electricity prices is implemented as an additional generation technology cap ∈
N with zero investment costs (kcap = 0) and variable costs vcap equal to the desired cap.
2.2.2 Welfare calculation
Total welfare W in each region consists of the sum of producer surplus for conventional
power plants PS, consumer surplus CS and congestion rent CoR minus the costs for the
capacity mechanism CM plus the net revenues of renewable energies RES (see equation
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2.17). As the markets are assumed to be competitive, producers invest until profits are
zero.
Wm = PSm + CSm + CoRm − CMm +RESm (2.17)
The calculation of consumer surplus is presented in equation 2.18: The first part rep-
resents the surplus if all generation was provided by regular capacity. The second part
corrects this value by deducing the generation by capacity representing the price cap
(xcap).
29
CSm =
∑
t
(
(atm − ptm)2
2 b
− b (x
t
m,cap)
2
2
)
(2.18)
The congestion rent is assumed to be split evenly between trading countries (see equation
2.19). The costs of the capacity mechanism, the capacity payments, simply consist of the
fixed capacity payments per unit of capacity c times the installed capacity (see equation
2.20).
Net revenues of renewable energies are calculated as revenues minus investment costs Kr
(see equation 2.21). The investments in renewable energies are exogenous and constant
for all scenarios. Thus, they cancel out in the delta analyses.30
CoRm =
1
2
∑
t,−m
(
ltm,−m(p
t
−m − ptm) + lt−m,m(ptm − pt−m)
)
(2.19)
CMm = ym,n cm (2.20)
RESm =
∑
t
rtm p
t
m −Kr (2.21)
2.3 Quantitative analysis
2.3.1 Data
We apply our model to the case of Germany and France. We use projections concerning
demand and the installed capacity of renewable energies for the year 2020 based on the
EU Reference Scenario 2016 by the European Commission.31 According to the EC’s
29If neighbouring markets have the same price cap the hourly market result may be ambiguous. If
both market prices actually reach the cap we assume that capacity is used to serve domestic demand
first – this way the outcome is unique.
30Given today’s investment costs the net revenues of renewables are rather negative than positive and
thus affect the welfare negatively. However, using the net revenues is more convenient in the context of
this paper as additional revenues result in an increase of welfare.
31See European Commission (2016b) and the data provided in Appendix A.
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sector inquiry on capacity mechanisms from 2016, European TSOs expect reliability
issues in the upcoming five years.
Annual demand is set to 530 TWh and 452 TWh for Germany and France respectively
according to the 2020 value of the EU Reference Scenario. The demand structure is based
on hourly values and corresponding prices for 2015 based on ENTSO-E (2016) and the
European Energy Exchange (EEX)32 respectively. The demand and other hourly input
values are scaled with a constant factor for each region to meet the scenario assumptions
concerning the yearly values.
A variety of estimates for the elasticity (denoted as η) of demand exists in the literature
(see, for example, Lijesen (2007), Knaut and Paulus (2016) and the literature overview
provided therein). Time-of-use elasticity, i. e., real-time or wholesale price elasticity, is
mostly estimated to have very low values ranging between -0.002 and -0.16, depending
on the date and time. In the base case we assume an elasticity of -0.01, which is rather
at the lower end of estimated values.33 We do this as the effects of price caps are mostly
relevant during high prices which in turn are more likely if demand elasticity is low.
The electricity generation structure of wind and photovoltaics is based on data provided
by the French and German TSOs for 2015.34
Modelled residual load, i. e., demand minus electricity generation by renewable energies,
is illustrated in figure 2.1. The average residual load is about 40 and 44 GW for Germany
and France respectively; the correlation coefficient between residual load levels is 0.62
with an average absolute difference of about 10.3 GW.
To limit the computational burden, we only include the first out of every four weeks of
the whole year. Investment costs are scaled accordingly.
As conventional generation technologies we take into account one base and one peak load
technology. Overnight investment costs are assumed to be 1,500e/kW and 500e/kW
for the base and the peak load technology respectively with variable production costs of
25e/MWh and 50e/MWh.
To analyse the influence of the interconnector we vary the capacity using 3,000 MW or
6,000 MW.35
32See www.eex.com.
33As we use linear demand functions we are referring to point elasticities. The slope of the demand
curve b is assumed to be constant and calculated as 1
η
p∗
d∗ with reference price p
∗= 100e/MWh and
reference demand d∗= 50 GW (thus b= 0.2). We use hourly y-intercepts a that result in demand curves
which meet historic demand and prices combinations.
34For France, see RTE (2016), for Germany, see Amprion (2016), 50Hertz (2016), TenneT (2016) and
TransnetBW (2016).
35The Ten-Year Network Development Plan 2016 (version November 2015) assumes 3,000 MW for the
cross-border capacity between DE and FR in 2020.
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Figure 2.1: Modelled residual load in Germany and France [GW]
We take into account three levels of price caps: unrestricted prices, a cap at 500e/MWh
and a cap at 250e/MWh.
2.3.2 Price caps and capacity payments in isolated markets
2.3.2.1 The effects of price caps
We start by analysing the effects of insufficient price signals and capacity payments in
an isolated market. This forms the basis for the analysis of interconnected markets that
follows afterwards. Here, we present the results for Germany. Similar effects can be
observed for France (see Appendix B).
Figure 2.2 illustrates the effects of price caps on installed capacity and the price duration
curve.
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Figure 2.2: Effects of capacity payments in DE
Compared to the reference case, a price cap reduces the revenues of power plants in
times of scarcity of supply. All technologies are affected to the same extent as the full
capacity is utilised. Assuming capacity would be identical with and without a (binding)
cap, this results in losses for the generators. Thus, capacity has to recede to restore
an equilibrium state. As can be observed in Figure 2.2a, although a price cap affects
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the revenues of all capacities, exclusively the capacity of peak load plants decreases.
The decrease of peak capacity results in additional revenues for all types of technology
whereas a decrease in base capacity would benefit technologies unevenly. Thus, in order
to restore an equilibrium state, only peak capacity recedes.
Compared to the reference case in which prices are not restricted, the peak capacity
at a price cap of 500e/MWh decreases by about 1.1 GW. In the case of a price cap of
250e/MWh the capacity decrease amounts to about 2.8 GW.
The resulting effect on prices is illustrated by the excerpt from the price duration curve
shown in Figure 2.2b. It shows the 3 % highest prices in descending order for varying
price caps and the reference case. The price caps and the resulting capacity decrease
result in an increasing number of hours with prices above variable costs of the peak load
technology. The revenues in these hours balance the losses resulting from the missing
peak prices. In total, the power plants’ revenues per unit of capacity as well as the
average market price p˜ remain constant. This follows directly from the generators’ KKT
conditions. From equation 2.5 follows:
p˜ =
∑
t p
t
T
= vn +
∑
t λ
t
n
T
(2.22)
Adding equation 2.6 results in:
p˜ = vn +
kn − c
T
(2.23)
Thus, the average market price solely depends on the annual fixed and marginal gen-
eration costs as well as capacity payments. A price cap – and in the later scenarios
trade with other markets – does not influence the average price. In the current sce-
nario, base load plants have to recover their annual fixed costs which amount to about
86.2e/kW.36 With variable costs of 25e/MWh this translates into an average market
price of 34.8e/MWh.
The effects on welfare and supply are illustrated in Figure 2.3. As seen before, the lower
the price cap the more capacity recedes and the more often prices exceed the variable
costs of peak plants. This benefits the revenues of renewable energies: Without a price
cap, high prices only occur during a few hours of scarcity of supply. These hours do not
coincide with renewable generation. With a cap and due to the receding conventional
capacity, renewables also benefit from peak prices.
The gain in revenues is overcompensated by losses in consumer surplus: With decreasing
generation capacity also the served demand decreases which in sum results in deadweight
36We assume an interest rate of 5 % and a technical lifetime of 25 and 40 years for the peak and base
load technology respectively.
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losses. Due to the exponential effect of an increasingly binding price cap on consumer
surplus (see equation 2.18), welfare is decreasing more severely with a decreasing cap.
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Figure 2.3: Effects of price caps in DE
A price cap of 500e/MWh has a comparably small effect on welfare – the effect of a
cap of 250e/MWh is about nine times higher.
2.3.2.2 The effects of capacity payments
Capacity payments are an option to support generation capacity and counter the neg-
ative effects of a price cap. Figure 2.4a illustrates the increase of capacity for the case
of a price cap at 250e/MWh. The capacity payments are indicated as the share of
investment costs of the peak load technology.
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Figure 2.4: Effects of capacity payments in DE
At about 60 % of investment costs the installed capacity reaches the same level as it does
without price restrictions (indicated by the lines). Not only the total level of installed
capacity is restored but also the capacity mix: Although all capacities receive the same
subsidies per unit of capacity, only the peak load capacity increases. The economic
intuition is similar to the previous argument explaining why only peak capacity recedes
while all capacity is affected by a price cap: With CP short-run profits have to decrease
in order to restore the zero profit condition of investment. In equilibrium the sum of
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reduced profits equals the capacity payments. If base load capacity increases, profits of
base and peak capacities would be affected unevenly in times in which base capacity is
setting the price. Whereas if peak capacity increases, all capacities are affected evenly
by a decreasing price. Therefore, in order to compensate for the capacity payments to
the same extent and thus reach an equilibrium state, only peak capacity increases.
At higher levels of CP the capacity exceeds those of the reference case. CP can fully
compensate for the foregone revenues induced by a price cap and restore the optimal
welfare (see Figure 2.4b). If the capacity support exceeds the optimal level, i. e., more
than compensates for foregone revenues, the welfare drops again as this results in excess
capacity.
Capacity payments also influence the market prices by increasing generation capacity:
Prices are still limited by the price cap but due to the additional capacity, prices reach
the cap less frequently (see Figure 2.5).
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Figure 2.5: Price duration curves (excerpt) for varying CP (p¯ = 250e/MWh)
As discussed earlier, average prices remain unchanged with price caps. The same is not
true for capacity payments. As CP directly influence investment costs they also alter
the equilibrium condition for investments: Less short run profits have to be earned in
order to cover long run costs. This results in decreasing average market prices with
increasing CP .
In summary, our results show that the negative effects of price caps can be countered
by capacity payments in isolated markets. The optimal level of generation capacity as
well as welfare are fully restored with an appropriate level of support.
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2.3.3 Market failure and capacity payments in interconnected markets
2.3.3.1 Reference case
We start by presenting the market outcome of a base case with no price restrictions. This
serves as a reference for the subsequent analyses. The main outcomes of the simulations
are summarised in the following table:
Table 2.2: Results of the base case
l¯= 3,000 MW l¯= 6,000 MW
DE FR DE FR
Installed capacity [GW]
Base: 52.6 Base: 50.4 Base: 51.6 Base: 50.6
Peak: 18.5 Peak: 22.9 Peak: 19.9 Peak: 22.0
Trade volume [TWh] 5.9 10.0
Average interconnector utilisation [%] 22.5 19.0
Average market price [e/MWh] 34.84 34.84 34.84 34.84
Maximum price [e/MWh] 1372 1372 1403 1403
The total installed capacity in both markets decreases only slightly by about 300 MW
with the higher trade capacity. Although the total base load capacity is reduced by
about 800 MW, the peak capacity compensates some of the reduction by increasing by
about 500 MW: Base load plants can be used more efficiently indicated by an increasing
utilisation factor whereas peak capacity is needed to cover peak demand.
The average electricity price in both markets is identical – and independent from the
interconnector capacity – at 34.8e/MWh. This results directly from the equilibrium
conditions of investment as discussed earlier: Average prices solely depend on investment
and variable costs as well as capacity payment, but are independent from trade.
Figure 2.6 illustrates the generation capacity mix and price duration curve for peak load
hours for a transmission capacity of 3,000 MW. The higher total but lower base load
capacity in France compared to Germany indicates a steeper residual demand curve in
France. The price duration curves for Germany and France for the 1 % highest prices
(see Figure 2.6b) display a similar pattern for both markets, with a slightly steeper
trajectory for France.
2.3.3.2 The effects of price caps
Market failures are often regarded as being harmful not only to domestic welfare but
also as negatively affecting neighbouring markets. We investigate this hypothesis by
simulating price caps in the model. We start by applying price caps to Germany whereas
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Figure 2.6: Installed capacity and price duration curve (l¯= 3,000 MW)
market prices in France are not restricted. Later on, we analyse the case of a cap only
in France.
We start by looking at the effect of a price cap on capacity. The capacity of the peak
technology in Germany recedes similar to the earlier case when Germany was assumed
to be isolated. This time the decrease of capacity is stronger: Whereas a price cap of
250e/MWh previously resulted in a decrease of about 2.8 GW this more than doubles
with an interconnector capacity of 6,000 MW (see Figure 2.7a). This is driven by the
price dampening effect of imports: In order to counter the profit loss induced by the
price cap, capacity recedes to restore the previous price level. But unlike the single
market case, imports partly replace the receding domestic capacity. In total, to restore
the previous average prices, capacity has to decrease to a higher extent. Here, the same
principle applies as in the isolated case: The average market price remains unchanged
as long run investment costs have to be covered by short run prices.
But although capacity is mainly affected in Germany, also capacity in France decreases
(see Figure 2.7b): The price cap in Germany results in additional exports from Germany
to France during peak demand. This decreases profits of power generators in France.
Accordingly, also French capacity recedes in order to balance short run profits and
investment costs.
The effect of a German price cap on prices in France is illustrated in Figure 2.8a. The
German price cap also hinders price peaks in France. This ultimately forces French
capacity to recede as it would otherwise be unprofitable. Although trade volumes remain
fairly stable, the congestion rent increases (see Figure 2.8b). This is due to an increasing
price difference triggered by the price cap.
Consumers in Germany are effected to a higher extend by a price cap if the German
market interacts with its neighbour France (see Figure 2.9a). Similar to the isolated case,
less demand is served in Germany. But this time, due to the on average higher prices in
France, even less demand is served as electricity is exported during high demand. Thus,
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Figure 2.8: Price duration curves and congestion rent with a price cap in Germany
the benefits of lower prices during peak demand due to the cap are partly cancelled
out by exports instead of domestic consumption. Given a price cap of 500e/MWh this
results in about five and eleven times higher losses in consumer surplus compared to
Germany being isolated with an interconnector capacity of 3,000 MW and 6,000 MW
respectively.
For France the effect on consumer surplus is positive, but less distinct (see Figure 2.9b).
There are two opposing effects: On the one hand France benefits from imports attracted
by higher domestic prices. On the other hand these imports force French capacity to
recede due to their price decreasing effect (as discussed earlier). The sum of served
demand does not change but the structure of supply does: During peak demand more
demand is served whereas supply decreases during low demand (this is also reflected in
the changing price price pattern as depicted in Figure 2.8a). In total, this increases the
consumer surplus.
The higher the interconnector capacity the stronger the benefit for consumers in the
country without (or a lower) price cap: Less restrictive interconnector capacity results
in higher imports during peak demand which dampens peak prices.
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Figure 2.9: Consumer surplus with a price cap in Germany
Although some of the losses in consumer surplus are compensated by (small) gains
in congestion rent and revenues of renewables, for Germany a price cap results in all
analysed cases in higher welfare losses compared to the case of an isolated market (see
Figure 2.10a). The losses are so significant that having no connection may be better
altogether.
The total welfare effect in France is positive in the analysed cases, but on a rather
low level (see Figure 2.10b). Although domestic capacity recedes due to additional
imports, gains in consumer surplus and congestion rent exceed slight losses in revenues
of renewable energies.
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Figure 2.10: Welfare effects with a price cap in Germany
The effect if only France has a price cap is illustrated in Figure 2.11. The shapes look
similar to the previous case: The French price cap causes welfare losses in France that
increase with increasing interconnector capacity and decreasing cap. For the neighbour-
ing country that has no cap – in this case Germany – the effect is the other way around:
The domestic welfare is increasing driven by increasing imports during peak demand as
prices – in contrast to the capped market – signal scarcity.
Negative effects of price caps increase in asymmetric (interconnected) markets – mainly
affecting the market with the cap – but what is the effect in case of symmetric caps?
Figure 2.12 illustrates the effect on welfare in Germany and France for both levels of
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Figure 2.11: Welfare effects with a price cap in France
interconnector capacity if both markets have the same price cap. The overall shape
is similar for both regions: A price cap of 500e/MWh has only a limited effect on
welfare compared to a cap of 250e/MWh. Again we can observe that a higher trade
capacity is increasing the negative effects of price caps, even if they are synchronous.
This is driven by the price dampening effect of trade which forces more capacity to
recede: The price cap forces a decrease of generation capacity which otherwise could
not recuperate investment costs. The higher the interconnector capacity the more of
the missing capacity is replaced by imports (if capacity is available in the neighbouring
market) which forces a stronger capacity cutback. Ultimately, less demand can be served
which results in the higher deadweight losses.
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Figure 2.12: Welfare in Germany and France with synchronous price caps
In summary our results suggest that in interconnected markets the negative effects of
price caps are more severe (at least for the market having the cap) than in isolated
markets. This is due to the supply flowing to neighbouring markets during scarcity
of supply as the neighbours allow for higher prices. Additionally, imports hinder the
recovering of prices with receding capacity which results in a sharper drop of generation
capacity and ultimately welfare.
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For the neighbouring markets the effects are much less pronounced. They even benefit
from the additional imports during peak demand. But generation capacity is negatively
affected in neighbouring markets, too.
2.3.3.3 The effects of capacity payments with unilateral price cap
In the following we analyse the ability of capacity payments to compensate for losses
triggered by price caps. For the case of isolated markets our results show that appropriate
CP restore the optimal level of capacity and welfare. Now we analyse if the same
holds true for connected markets. At first, like in the previous section, we start by
assuming that only Germany has a price cap while prices in France are not restricted.
Capacity payments to support domestic generation capacity are also assumed to be paid
in Germany exclusively (the case of a price cap and capacity payments in France yields
similar results, see Appendix C). Afterwards we introduce price caps in both markets to
analyse if markets can rely on the efforts of their neighbours.
First we look at the effect of capacity payments on capacity. Like for the isolated case,
capacity payments seem fit to increase the installed capacity and thereby restore the
optimal level (see Figure 2.13a). Depending on the interconnector capacity the effect
of CP is of varying magnitude: The higher the interconnector capacity the stronger is
the effect on capacity. This is in line with the previous observation of a stronger de-
crease of generation capacity with higher trade capacities: The higher capacity decrease
originated from the price dampening effect of imports which prevented prices to recover
with decreasing generation capacity. As capacity payments directly support domestic
investments this reinforcing negative influence of imports can be circumvented.
The impact of CP in Germany on capacity in France is small but increasing with higher
transmission capacity (see Figure 2.13b). Capacity is decreasing as the additional capac-
ity in Germany decreases prices in France. This indicates that in interconnected markets
CP are not able to restore the welfare optimum like they did in isolated markets: Ca-
pacity in France already decreased due to the price cap and the resulting additional
imports from Germany. As CP further decrease the capacity in France the equilibrium
outcome of markets with no cap and no CP cannot be restored.
Increasing capacity in Germany as a result of capacity payments increases consumer
surplus. At the same time capacity payments arise which have to be paid for. The
net effect of increasing consumer surplus minus CP is illustrated in Figure 2.14a: With
existing price caps the increase in consumer surplus exceeds the costs of capacity pay-
ments at first. For higher CP the net effect becomes negative. In contrast to the case
of an isolated market, Germany cannot achieve the same welfare level as without a cap.
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Figure 2.13: Effects of capacity payments in Germany on capacity (p¯= 250e/MWh)
Although capacity payments increase domestic welfare up to a certain point the cost
for the support scheme exceeds the benefits for the customers before the original level
is reached. This is due to the distorted price signals still caused by the price cap which
result in exports during scarce domestic supply.
For France the effects of CP in Germany are – compared to the effect on Germany –
small (see Figure 2.14b). For lower levels of CP welfare slightly decreases driven by
the receding generation capacity which is crowded out by the additional imports from
Germany: Imports are less reliable than domestic capacity due to import restrictions. As
a result, peak prices increase whereas medium prices decrease (the average price remains
unchanged). As supply during high demand is more valuable than during medium
demand, consumer surplus decreases. For higher levels of CP this negative impact on
consumer surplus is overcompensated by an increase of congestion rent: The higher
the CP are the more average prices diverge as CP lower the average market price in
Germany. This increases the congestion rent.
In total, capacity payments cannot fully restore the optimal welfare level in Germany
as well as overall (see Figure 2.14c): As the distortion of price signals persists, some
inefficiencies in the allocation of capacity and supply remain.
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Figure 2.14: Welfare effect of capacity payments in Germany (l¯= 3,000 MW)
Given an interconnector capacity of 6,000 MW the patterns for the welfare effect of
capacity payments look similar for Germany and also the total effect. For France, the
benefits of additional congestion rent exceed losses in consumer surplus at all times –
63
2.3 Quantitative analysis
France is never worse off compared to the reference case with no price cap (see Figure
2.15).
-800
-600
-400
-200
0
0% 30% 60% 90%
De
lta
 w
el
fa
re
 [m
 €
]
Capacity paments DE
ref cap500 cap250
(a) Germany
0
20
40
60
80
0% 30% 60% 90%De
lta
 w
el
fa
re
 [m
 €
]
Capacity payments DE
ref cap500 cap250
(b) France
-800
-600
-400
-200
0
0% 30% 60% 90%De
lta
 w
el
fa
re
 [m
 €
]
Capacity payments DE
ref cap500 cap250
(c) Total
Figure 2.15: Welfare effect of capacity payments in Germany (l¯= 6,000 MW)
In summary, capacity payments are less effective in interconnected than in isolated mar-
kets. They can restore some of the welfare losses triggered by price caps, but cannot
solve the inefficient price signals resulting in suboptimal allocation of capacity and sup-
ply. Thus some of the welfare losses remain.
The overall effects of CP on neighbouring markets are comparably small. They do not
indicate a reason for concerns regarding the influence on price signals and the resulting
effects on imports and exports.
2.3.3.4 Spill-over effects of capacity payments with bilateral price caps
The previous analysis did not show large effects of price caps on neighbouring markets,
they might even benefited from increasing congestion rent. Those analyses focused on
neighbouring markets that do not have a price cap themselves. Now we look at the
case where both markets have price restrictions. Building on the previous analysis we
address the following questions: If both markets have a cap, do capacity payments in
one market also help to overcome the negative effects in the other market? And if this
is the case, does it reward free-riding behaviour?
We start our analysis by assuming that both markets face the same price cap and
Germany introduces capacity payments. As seen earlier, capacity payments can have
a positive effect on domestic welfare with unilateral caps. We can observe the same
in this scenario for an interconnector capacity of 3,000 MW (see Figure 2.16 comparing
welfare with the base case of no cap and no CP ).37 Welfare in Germany may even
exceeds the level without caps and CP : Net benefits from increasing consumer surplus
minus capacity payments recover most of the consumer surplus lost due to the price cap.
Additional congestion rent results in extra welfare gains.
37The effects for an interconnector capacity of 6,000 MW are similar (see Appendix D).
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For France the effect is negligible for a common cap of 500e/MWh – with a cap of
250e/MWh capacity payments in Germany result in additional welfare losses for France
(up to the optimal level of CP in Germany).
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Figure 2.16: Effects of capacity payments in DE on welfare (l¯= 3,000 MW)
This is because the additional capacity in Germany crowds out generation capacity in
France to an even lower level than was already reached due to the price cap (see Figure
2.17). Assuming a price cap of 250e/MWh in both markets, Germany reaches about the
same level of capacity at CP of almost 60 % of investment costs of the peak technology
– France looses about 1.5 GW of capacity additionally.
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Figure 2.17: Effects of capacity payments in DE on installed capacity (l¯=3,000 MW)
Our results indicate that capacity payments are beneficial for the introducing country
given that both markets have a price cap. For the neighbouring market the effects are
rather small and, depending on the actual set up, may even be harmful. We complement
our analysis by introducing capacity payments also in France. Thus, in the following,
both markets feature the same price cap as well as the same level of CP .
Figure 2.18 illustrates the welfare effects for a trade capacity of 3,000 MW.38 France
can clearly benefit from having its own capacity payments instead of relying on its
neighbour. Given an optimal choice of capacity payments, total welfare is only slightly
below the optimal value achieved with no cap and no CP . The remaining losses are due
to insufficient price signals – capacity and supply are not perfectly allocated.
38See Appendix D for the case of 6,000 MW.
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Figure 2.18: Effects of capacity payments in both markets on welfare (l¯= 3,000 MW)
In summary, our results concerning possible spill-over effects do not support concerns
regarding incentives for free-riding. First of all, adjacent markets with no own CRM do
not appear to hinder the effectiveness of capacity payments. Furthermore, relying on
capacity support in neighbouring markets does not help to overcome domestic deficits. If
neighbouring markets both support capacity investments, most of the deadweight losses
resulting from price caps can be prevented.
2.4 Conclusions
Existing literature on market imperfections and capacity mechanisms mainly focuses on
a national perspective. Recent concerns that national CRMs might harm neighbouring
markets by distorting market prices, for example raised by the EU Commission, are only
rarely discussed.
We extend the literature on cross-border effects by using an equilibrium model with real
world data. Thereby, we are able to cover the complex interaction of supply and demand
in interconnected markets. We apply our model to the case of Germany and France to
analyse the cross-border and interaction effects of price caps and capacity payments.
Our results indicate that the interaction with neighbouring markets not only influences
the effect of market failure on domestic welfare but also the efficiency of capacity re-
muneration mechanisms. In our case, price caps result in more severe welfare losses
and capacity payments are less efficient in countering the resulting market distortions.
Given the frequently expected capacity shortages in the future and the numerous CRMs
currently already implemented in the European electricity market, this raises further
questions concerning the efficiency of the existing uncoordinated national mechanisms.
At least our results do not indicate serious negative effects of price caps on neighbouring
markets. Similarly, this should be the case for a strategic reserve (which is already
implemented or discussed in some markets) or excess capacity that may be triggered
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by overly high capacity payments or oversized capacity auctions as they have similar
properties.
Likewise, our results do not indicate (relevant) positive effects of capacity payments on
neighbouring markets that face insufficient price signals themselves. Thus, we do not
identify incentives for free-riding on the capacity efforts of neighbours.
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2.5 Appendix
2.5.1 Appendix A: Model assumptions
Table 2.3: Assumptions concerning annual wind and photovoltaics generation
Wind generation [TWh] Photovoltaics generation [TWh]
DE 109 48
FR 55 32
68
2.5 Appendix
2.5.2 Appendix B: Isolated France
Figure 2.19 illustrates the effects of price caps and capacity payments in France (with
no connection to Germany). The general shape of the effects of price caps is similar
to those for Germany – but the installed capacity, welfare and supply are affected to
a larger extent. This is the result of a steeper residual demand curve in the relevant
segment around the installed capacity: A decrease in installed capacity results in a
smaller increase in average market prices. Therefore, capacity in France has to decrease
to a larger extent – compared to Germany – in order to meet the equilibrium conditions
of investment.
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Figure 2.19: Effects of price caps on capacity, supply and welfare in an isolated France
The stronger decrease of capacity results in less demand being served which again results
in a higher deadweight loss. The negative effects of price caps can – equal to the German
case – be countered by capacity payments that fully restore the optimal welfare level
given an appropriate level of payments (see Figure 2.20).
-300
-200
-100
0
0% 30% 60% 90%
De
lta
 w
el
fa
re
 [m
 €
]
Capacity payments in FR
ref cap500 cap250
Figure 2.20: Effects of price caps and capacity payments in an isolated France
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2.5.3 Appendix C: Interconnected France
The effects of price caps and capacity payments in France are similar to the case for
Germany (see Figure 2.21), the conclusions drawn earlier also apply here (see section
2.3.3.3). The effect in France is more pronounced than in the case for Germany which
is due to the steeper residual supply curve as discussed in section 2.5.2.
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Figure 2.21: Welfare effect of price caps and CP in France (l¯= 3,000 MW)
Similar but amplified effects can be observed for a higher interconnector capacity (see
Figure 2.22). This is in line with previous results.
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Figure 2.22: Welfare effect of price caps and CP in France (l¯= 6,000 MW)
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2.5.4 Appendix D: Bilateral price caps – Additional results
Here we complement the analysis from section 2.3.3.4. We start with the case of capacity
payments in Germany and a interconnector capacity of 6,000 MW. The effects are similar
to the case with less transmission capacity (see Figure 2.23). This time, the optimal
level of CP is slightly lower than in the earlier example.
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Figure 2.23: Effects of capacity payments in DE on welfare (l¯= 6,000 MW)
The following Figure 2.24 illustrates the effects of capacity payments in France on welfare
if prices in both markets are limited by a cap.
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Figure 2.24: Effects of capacity payments in FR on welfare (l¯= 3,000 MW)
Figure 2.25 illustrates the same case but this time both markets are connected by a
higher transmission capacity.
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Figure 2.25: Effects of capacity payments in both markets on welfare (l¯= 6,000 MW)
The welfare effects of equal price caps and capacity payments in both countries and
interconnector capacity l¯= 6,000 MW are illustrated in Figure 2.26.
For all three cases presented here the results in the main body of this text are also
applicable.
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Figure 2.26: Effects of capacity payments in both markets on welfare (l¯= 6,000 MW)
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Part II
Strategic behaviour in spacial
natural resource markets
Assessing market structures in resource
markets –
An empirical analysis of the market for
metallurgical coal using various equilibri-
um models
The prevalent market structures found in many resource markets consist of high con-
centration on the supply side and low demand elasticity. Market results are therefore
frequently assumed to be an outcome of strategic interaction between producers. Com-
mon models to investigate the market outcomes and underlying market structures are
games representing competitive markets, strategic Cournot competition and Stackelberg
structures that take into account a dominant player acting first followed by one or more
players. We add to the literature by expanding the application of mathematical mod-
els and applying an Equilibrium Problem with Equilibrium Constraints (EPEC), which
is used to model multi-leader-follower games, to a spatial market. Using our model,
we investigate the prevalent market setting in the international market for metallurgi-
cal coal between 2008 and 2010, whose market characteristics provide arguments for a
wide variety of market structures. Using different statistical measures to compare model
results with actual market outcomes, we find that two previously neglected settings per-
form best: First, a setting in which the four largest metallurgical coal exporting firms
compete against each other as Stackelberg leaders, while the remainders act as Cournot
followers. Second, a setting with BHPB acting as sole Stackelberg leader.
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Many resource markets suffer from high concentration on the supply side and low demand
elasticity. Market results are therefore frequently assumed to be an outcome of strategic
interaction between producers. The use of mathematical models to analyse market
outcomes to gain insights into underlying market structures has a long tradition in
the economic literature. Common models are one-stage games representing competitive
markets or Cournot competition. More advanced two-stage models of the Stackelberg
kind take into account a single leader followed by one or more players. We add to
the literature by expanding the application of mathematical models and applying an
Equilibrium Problem with Equilibrium Constraints (EPEC) to a spatial market, i. e.,
a setup with multiple, geographically disperse demand and supply nodes. This model
class is used to simulate multi-leader-follower games. This enables us to investigate more
complex market structures that have been neglected in previous studies on resource
markets. Omitting these market structures may result in false conclusions about the
prevalent state of competition.
The paper at hand investigates which market structure was prevalent in the international
market for metallurgical coal during the time period 2008 to 2010.39 The international
metallurgical coal market is particularly suited for this kind of analysis since, first, the
supply side is dominated by four large mining firms (hereafter referred to as the Big-
Four), namely BHP Billiton (BHPB), Rio Tinto, Anglo American and Xstrata. Second,
metallurgical coal is an essential input factor in producing pig iron and difficult to
substitute, causing demand to be rather price inelastic. Third, in the period under
scrutiny in this paper, yearly benchmark prices were negotiated between representatives
of the Big-Four and representatives of the large Asian steel makers (Bowden, 2012).
Fourth, one of the firms of the Big-Four, BHP Billiton, is by far the largest firm in the
international market for metallurgical coal. Nonetheless, the other firms played a central
role in the negotiations as well. Consequently, a wide variety of market structures may
be a plausible approximation of the actual market setting.
Our research adds to that of Graham et al. (1999) and Tru¨by (2013) who were the first
to analyse the market for metallurgical coal. The former investigates various market
settings for the year 1996, in which firms or consumers simultaneously choose quantities.
In contrast, the latter focusses on the time period from 2008 to 2010. Regarding the
market structures, the author arrives at the conclusion that assuming the Big-Four
39The terms metallurgical and coking coal are often used interchangeably in the related literature as
well as throughout this paper. Yet, this is not entirely correct since metallurgical coal includes coals
(as it is the case in our data set) that technically are thermal coals but can be used for metallurgical
purposes as well, such as pulverised coal injection (PCI).
75
3.1 Introduction
jointly act as a Stackelberg leader provides the best fit to the actual market outcome.
However, Tru¨by finds that it cannot be ruled out that firms in the market simply engaged
in an oligopolistic Cournot competition. We add to the literature by extending the scope
of possible market structures.40
More specifically, we simulate one scenario in which the Big-Four compete against each
other at a first stage, i. e., choose output to maximise individual profits, while the re-
maining firms form a Cournot fringe and act as followers. This constitutes a multi-
leader-follower game. In another scenario, BHP Billiton takes on the role as the sole
Stackelberg leader, with the rest of the Big-Four choosing quantities simultaneously with
the remaining players as followers. Thereby, we broaden the range of market structures
analysed in the field of spatial resource markets as multi-leader games have thus far
been omitted from existing studies. As investigating collusive behaviour in markets us-
ing simulation models crucially depends on an appropriate and comprehensive market
representation, multi-leader games may help to expose previously overlooked market
structures. Since it is a priori not clear which is the correct demand elasticity, we run
the market simulations for a wide range of values. To assess whether one of the market
structures is superior to the others, we compare simulated prices, trade flows and pro-
duction volumes of the Big-Four to realised market outcomes. In order to compare trade
flows, different statistical measures/tests are applied as suggested by, e. g., Bushnell et al.
(2008), Paulus et al. (2011), and Hecking and Panke (2014).
This paper contributes to the literature on applied industrial organisation and, more
specifically, the analysis of the international market for metallurgical coal. We expand
previous studies by applying an Equilibrium Problem with Equilibrium Constraints
(EPEC), a mathematical programme used to model multi-leader-follower settings, to
a spatial market, i. e., a market with multiple, geographically disperse supply and de-
mand nodes. In doing so, we find that the two additional market settings proposed in
this paper provide a good fit with realised market outcomes for the time period 2008
to 2010. In addition, by analysing production volumes and profits of the Big-Four, we
enhance the market structure analysis by providing an additional plausibility check. We
are able to show that even if simulated prices and trade flows fit well with market out-
comes, a scenario in which the Big-Four form a Cartel that acts as a Stackelberg leader is
less likely since production volumes deviate from actual production. More importantly,
additional revenues of the Big-Four from forming and coordinating a cartel are rather
small compared to a scenario in which all four compete against each other at a first
stage. Accounting for the transaction costs caused by the coordination of the cartel
40Graham et al. (1999) indicate that there could be market power on the demand side as well. However,
given that two out of the three years under consideration in our paper are characterised by high prices,
we focus on setups with market power on the supply side. An analysis of market power on the demand
side could be a subject of further research.
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would further decrease possible benefits. Concerning the demand elasticity, we detect
that simulated prices for elasticities from -0.3 to -0.5 seem to be within a reasonable
range for most of the market structures.
Summing up our findings, one of the main advantages of simulation models is that they
allow us to assess different market structures. Yet, as shown in our paper, it may be
difficult to decide on one setting that provides the best fit. Consequently, such analyses
need to be accompanied by additional analyses similar to our comparison of production
volumes of the Big-Four. To be able to further narrow down the number of potential
market structures, additional data such as firm-by-firm export volumes, which were not
available for all relevant firms in our example, would be helpful.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows: Section 3.2 offers an overview of
the relevant literature, while the methodology is described in Section 3.3. Section 3.4
briefly describes the numerical data used in this study. Section 3.5 is devoted to the
analyses of the empirical results. Section 3.6 concludes.
3.2 Literature review
Commodity markets have often been subject to concerns of high concentration on the
supply side, with several prominent examples being the markets for energy resources
such as oil, natural gas or metallurgical coal. Consequently, there has been substantial
academic research in an attempt to assess whether companies or countries exercised
market power. In order to do so, one of two different methodological approaches –
econometric methods or simulation models – is applied. While both approaches have
their respective advantages and disadvantages41, one of the most persuasive arguments
in favour of using simulation models to assess the exercise of market power is that they
are highly flexible with respect to the specific market structure. This, in principle, not
only enables researchers to answer the question whether or not market power in a specific
market has been exercised, but also provides hints as to which kind of market structure
is prevalent, e. g., whether firms form a cartel or show no signs of explicit cooperation.
The use of mathematical programming models to analyse spatial markets has a long
tradition in economics. Enke (1951) first described the problem of spatial markets,
proposing a solution method using a simple electric circuit to determine equilibrium
prices and quantities in competitive markets. Samuelson (1952) showed how the problem
can be cast into a (welfare) maximisation problem and thereafter be solved using linear
programming. Together with Takayama and Judge (1964, 1971) who extend the spatial
41For a brief overview of the various econometric approaches used in the literature and their respective
advantages and drawbacks, see Germeshausen et al. (2014).
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market representation (e. g., by including monopolistic competition), Samuelson’s work
is generally considered to have laid the groundwork for spatial market analysis using
mathematical programming.
Advances in the representation of markets were made during the 1980s by modelling
imperfect competition (e. g., by Harker, 1984, 1986, Nelson and McCarl, 1984). This
has frequently been done since then, e. g., for steam coal markets (Haftendorn and Holz,
2010, Kolstad and Abbey, 1984, Tru¨by and Paulus, 2012), natural gas markets (Boots
et al., 2004, Egging et al., 2010, Gabriel et al., 2005a, Growitsch et al., 2013, Holz et al.,
2008, Zhuang and Gabriel, 2008), wheat markets (Kolstad and Burris, 1986), oil markets
(Huppmann and Holz, 2012) or for the coking coal and iron ore markets (Hecking and
Panke, 2014). A multi-fuel market model is presented in Huppmann and Egging (2014)
We focus our analysis on the metallurgical coal market. A recent analysis of short-term
market outcomes by Tru¨by (2013) indicates that the market from 2008 to 2010 may has
been characterised by firms exercising market power. This rejects the previous findings
by Graham et al. (1999), although this study focuses on 1996.
Most of the aforementioned studies use models that assume players make decisions si-
multaneously. This model type can be extended to represent bi-level games, the clas-
sical example being Stackelberg games (Stackelberg, 1952). There are several applica-
tions for this type of problem, which can be modelled as a Mathematical Problem with
Equilibrium Constraints (MPEC). MPECs are constrained optimisation problems, with
constraints including equilibrium constraints (see Luo et al., 1996, for an overview of
MPECs). MPECs have for instance been used to model power markets, e. g, by Gabriel
and Leuthold (2010), Wogrin et al. (2011) and natural gas markets, e. g., by Siddiqui
and Gabriel (2013). Bi-level games are, due to non-linearities, computationally more
challenging to solve in comparison to one-level games.
The single-leader Stackelberg game can be extended to a multi-leader-follower game
in which several players make decisions prior to one or more subsequent players. Any
solution to this game must maximise leaders’ profits while simultaneously taking into
account the equilibrium outcome of the second stage. This results in an Equilibrium
Problem with Equilibrium Constraints (EPEC). Due to the concatenation of several
MPEC problems to one EPEC and the resulting high non-linearity, EPECs are even more
difficult to solve than MPECs. Previous EPEC models have mostly been used to analyse
electricity markets, e. g., by Barroso et al. (2006), Sauma and Oren (2007), Shanbhag
et al. (2011), Yao et al. (2008) and Wogrin et al. (2013a). In addition, Lorenczik et al.
(2017) analyse investment decisions in the metallurgical coal market.
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3.3.1 Market Structures
Due to its market structure (with few large producers and relatively low demand elastic-
ity), the metallurgical coal market is often presumed to lack competition. This suspicion
is confirmed by a recent study showing that market outcomes can be reproduced by as-
suming strategic rather than competitive behaviour. Tru¨by (2013) finds that over the
years 2008 to 2010, assuming perfect competition, neither trade flows nor prices match
well with actual market results. In contrast, the non-competitive market structures con-
sidered in the paper perform reasonably well with the exception of the Cournot Cartel
case.42 The paper’s conclusion regarding the market structures is that assuming the
Big-Four jointly act as a Stackelberg leader provides the best fit to the actual market
outcome. However, it cannot be ruled out that firms in the market simply engaged in
an oligopolistic Cournot competition. Therefore, two of the scenarios analysed in Tru¨by
(2013), namely the case of Cournot competition (hereafter, referred to as MCP, which is
the programming approach used to simulate the market setting) and a setting in which
the Big-Four form a cartel that acts as the Stackelberg leader (MPEC Cartel) are taken
into consideration in this paper as well to ease the comparison of results.
We expand the range of investigated market structures by analysing a multi-leader-
follower game as well as one additional market setting involving one Stackelberg leader.
In the multi-leader-follower game, the Big-Four compete against each other at the first
stage and take into account the reaction of the other firms engaging in Cournot compe-
tition at the second stage (EPEC Big 4). We reason that this setting is relevant since,
first, benefits in terms of additional revenues from forming a cartel are rather small
when compared to the EPEC Big 4 scenario, even without accounting for the transac-
tion costs that go along with coordinating a cartel. Thus, while still acting as leaders,
it is reasonable to assume that the Big-Four compete against each other. Second, the
simulated production volumes by the Big-Four fit historical production data better in
the two additional settings proposed in this paper than in the MPEC Cartel case. Thus,
they are worth a closer investigation. Both reasons will be discussed in depth in Section
3.5.3.
Finally, we simulate an additional single Stackelberg leader setting in which BHP Billiton
sets quantities in a first stage with the remaining firms being followers (MPEC BHBP).
42In the Cournot Cartel case, the Big-Four are assumed to engage in a cartel and, thus, jointly optimise
their total supply. Tru¨by (2013) finds that under this market setting, prices could only be reproduced
when assuming very high elasticities. Concerning trade flows, the linear hypothesis tests suggest that
simulated trade flows do not resemble actual market outcomes in 2009 for all elasticities, while in the
other years the H0-hypothesis could be rejected for elasticities up to -0.2 (2008) and -0.3 (2010).
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The main reason that modelling such a market structure is intuitive is the fact that
BHBP is by far the world’s most important coking coal miner. Figure 3.1 provides an
overview of the market structures investigated in this paper.
EPEC Big 4
MPEC BHPB
MPEC Cartel
MCP
first stage second stage
BHP, Rio, Anglo, Xstrata others +
Big 4* others +
BHP Rio, Anglo, Xstrata, others +
BHP, Rio, Anglo, Xstrata, others +
* corresponding exporters form a cartel; + players not belonging to the “Big4“, but individually maximize profits
Figure 3.1: Overview of modelled market structures
To simulate the different aforementioned coking coal market settings, three different
types of simulation models are used. The first calculates the expected market outcome
in a Cournot oligopoly in which all players decide simultaneously about produced and
shipped quantities. The two other models constitute bi-level games in which players
act in consecutive order. In the Stackelberg game, one player (or a group of players
forming a cartel) acts first followed by the remaining players. The last model type
represents a market with multiple (Stackelberg) leaders and one or more followers. From
a modelling perspective, the first model constitutes a Mixed Complementary Problem
(MCP). The second and third models are implemented as a Mathematical Problem
with Equilibrium Constraints (MPEC) and an Equilibrium Problem with Equilibrium
Constraints (EPEC), respectively.
3.3.2 Model descriptions
Although we focus our analysis on the coking coal market, the model is suitable for
a multitude of similar commodity markets such as the iron ore, copper ore, oil or gas
market, which are characterised by a high concentration on the supply side and therefore
may not be competitive. Thus, we use general terms for the model description as well
as generic notation to emphasise the applicability of our approach to markets other
than the coking coal market. Table 3.1 summarises the most relevant nomenclature
used throughout this section, i. e., displays the abbreviations used for the various model
sets, parameters and variables and provides a short description. Additional symbols are
explained throughout the text where necessary.
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Table 3.1: Model sets, parameters and variables
Abbreviation Description
Model sets
i ∈ I Players
j ∈ J Markets
m ∈M Production facilities
Model parameters
aj Reservation price [per unit]
bj Linear slope of demand function
cm Variable production costs [per unit]
capm Production capacity [units per year]
tci,j Transportation costs [per unit]
Model variables
Pj Market price [per unit]
si,j Supply [units]
xm Production [units]
3.3.2.1 The MCP model
The first model assumes a market in which all producers decide simultaneously about
the use of production facilities and the delivery of goods. Each player i ∈ I maximises
profits according to:
max
xm,si,j :m∈Mi
∑
j
Pj · si,j −
∑
j∈J
tci,j · si,j −
∑
m∈Mi
cm · xm
subject to
capm − xm ≥ 0, ∀m ∈Mi (λm)∑
m∈Mi
xm −
∑
j
si,j ≥ 0 (µi)
Pj = aj − bj · (si,j + S−i,j), ∀j
si,j ≥ 0, ∀j
xm ≥ 0, ∀m ∈Mi .
Total supplied quantities S−i,j (=
∑
−i 6=i s−i,j) to market j by other producers (−i)
are taken as given. Hence, each producer maximises revenues minus costs (production
plus transportation) taking into account capacity restrictions (with λm being the dual
variable for the capacity limit) and the restriction that total production has to be greater
than total supply (with µi as the respective dual variable). As all production facilities
of each player are located in the same area, transportation costs between production
and specific demand nodes are assumed to be identical. Since different years are not
interlinked, they can be optimised separately.
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Maximising each players’ profits is equivalent to finding a solution that satisfies the
following Karush-Kuhn-Tucker (KKT) conditions simultaneously for all players:
0 ≤ tci,j − Pj + bj · si,j + µi ⊥ si,j ≥ 0, ∀ i, j
0 ≤ cm + λm − µi ⊥ xm ≥ 0, ∀ m ∈Mi
0 ≤ capm − xm ⊥ λm ≥ 0, ∀ m
0 ≤
∑
m∈Mi
xm −
∑
j
si,j ⊥ µi ≥ 0, ∀ i
Pj = aj − bj · (si,j + S−i,j), ∀ j
si,j ≥ 0, ∀ i, j
xm ≥ 0, ∀ m ,
with the perp operator (⊥) meaning that the product of the expressions to the left and
to the right has to equal zero. The first inequality reflects the first order condition for
the optimal supply of player i to region j: Marginal revenues of additional supply (i. e.,
market price P minus transportation costs tc and the marginal costs of supply µ) have
to equal supply times the slope of the linear demand function b, i. e., the reduction of
revenue due to the negative price effect of additional supply. The second inequality,
which represents the first order condition for production, reflects the marginal costs of
supply µ as the sum of variable production costs c and the scarcity value of capacity λ.
The third and fourth conditions represent the complementarity conditions forcing pro-
duction to be within the capacity limit (with λ being the scarcity value of capacity) and
production to meet supply (with marginal production costs µ). The equality condition
constitutes the linear demand function followed by non-negativity constraints for supply
and production.
Due to the strict quasi-concave objective function and the convexity of restrictions, the
KKT conditions are necessary and sufficient for an optimal solution.
3.3.2.2 The MPEC model
In the MPEC model, we seek to represent a Stackelberg market structure with one leader
(l) taking into account the equilibrium decisions of the follower(s). The model equations
are as follows:
max
xm,sl,j ,λm,µi
∑
j
Pj · sl,j −
∑
j∈J
tcl,j · sl,j −
∑
m∈Ml
cm · xm
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subject to
0 ≤ tci,j − Pj + bj · si,j + µi ⊥ si,j ≥ 0, ∀ i 6= l, j
0 ≤ cm + λm − µi ⊥ xm ≥ 0, ∀ m ∈Mi 6=l
0 ≤ capm − xm ⊥ λm ≥ 0, ∀ m ∈Mi 6=l
0 ≤
∑
m∈Mi
xm −
∑
j
si,j ⊥ µi ≥ 0, ∀ i 6= l
Pj = aj − bj · (S−i,j + sl,j), ∀ j
si,j ≥ 0, ∀ i, j
xm ≥ 0, ∀ m .
Thus, the leader decides on supply taking the equilibrium outcome of the second stage
(which influences the market price) into account. The followers (−i) take the other
followers’ as well as the leader’s supply as given. The objective function is non-convex
and thus solving the MPEC problem in the form previously described does usually not
guarantee a globally optimal solution. Thus, we transform the model into a Mixed
Integer Linear Problem (MILP) that can be solved to optimality with prevalent solvers.
There exist several approaches for linearising the existing non-linearities. Due to its
simple implementation, we follow the approach presented by Fortuny-Amat and McCarl
(1981) for the complementary constraints (for an alternative formulation see Siddiqui
and Gabriel, 2013). For instance, the non-linear constraint
0 ≤ cm − Pj + bj · si,j + λm ⊥ si,j ≥ 0
is replaced by the following linear constraints
0 ≤ cm − Pj + bj · si,j + λm ≤M · ui,j
0 ≤ si,j ≤M(1− ui,j)
with M being a large enough constant (for hints on how to determine M , see Gabriel
and Leuthold (2010)).
For the remaining non-linear term in the objective function (Pj · si,j), we follow the
approach presented by Pereira et al. (2005) using a binary expansion for the supply
variable si,j . The continuous variable is replaced by discrete variables
si,j = ∆s
∑
k
2kbsk,i,j
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where ∆s represents the step size, i. e., the precision of the linear approximation, and
k the number of steps. Variables bsk,i,j are binary. The term Pj · si,j in the objective
function is replaced by Pj ·∆s
∑
k 2
kzsk,i,j . In addition, the following constraints have to
be included in the model
0 ≤ zsk,i,j ≤M sbsk,i,j
0 ≤ Pj − zsk,i,j ≤M s
(
1− bsk,i,j
)
.
The thereby formulated model constitutes a MILP that can be reliably solved to a
globally optimal solution.43
3.3.2.3 The EPEC model
The EPEC model extends the Stackelberg game by enabling the representation of sev-
eral leaders taking actions simultaneously under consideration of the reaction of one
or more followers. The solution of an EPEC constitutes the simultaneous solution of
several MPECs. Whereas MPECs are already difficult to solve due to their non-linear
nature, it is even more difficult to solve EPECs. KKT conditions generally cannot be
formulated for MPECs as regularity conditions are violated. Our model is solved using
a diagonalisation approach. In doing so, we reduce the solution of the EPEC to the
solution of a series of MPECs. The iterative solution steps are as follows:
1. Define starting values for the supply decisions s0l,j of all leaders l ∈ L, a convergence
criterion , a maximum number of iterations N and a learning rate R
2. n = 1
3. For all leaders,
(a) Fix the supply decisions for all but the current leader
(b) Solve current leader’s MPEC problem to obtain optimal supplies snl,j , ∀j
(c) Set snl,j equal to (1−R) · sn−1l,j +R · snl,j , ∀j
4. If |snl,j − sn−1l,j | <  for all producers: equilibrium found, quit
5. If n = N : failed to converge, quit
6. n = n+ 1: return to step 3.
EPECs may or may not have one or multiple (pure strategy) equilibrium solutions, and
only one solution can be found per model run. In addition, if the iterations do not
43 Within the range of the discretisation of the production variable.
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converge to an equilibrium, this does not necessarily mean that no solution exists. This
problem can partially be solved using multiple initial values for the iteration process, but
it cannot be guaranteed that additional equilibria have not been missed. Despite these
drawbacks, diagonalisation has been used widely and successfully in the corresponding
literature (see Gabriel et al. (2012) and the literature cited therein).
For each EPEC setting, we run our model five times with varying start values and
iteration orders to check for multiple equilibria. Each run converged to similar results
with deviations of prices from the mean values of maximum 5%, single trade flows below
1.2 Mt and total production per mine below 0.6 Mt. Profits of the Big-Four and the
cartel groups differed to a maximum of 1%. Whether theses deviations are due to a
multiplicity of (similar) equilibra or to the (lack of) precision of the applied algorithm
is not quite clear. In consideration of the almost equal results, we refrain from further
analyses of the deviations.
3.4 Data
Modelling international commodity markets may be computationally challenging due
to their spatial nature, i. e., multiple supply and demand nodes. In most empirical
examples, each supply node is able to transport the commodity to each demand node
giving rise to a large set of potential trade routes. The possible routes rapidly increase
with additional demand or supply nodes. Whether a certain set of trade routes turns out
to be computationally challenging depends on which market structure one would like to
analyse. While solvers for Mixed Complementary Problems such as PATH (see Dirkse
and Ferris, 1995) can handle quite large systems of equations and variables, the same
setup may be intractable when formulated as a Mathematical Problem with Equilibrium
Constraints (MPEC) or other more complex problems such as an Equilibrium Problems
with Equilibrium Constraints (EPEC) due to their high non-linearity.
Since we are particularly interested in how well a multi-leader-follower game is able to
model the coking coal market, we had to reduce the number of mines per player to one
to keep the model feasible.44 To ensure comparability, the same data setup was used for
all market structures analysed in this paper irrespective of whether the respective solvers
may have been able to handle larger sets of equations and variables (see Appendix A for
production and shipping costs as well as capacities).
In total, the model used to conduct our empirical analysis consists of twelve supply
nodes and six demand nodes. The supply side consists of individual firms as well as
44We would like to thank Johannes Tru¨by for allowing us to use his extensive mine-by-mine dataset
on the international market for metallurgical coal.
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countries. In addition to each of the four firms belonging to the Big-Four, i. e., BHP
Billiton (BHPB), Rio Tinto, Anglo American and Xstrata, eight country supply nodes
are included in the model of the international coking coal market (Table 3.2 shows
which countries on the supply and demand side are represented in the model). When
aggregating the data, production capacities of each mine belonging to the same firm or
country are simply added up. Concerning production costs, we use the quantity-weighted
average of the individual mines of a firm or country.
Table 3.2: Overview of firms and countries used in the model
Supply nodes Demand nodes
Countries/regions
belonging to demand node
BHP Billiton JP KR Japan and Korea
Rio Tinto CN TW China and Taiwan
Anglo American IN India
Xstrata
LAM
Latin America (mainly
Australia Brazil and Chile)
Canada EUR MED Europe and Mediterranean
China Other Africa and Middle East
Indonesia
New Zealand
Russia
South Africa
United States
The demand side is represented by six nodes, most of which represent a demand clus-
ter, with India being the only exception. The demand clusters were chosen based on
geographical proximity and importance for international trade of metallurgical coal.
Geographical proximity is important because shipment costs, which represent a large
share in total import costs, largely depend on the shipping distance. Due to their minor
importance in terms of the share of total import volumes, we included Africa and the
Middle East in one demand node despite the large area this demand node covers. Inverse
demand functions are assumed to be linear (see Table 3.4 in Appendix A for the used
market data).45 Since it is a priori not clear which is the correct elasticity, we run the
market analyses for a range of values. More specifically, we consider elasticities from
-0.1 to -0.6. This is in line with Bard and Loncar (1991), who estimated the elasticity
of coking coal demand to lie in the range from -0.15 to -0.5, with Western European
(Asian) demand elasticity lying in the lower (upper) part of this range. Graham et al.
45Choosing a linear functional form is a simplification of the real, unobservable demand function. It
implies that the absolute price reaction to a specific absolute change in coking coal output is constant.
The price elasticity, however, is not constant and depends on the price/demand combination. The
stated elasticities refer to the elasticity at the reference price/demand combination. The choice of a
linear demand function simplifies solving the model, particularly the two-stage ones.
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(1999) finds that for 1996, a demand elasticity of -0.3 characterises best the actual mar-
ket outcomes, whereas Tru¨by (2013) concludes that for the years 2008 to 2010, demand
elasticity falls in the range from -0.3 to -0.5.
3.5 Results
In this section, the model results are presented and discussed. We start out by comparing
the prices under the different market settings to the actual market prices. This allows
us to narrow down the range of elasticities we need to focus on. In a second step, we
use three statistical measures, namely a linear regression test as suggested by Bushnell
et al. (2008), Spearman’s rank correlation coefficient, and Theil’s inequality coefficient,
to assess whether trade flows simulated under different market structures match actual
trade flows. Finally, revenues and production volumes of the Big-Four are analysed.
3.5.1 Prices
Figure 3.2 displays the actual FOB benchmark in 2008 (straight black line) as well as
the simulated FOB prices for a range of elasticities (-0.1 to -0.6) and for the four market
structure settings analysed in this paper. Four observations can be made: First, for
very low elasticities, i. e., between -0.1 and -0.2, none of the market settings is able to
reproduce actual market prices. Although only the results for 2008 are displayed in
Figure 3.2, taking a look at the other years (see Figure 3.6 in Appendix C) confirms this
conclusion.
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MCP Actual price
Elasticity
Figure 3.2: FOB Prices for a range of (abs.) elasticities – model results vs. actual
benchmark price
Second, prices in the multi-leader-follower setting, EPEC Big 4, as well as in the setting
in which BHP Billiton acts as a Stackelberg leader, MPEC BHPB, are more or less
equivalent. This result is caused by the interaction of three effects (our argumentation
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follows Daughety (1990)): First, each following firm that becomes a Stackelberg leader
has the incentive to increase its output since, now, it takes into account the optimal
reaction of the remaining followers to a change in the output of the Stackelberg leaders.
Second, increasing the number of leaders causes the output of each (incumbent) leader
to drop. This may be interpreted as the result of the intensifying Cournot competition
between the leaders. Third, the total output of the followers decreases with each firm
becoming a Stackelberg leader. In our simulations, these effects seem to counterbalance
each other, which is why the two market settings, EPEC Big 4 and MPEC BHPB, result
in similar market outputs and prices.
Third, another interesting aspect is that (for low demand elasticities) prices for the case
in which the Big-Four form a cartel that acts as a Stackelberg leader (labelled MPEC
Cartel) are below the prices in the Cournot oligopoly (MCP).46 In other words, the
output-increasing effect of becoming a leader is stronger than the output-decreasing
effect of collusion (forming the cartel). Building on Shaffer (1995), the intuition be-
hind this finding can be explained as follows: For the case of N identical firms, zero
marginal costs and a linear demand, the output of a cartel with k-members that acts as
a Stackelberg leader is higher than in a Cournot oligopoly for k lower than N+12 , but is
decreasing in k. In other words, the bigger the cartel becomes, the more dominant the
output-reducing collusion effect.47 This is also in line with the results for the case in
which BHPB acts as single leader (MPEC BHPB).
Finally, the higher the elasticity, the more the simulated prices converge. This can be
explained by two effects: First, with increasing elasticity, total production increases as
well (along with decreasing prices). As such, the capacity utilisation over all players
increases from a minimum of 79 % (MCP, eta -0.1) to around 97 % (all scenarios with
eta -0.6) for 2008. This narrows the ability to differentiate strategic behaviour as more
players produce at their capacity limit. Second, increased price elasticity of demand itself
narrows the potential for strategic choice of production as prices react more severely to
changes in output.
Consequently, we conclude that the range of elasticities may be narrowed down to the
range of -0.3 to -0.5, which is in line with previous analyses (see Section 3.4).
46For higher demand elasticities (i. e., larger than -0.3), prices of both cases are identical (given the
tolerance of the applied linearisation method).
47In the case of k = N , i. e., the cartel consists of all firms N in the market, the price in the market
would equal the monopoly price.
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3.5.2 Trade flows
In a first step, we investigate whether simulated trade flows under the different market
structures match the actual market outcomes by regressing the former on the latter. If
the two were a perfect match, then the estimated linear equation would have a slope
of one and an intercept of zero. Table 3.3 shows the p-values of the F-test that checks
whether the coefficient of the slope and the intercept jointly equal one and zero, respec-
tively, for six different elasticities and the four market structures.48
Taking a closer look at Table 3.3, we can conclude that all four market settings provide
a reasonable fit with actual trade flows in the relevant range of elasticities (-0.3 to -0.5).
This finding generally holds true for lower elasticities as well, with one exception. In
the case of the MCP scenario, trade flows in 2008 and 2010 for an elasticity of -0.1 and
in 2009 for an elasticity of -0.1 and -0.2 do not seem to provide a reasonable fit since
the H0-hypothesis is rejected. It should, however, be noted that 2009 was special in the
sense that it was characterised by a significant drop in utilisation rates of the mines since
steel demand and, thus, demand for coking coal plummeted compared to the previous
year because of the financial crisis.
Table 3.3: P-values of the F-tests (β0 = 0 and β1 = 1) for a range of elasticities
Elasticity
EPEC Big 4 MPEC BHPB
2008 2009 2010 2008 2009 2010
e = -0.1 0.86 0.86 0.64 0.86 0.85 0.68
e = -0.2 1.00 0.80 0.90 1.00 0.81 0.92
e = -0.3 0.92 0.57 0.98 0.92 0.57 0.99
e = -0.4 0.85 0.44 0.95 0.84 0.46 0.97
e = -0.5 0.74 0.48 0.91 0.73 0.50 0.92
e = -0.6 0.59 0.52 0.84 0.59 0.52 0.85
Elasticity
MPEC Cartel MCP
2008 2009 2010 2008 2009 2010
e = -0.1 0.79 0.76 0.70 0.08* 0.02** 0.06*
e = -0.2 1.00 0.66 0.12 0.22 0.09* 0.16
e = -0.3 0.43 0.45 0.37 0.43 0.25 0.34
e = -0.4 0.75 0.85 0.73 0.67 0.52 0.59
e = -0.5 0.78 0.49 0.92 0.77 0.73 0.81
e = -0.6 0.57 0.40 0.85 0.61 0.90 0.84
Significance levels: 1% ’***’ 5% ’**’ 10% ’*’
In order to cross-check the results from the linear hypothesis test, two additional in-
dicators are taken into consideration. Figure 3.3 depicts Spearman’s rank correlation
and Theil’s inequality coefficient for the different market settings and the whole range
48See Appendix B for more details on the methodology used in this subsection.
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of elasticities in 2008.49 Both coefficients confirm the analysis of the linear hypothesis
test since neither of the two indicators allows us to discard one of the market settings
when looking at the relevant range of elasticities.
Figure 3.3: Spearman’s correlation coefficients and Theil’s inequality coefficients for
a range of (abs.) elasticities
3.5.3 Production and revenues of the Big-Four
So far the conducted analyses have not provided significant evidence that one of the
market structures investigated in this paper performs better or worse than another.
Therefore, we take a closer look at two further components: revenues and production
volumes of the Big-Four.
When analysing the differences in profits of the Big-Four between the various market
structures simulated in this paper, we can observe that, as expected, the Big-Four make
the largest profits in the MPEC Cartel setting. However, relative differences between
the different market structures are negligible (< 1%), which becomes obvious when
comparing the bars in Figure 3.4.50
Thus, the conclusion that can be drawn from this comparison is that the gains of forming
and coordinating a cartel are small even when neglecting transaction costs that go along
with maintaining the cartel.
Turning now to production, we compare the absolute difference in simulated versus
actual production volumes of the Big-Four cumulated over the time period investigated
in this paper (2008 to 2010). This indicator was chosen because it captures differences
in the total production volumes of the Big-Four as well as deviations in each firm’s
production volumes. In addition, we compare the sum of squared differences between
actual and modelled production to assess the structure of deviations. The resulting
differences are depicted in Figure 3.5 for a demand elasticity of -0.4, which is the mean
value of the range of elasticities found to be relevant (see Subsection 3.5.1). As can
49Conclusions remain unchanged when focusing on the other two years, as can be seen in Figure 3.7
in Appendix C.
50The results for 2009 and 2010 are similar.
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MPEC_MIP_big4 EPEC_big4
2008 BHP_Rio_Anglo_Xstrata Rio Anglo Xstrata BHP Summe
-0.1 eta01 43.918 6.163 6.289 5.535 25.573 43.561
-0.2 eta02 25.917 3.607 3.771 3.311 15.084 25.773
-0.3 eta03 20.756 2.768 2.919 2.579 11.659 19.924
-0.4 eta04 18.723 2.561 2.716 2.410 10.824 18.511
-0.5 eta05 17.717 2.447 2.599 2.303 10.337 17.687
-0.6 eta06 17.170 2.361 2.518 2.239 10.025 17.143
MPEC_MIP_big4 EPEC_big4
2009 BHP_Rio_Anglo_Xstrata Rio Anglo Xstrata BHP Summe
eta01 17.674 2.404 2.559 2.439 10.031 17.433
eta02 10.859 1.455 1.619 1.565 6.153 10.792
eta03 8.445 1.117 1.277 1.247 4.780 8.420
eta04 7.283 949 1.108 1.090 4.081 7.229
eta05 6.651 863 1.020 1.007 3.725 6.615
eta06 6.254 806 964 956 3.492 6.217
MPEC_MIP_big4 EPEC_big4
2010 BHP_Rio_Anglo_Xstrata Rio Anglo Xstrata BHP Summe
eta01 38.607 5.179 5.361 5.108 22.737 38.386
eta02 22.436 2.979 3.168 3.029 13.196 22.372
eta03 18.048 2.321 2.509 2.407 10.379 17.617
eta04 16.044 2.095 2.285 2.196 9.395 15.972
eta05 14.997 1.961 2.151 2.067 8.805 14.984
eta06 14.337 1.871 2.059 1.983 8.413 14.325
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Figure 3.4: 2008’s profits of the Big-Four in the three two-stage-games for the whole
range of elasticities
be seen in the left diagram, cumulated absolute differences to historical data lie in
the range of 8% to 17%, with the MPEC Cartel setting performing worst. On the
other hand, the market structures in which BHP Billiton is the sole Stackelberg leader
and the case of four non-colluding leaders perform best. Taking a closer look at the
individual differences of the two settings with the largest differences, it becomes obvious
that the MCP setting performs reasonably well in 2008 and 2010 but fails to reproduce
the decline in production of the Big-Four in 2009. This is also the reason for the
poor performance regarding squared deviations. In contrast, the MPEC Cartel setting
constantly overestimates the production of BHP Billiton and underestimates the one of
Rio Tinto, with the reason being that this minimizes the overall production costs of the
cartel. In the two cases that perform best (MPEC BHPB and EPEG Big 4), we observe
no significant patterns.
Realised values Model results
2008 2009 2010 Summe Scenario
BHP 59,5 59,6 61,5 180,6
Rio 14,6 13,4 15,7 43,7
Anglo 14,6 13,9 15,9 44,4
XStrata 12,2 12,6 14,3 39,1
Total 100,9 99,6 107,4 307,9
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Figure 3.5: Cumulated absolute and squared difference in production volumes of the
Big-Four to actual market outcomes at an elasticity of -0.4
In summary, three conclusions may be drawn from our analyses: i) We are able to
support previous findings that the setting in which a cartel of the Big-Four acts as the
Stackelberg leader, MPEC Cartel, as well as the Cournot oligopoly setting sufficiently
reproduce actual trade flows and prices. ii) However, we also show that additional
revenues from forming a cartel are rather small and individual production volumes of
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the Big-Four in the cartel setting do not match well with actual production numbers.
Thus, we argue that a market structure with a cartel of the Big-Four that moves first
is less likely than the other scenarios. iii) We find that the two settings with one or
more leading firms reproduce actual trade flows and prices as good as the cartel and
the Cournot settings. In addition, these two settings perform better than the former
two settings with respect to the production volumes of the Big-Four. In particular, the
methodology introduced in this paper to represent multi-leader-follower games scored
among the best results in all tests used in our analysis.
3.6 Conclusions
Previous analyses of the prevailing market structure in spatial resource markets mainly
focussed on the comparison of actual market outcomes to market results under perfect
competition, Cournot competition and with a single (Stackelberg) leader. We add to
these analyses by developing a model able to represent multi-leader market structures.
We apply our model to the metallurgical coal market, which is especially suited as its
market structure suggests a multitude of possible markets structures that have partly
been neglected in previous analyses. Thereby, we are able to demonstrate the practica-
bility and usefulness of our approach.
Tru¨by (2013) shows that market results of the metallurgical coal market indicate non-
competitive behaviour. Actual prices and trade flows could rather be explained by
Cournot competition or a game in which the Big-Four form a cartel that acts as a
single Stackelberg leader. Our results confirm that a Cournot oligopoly as well as a
cartel consisting of the Big-Four fit well with observed prices and trade flows of the
metallurgical coal market from 2008 to 2010. Based on our results, however, the same
is true for two additional settings: First, a market with BHPB acting as a Stackelberg
leader and the remaining players competing afterwards in a Cournot fashion (MPEC
BHBP). Second, a multi-leader market structure where the Big-Four independently act
first followed by the remaining players (EPEC Big 4). By additionally analysing profits
and comparing the actual production data with models results, we conclude that the two
latter scenarios are even more likely than the previously suggested market structures.
For 2009, in which overall demand has been low, model outcomes, in particularly con-
cerning prices, do not fit as well as for the other two years. Hence, taking into account
market power on the demand side – as suggested by Graham et al. (1999) – might be
more appropriate than the market settings analysed in this paper.
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To improve the accuracy of current market structure analyses and to further narrow
down the set of potential market structures, it could be useful to have more detailed
firm and market data, also for smaller market participants. In order to be able to
solve the computationally challenging non-linear bi-level games, we had to aggregate
our dataset. Improving available solution methods for these problems to obtain mine-
by-mine results may help to discriminate between the goodness of fit of different model
results with actual market data. However, this would require detailed data availability.
Unfortunately, neither mine-by-mine market results nor detailed profitability data on a
firm level were available.
Our results demonstrate the multiplicity of possible market structures able to explain
actual market outcomes concerning trade flows and market prices. By analysing the
production data, we were able to identify two promising candidates for the underlying
market structure. However, we are aware of the fact that the market structures analysed
in this paper may not cover the whole range of potentially interesting settings, e. g., as
indicated by Graham et al. (1999), the demand side could be exerting market power as
well.
From this findings, two conclusions can be drawn: First, omitting potential scenarios can
lead to false conclusions of the prevailing market structure. This is relevant especially
when it comes to judging if market outcomes reveal collusive behaviour. Second, a
market structure analysis solely based on market outcomes with respect to price and
trade flows may not be sufficient to determine the actual market structure but should
rather be completed using additional analyses.
These conclusions lead to the following subjects for future research: First, expanding
the range of market settings under consideration, in particular including market power
on the demand side, could give additional insights. This is especially relevant given
the varying observable levels of demand in different years. Second, including more
years could strengthen the explanatory power of the findings and eventually help to
identify changing market structures over time. Third, expanding the model to include
investment decisions could further strengthen the understanding of current markets and
their development as research on this topic is rather thin.51
51See Lorenczik et al. (2017) for an analysis for the coking coal market that includes investment
decisions.
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3.7.1 Appendix A: Input data
Table 3.4: Reference demand [Mt] and price [US$/t]
2008 2009 2010
demand price demand price demand price
JP KR 80 300 71 129 87 227
CN TW 10 300 26 129 42 227
IN 26 300 26 129 35 227
LAM 16 300 15 129 17 227
EUR MED 63 300 43 129 58 227
Other 18 300 10 129 7 227
Table 3.5: Production costs [US$/t]
2008 2009 2010
Australia 67 71 73
Canada 100 101 104
China 91 114 117
Indonesia 110 112 113
New Zealand 72 73 75
Russia 162 163 156
South Africa 51 52 53
USA 117 108 113
Anglo American 67 69 70
BHP Billiton 76 77 80
Rio Tinto 78 79 82
Xstrata 63 65 67
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Table 3.6: Production capacities [Mtpa]
2008 2009 2010
Australia 37.4 34.4 42.6
Canada 25.6 28.0 28.0
China 4.0 2.1 2.1
Indonesia 2.1 2.1 2.5
New Zealand 2.6 2.6 2.6
Russia 15.2 15.5 15.5
South Africa 0.8 0.8 0.8
USA 52.2 57.2 60.2
Anglo American 15.1 15.1 16.3
BHP Billiton 63.6 63.6 71.4
Rio Tinto 15.0 15.0 16.2
Xstrata 13.2 14.5 15.0
Table 3.7: Shipping costs [US$/t]
CN TW EUR MED IN
2008 2009 2010 2008 2009 2010 2008 2009 2010
Australia 24.7 13.8 15.9 42.9 18.9 20.9 29.9 15.4 17.5
Canada 30.5 15.6 17.6 37.6 17.6 19.6 37.1 17.4 19.5
China 15.2 10.5 12.4 41.8 18.6 20.6 26.5 14.4 16.4
Indonesia 17.9 11.5 13.5 39.9 18.2 20.2 23.5 13.4 15.5
New Zealand 29.6 15.3 17.4 42.5 18.8 20.8 32.3 16.1 18.2
Russia 16.7 11.1 13.1 16.5 11.0 13.0 27.4 14.7 16.7
South Africa 31.6 15.9 18.0 32.7 16.2 18.3 25.1 14.0 16.0
USA 41.7 18.6 20.6 23.7 13.5 15.6 37.8 17.6 19.6
JP KR LAM Other
2008 2009 2010 2008 2009 2010 2008 2009 2010
Australia 24.8 13.9 15.9 36.2 17.2 19.2 33.7 16.5 18.5
Canada 26.4 14.4 16.4 36.4 17.2 19.3 41.2 18.5 20.5
China 15.1 10.4 12.4 42.5 18.8 20.8 32.1 16.0 18.1
Indonesia 22.2 13.0 15.0 37.7 17.6 19.6 26.9 14.5 16.6
New Zealand 29.2 15.2 17.3 32.3 16.1 18.1 36.2 17.2 19.2
Russia 12.4 9.3 11.2 33.0 16.3 18.4 27.2 14.6 16.7
South Africa 34.9 16.8 18.9 26.0 14.2 16.3 26.2 14.3 16.4
USA 39.2 18.0 20.0 27.9 14.8 16.9 36.5 17.3 19.3
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3.7.2 Appendix B: Statistical measures52
In order to assess the accuracy of our model, we compare market outcomes such as
production, prices and trade flows to our model results. In comparing trade flows, we
follow, for example, Kolstad and Abbey (1984), Bushnell et al. (2008) and more recently
Tru¨by (2013) as well as Hecking and Panke (2014) by applying three different statistical
measures: a linear hypothesis test, the Spearman rank correlation coefficient and Theil’s
inequality coefficient. In the following, we briefly discuss the setup as well as some of
the potential weakness of each of the three tests.
Starting with the linear hypothesis test, if the actual and model trade flows had a perfect
fit, the dots in a scatter plot of the two data sets would align along a line starting at zero
and have a slope equal to one. Therefore, we test model accuracy by regressing actual
trade flows At on the trade flows of our model Mt, with t representing the trade flow
between exporting country e ∈ E and importing region d ∈ D, as data on trade flows is
available only on a country level. Using ordinary least squares (OLS), we estimate the
following linear equation:
At = β0 + β1 ∗Mt + t.
Modelled trade flows have a bad fit with actual data if the joint null hypothesis of β0 = 0
and β1 = 1 can be rejected at typical significance levels. One of the reasons why this test
is applied in various studies is that it allows hypothesis testing, while the other two tests
used in this paper are distribution-free and thus do not allow such testing. However,
there is a drawback to this test as well, since the results of the test are very sensitive to
how good the model is able to simulate outliers. To improve the evaluation of the model
accuracy regarding the trade flows, we apply two more tests.
The second test we employ is the Spearman’s rank correlation coefficient, which, as
already indicated by its name, can be used to compare the rank by volume of the
trade flow t in reality to the rank in modelled trade flows. Spearman’s rank correlation
coefficient, also referred to as Spearman’s rho, is defined as follows:
rho = 1−
T∑
t
d2t /(n
3 − n)
with di,j being the difference in the ranks of the modelled and the actual trade flows
and T being the total number of trade flows. Since Spearman’s rho is not based on a
distribution, hypothesis testing is not applicable. Instead, one looks for a large value
52This section has already been published in Hecking and Panke (2014), which is co-authored by one
of the authors of this paper.
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of rho. However, Spearman’s rank correlation coefficient does not tell you anything
about how well the predicted trade flows compare volumewise to the actual trade flow
volumes. For example, rho could be equal to one despite total trade volume being ten
times higher in reality as long as the market shares of the trade flows match.
Finally, we apply the normed-version of Theil’s inequality coefficient U , which lies be-
tween 0 and 1, to analyse the differences between actual and modelled trade flows. A U
of 0 indicates that modelled trade flows perfectly match actual trade flow, while a large
U hints at a large difference between the two data sets. Theil’s inequality coefficient is
defined as:
U =
√∑T
t (Mt −At)√∑T
t M
2
t +
√∑T
t A
2
t
.
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3.7.3 Appendix C: Prices and statistical measures for trade flows
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Figure 3.6: FOB Prices for a range of (abs.) elasticities – model results vs. actual
benchmark price
Statistical measures for trade flows
Figure 3.7: Spearman’s correlation coefficients and Theil’s inequality coefficients for
a range of (abs.) elasticities
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Modeling strategic investment decisions
in spatial markets
Markets for natural resources and commodities are often oligopolistic. In these mar-
kets, production capacities are key for strategic interaction between the oligopolists.
We analyze how different market structures influence oligopolistic capacity investments
and thereby affect supply, prices and rents in spatial natural resource markets using
mathematical programing models. The models comprise an investment stage and a sup-
ply stage in which players compete in quantities. We compare three models, a perfect
competition and two Cournot models, in which the product is either traded through
long-term contracts or on spot markets in the supply stage. Tractability and practical-
ity of the approach are demonstrated in an application to the international metallurgical
coal market. Results may vary substantially between the different models. The metal-
lurgical coal market has recently made progress in moving away from long-term contracts
and more towards spot market-based trade. Based on our results, we conclude that this
regime switch is likely to raise consumer rents but lower producer rents, while the effect
on total welfare is negligible.
4.1 Introduction
Markets for natural resources and commodities such as iron ore, copper ore, coal, oil
or gas are often highly concentrated and do not appear to be competitively organized
at first glance. In such markets, large companies run mines, rigs or gas wells and trade
their product globally. In the short term, marginal production costs and capacities are
given and determine the companies’ competitive position in the oligopolistic market.
However, in the longer term, companies can choose their capacity and consequently
alter their competitive position.
Investing in production capacity is a key managerial challenge and determining the
right amount of capacity is rarely trivial in oligopolistic markets. Suppliers have to take
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competitors’ reactions into account not only when deciding on the best supply level but
also when choosing the best amount of capacity.
In this paper, we introduce three different models to address this capacity expansion
problem in oligopolistic natural resource markets under varying assumptions of market
structure and conduct. Moreover, we pursue the question as to how different market
structures influence capacity investments, supply, prices and rents. The models com-
prise two stages: an investment stage and a supply stage in which players compete in
quantities. We explicitly account for the spatial structure of natural resource markets,
i. e., demand and supply regions are geographically separated and market participants
incur distance-dependent transportation costs.
The first model assumes markets to be contestable; hence investment follows competi-
tive logic. Solving this model yields the same result as would be given by a perfectly
competitive market. The second model assumes the product to be sold through long-
term contracts under imperfect competition. Even though supply takes place in stage
two, the supply and investment decisions are made simultaneously in stage one. The
long-term contract that is fulfilled in stage two determines the level of capacity invest-
ment in stage one. Any production capacity that is different from the one needed to
produce the quantity of the best-supply equilibrium in stage two reduces the respec-
tive players profits and is not a Nash equilibrium. The outcome is termed ’open-loop
Cournot equilibrium’ and corresponds to the result of a static one-stage Cournot game
(accounting for investment costs). The third model assumes that investment and supply
decisions are made consecutively: In stage one, when investment takes place, none of
the oligopolists can commit to their future output decision in stage two (unlike in the
open-loop case). In stage two, when the market clears, the investment cost spent in the
first stage is sunk and the players base their output decision solely on production cost.
The resulting equilibrium is termed ’closed-loop Cournot equilibrium’ and may differ
from the open-loop outcome.
Intuitively, the lack of commitment in the closed-loop game and therefore the repeated
interaction of the oligopolists would suggest a higher degree of competition and thus
lower prices and higher market volumes than in the open-loop equilibrium. However, the
players anticipate this strategic effect and make their investment decisions accordingly.
How prices and volumes rank compared to the open-loop game is parameter-dependent
and requires a numerical analysis. As discussed for instance in Fudenberg and Tirole
(1991) in a more general context, each player in the closed-loop model has a strategic
incentive to deviate from his first stage open-loop action as he can thereby influence
the other players’ second stage action. Applying this general economic framework to
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the capacity expansion problem examined in this paper, indeed tends to lead to higher
investment and supply levels in the closed-loop model and hence to lower prices.
Computing open-loop games is relatively well understood, and existence and uniqueness
of the equilibrium can be guaranteed under certain conditions (see, e. g., Harker, 1984,
1986, Takayama and Judge, 1964, 1971). The open-loop Cournot model can be solved
via the Karush-Kuhn-Tucker conditions as a mixed complementarity problem (MCP).
Oligopolistic spatial equilibrium models have been widely deployed in analyzing resource
markets, without taking investments decisions into account, e. g., for steam coal markets
(Haftendorn and Holz, 2010, Kolstad and Abbey, 1984, Tru¨by and Paulus, 2012), met-
allurgical coal markets (Graham et al., 1999, Tru¨by, 2013), natural gas markets (Gabriel
et al., 2005b, Growitsch et al., 2013, Holz et al., 2008, Zhuang and Gabriel, 2008), wheat
markets (Kolstad and Burris, 1986), oil markets (Huppmann and Holz, 2012) or for iron
ore markets (Hecking and Panke, 2014). Investments in additional production capacity
have been analyzed for example in Huppmann (2013) with investment and production
decisions being made simultaneously and therefore implicitly assuming a market struc-
ture with long-term contracts.
Closed-loop models are computationally challenging due to their non-linear nature. De-
pending on the problem this can be resolved. Gabriel and Leuthold (2010) for instance
model an electricity market with a Stackelberg leader using linearization to guarantee a
globally optimal solution. Closed-loop models in energy market analysis have primarily
been used to study restructured electricity markets (e. g., Daxhelet and Smeers, 2007,
Shanbhag et al., 2011, Yao et al., 2008, 2007). Murphy and Smeers (2005) and Wogrin
et al. (2013a,b) have analyzed the implications of closed- and open-loop modeling on
market output and social welfare as well as characterized conditions under which closed-
and open-loop model results coincide.
Our two-stage model consists of multiple players on both, the first and second stage
(investment in stage one and supply in stage two), and therefore existence and unique-
ness of (pure strategy) equilibria cannot be guaranteed. The closed-loop model, which
is formulated as an Equilibrium Problem with Equilibrium Constraints (EPEC), is im-
plemented using a diagonalization approach (see, e. g., Gabriel et al., 2012). In doing
so, we reduce the solution of the EPEC to the solution of a series of Mathematical Pro-
grams with Equilibrium Constraints (MPEC). Concerning the solution of the MPECs
we implement two algorithms, grid search along the investment decisions of the individ-
ual players and a Mixed Integer Linear Program reformulation following Wogrin et al.
(2013a).
We demonstrate the tractability and practicality of our investment models in an appli-
cation to the international metallurgical (or coking) coal trade. Metallurgical coal is,
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due to its special chemical properties, a key input in the process of steel-making. The
market for this rare coal variety is characterized by a spatial oligopoly with producers
mainly located in Australia, the United States and Canada competing against each other
and providing the bulk of the traded coal (Bowden, 2012, Tru¨by, 2013). The players
hold existing mining capacity and can invest into new capacity. Investment and mining
costs differ regionally. Key uncertainties in this market are demand evolution and price
responsiveness of demand. We therefore compute sensitivities for these parameters to
demonstrate the robustness of our results.
Our findings are generally in line with previous results found in the literature on two-
stage games with players choosing capacity and output, i. e., we find that prices and
supply levels in the closed-loop game fall between those in the perfect competition and
the open-loop game (see, e. g., Murphy and Smeers, 2005). If investment costs are low
compared to variable costs of supply, the strategic effect of the two-stage optimiza-
tion in the closed-loop game diminishes. With investment costs approaching zero, the
closed-loop result converges to the open-loop result. Hence, the closed-loop model is
particularly useful for capital-intensive natural resource industries in which the product
is traded on spot markets.
The numerical results for supply levels, prices and rents in the metallurgical coal market
analysis differ markedly between the three models. Consistent with actual industry in-
vestment pipelines, our model suggests that the bulk of the future capacity investment
comes from companies operating in Australia followed by Canadian and US firms. Start-
ing in 2010, the metallurgical coal market has undergone a paradigm shift, moving away
from long-term contracts and more towards a spot market-based trade – with similar
tendencies being observed in other commodity markets such as the iron ore trade. In
light of our findings, this effect is detrimental to the companies’ profits but beneficial to
consumer rents. The effect on welfare is negligible: Gains in consumer rents and losses
in producers’ profits are of almost equal magnitude.
The contribution of this paper is threefold: First, by extending the multi-stage in-
vestment approach to the case of spatial markets, we introduce a novel feature to the
literature on Cournot capacity expansion games. Second, we outline how our modeling
approach can be implemented and solved to analyze capacity investments in natural
resource markets. We thereby extend previous research on natural resource markets,
which has typically assumed capacities to be given. Finally, we illustrate and discuss
the model properties on the basis of a real-world application to the international met-
allurgical coal trade and draw conclusions for this market. In doing so, we also take
into account existing capacities of the players and hence incorporate a feature which
to our knowledge has been ignored in previous work on multi-stage Cournot capacity
102
4.2 The Model
expansion games. By comparing open- and closed-loop model results, we illustrate pos-
sible consequences of the ongoing regime switch from long-term contracts to a more
spot market-based trade in the international metallurgical coal market. Our analysis in
particular allows for the first quantification of the magnitude of the divergence between
open- and closed-loop model results in a real-world application.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows: Section 4.2 describes the models
developed in this paper and Section 4.3 provides details about their implementation.
The data is outlined in Section 4.4, results are presented in Section 4.5. Section 4.6
discusses computational issues and Section 4.7 concludes.
4.2 The Model
We introduce three different approaches to the capacity expansion problem – two open-
loop models and a closed-loop model. In the open-loop models, all players decide simul-
taneously on their investment and production levels, whereas in the closed-loop model
all players first decide on their investment levels simultaneously and then, based on ob-
served investment levels, they simultaneously decide on their production levels. The two
open-loop models vary in their underlying market structure: one model assumes perfect
competition, the other model assumes Cournot competition with a competitive fringe.
The closed-loop model also assumes Cournot competition with a competitive fringe.
While similar open-loop models have previously been studied, the introduced closed-loop
model varies from existing closed-loop models by taking into account also the spatial
structure of the market as well as considering existing capacities of the players.
4.2.1 General Setting and Notations
Table 4.1 summarizes the most relevant nomenclature used throughout this section.
Additional symbols are explained where necessary. We assume a spatial, homogeneous
good market consisting of producers i ∈ I, production facilities m ∈ M and demand
regions j ∈ J . Each producer i owns production facilities m ∈ Mi ⊂ M . Furthermore,
we assume that Mi ∩Mj = ∅ for i 6= j, i. e., production facilities are exclusively owned
by one producer. Producers decide on both their investment in production facilities as
well as on their supply levels.
As in equilibrium added capacities are fully utilized, no stock constraint for new capaci-
ties is modeled. Therefore we implicitly assume that mines will be exhausted after their
depreciation period (see Section 4.4).
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The supply from production facility m to market j is given by xm,j . Total production of
production facility m is hence given by
∑
j xm,j . It is limited by the facilities’ capacity
cap0m + ym, where cap
0
m is the initial production capacity and ym denotes the capacity
investment. Capacity investments ym are non-negative and limited by y
max
m . The upper
bound on capacity expansion is chosen sufficiently high not to impose restrictions on
economically favorable investments but is rather used to ease the solution algorithm
(the upper limit restricts the solution space of the non-linear MPEC and enables the
equidistant separation of investments in the case of the line search, see Section 4.3).
Capacity investments in an existing production facility (i. e., cap0m 6= 0) can be inter-
preted as capacity expansions, and investments in the case of cap0m = 0 as newly built
production facilities.
Investment expenditures for facility m are given by Cinvm . We assume that C
inv
m is a
linear function in the investment level ym, with km denoting marginal investment costs,
i. e.,
Cinvm (ym) = km · ym.
Variable costs Cvarm are specific to the production facility m. They are composed of
transportation costs τm,j per unit delivered from m to market j as well as the variable
production costs vm. We assume that vm is a linear function in the total production of
the facility. Total variable costs of facility m therefore amount to
Cvarm (xm) =
∑
j
(xm,j · τm,j) + vm(
∑
j
xm,j),
with xm = (xm,j)j denoting the production vector of facility m.
Market prices Pj in market j are given by a linear inverse demand function, i. e.,
Pj = aj − bj ·
∑
m
xm,j .
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Table 4.1: Model sets, parameters and variables
Abbreviation Description
Model sets
m ∈M Production facilities
j ∈ J Markets
i ∈ I Players
Model parameters
km Marginal investment costs [US$ per unit per year]
vm Variable production costs [US$ per unit]
τm,j Transportation costs [US$ per unit]
aj Reservation price [US$ per unit]
bj Linear slope of demand function
cap0m Initial production capacity [units per year]
ymaxm Maximum capacity expansion [units per year]
Model variables
Cvarm Total variable production costs [US$]
Cinvm Investment expenditures [US$]
xm,j Supply [units]
Pj Market price [US$ per unit]
ym Capacity investments [units per year]
4.2.2 Model 1: The Open-Loop Perfect Competition Model
In the open-loop perfect competition model (in the following simply termed ‘perfect
competition model’), each producer i ∈ I solves the optimization problem
max
xm,ym:m∈Mi
∑
m∈Mi
(∑
j∈J
Pj · xm,j − Cvarm (xm)
)− ∑
m∈Mi
Cinvm (ym)
subject to
Pj = aj − bj · (Xi,j +X−i,j), ∀j
cap0m + ym −
∑
j
xm,j ≥ 0, ∀m ∈Mi (λm)
ymaxm − ym ≥ 0, ∀m ∈Mi (θm)
xm,j ≥ 0, ∀m ∈Mi, j
ym ≥ 0, ∀m ∈Mi
while taking the supplies X−i,j of the other producers (−i) as given. Here and in the
following, we use the abbreviation XI1,j =
∑
i∈I1
∑
m∈Mi xm,j for some I1 ⊂ I.
Hence, in the perfect competition model, each producer simultaneously makes his (“long-
term”) investment and (“short-term”) production decisions in order to maximize profits.
In doing so, each producer takes capacity restrictions into account. However, players do
not take into account their influence on price.
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Any solution to the above optimization problem has to satisfy the short-term Karush-
Kuhn-Tucker (KKT) conditions
0 ≤ ∂C
var
m (xm)
∂xm,j
− [aj − bj · (Xi,j +X−i,j)] + λm ⊥ xm,j ≥ 0, ∀i,m ∈Mi, j
0 ≤ cap0m + ym −
∑
j
xm,j ⊥ λm ≥ 0, ∀i,m ∈Mi
as well as the long-term KKT conditions
0 ≤ km − λm + θm ⊥ ym ≥ 0, ∀i,m ∈Mi
0 ≤ ymaxm − ym ⊥ θm ≥ 0, ∀i,m ∈Mi.
In equilibrium, all KKT conditions have to hold simultaneously. Uniqueness of the
solution is guaranteed due to the quasi-concave objective function and the convexity
of the restrictions. The derived KKT conditions are thus necessary and sufficient for
obtaining the solution.
4.2.3 Model 2: The Open-Loop Cournot Model with Competitive
Fringe
In the open-loop Cournot model with competitive fringe (in the following simply termed
‘open-loop model’), each producer i ∈ I solves an optimization problem identical to
the one for the perfect competition model described above. However, each producer
may take additionally into account his influence on price which is represented by the
conjectural variation parameter ψi, where
∂Pj
∂xm,j
= ψi · bj for all m ∈ Mi. Cournot
behavior with a competitive fringe can then be represented as ψi = 1 for the Cournot
players and ψi = 0 for the competitive fringe.
53
Any solution to the open-loop Cournot model with competitive fringe then satisfies the
short-term Karush-Kuhn-Tucker (KKT) conditions
0 ≤ ∂C
var
m (xm)
∂xm,j
− [aj − bj · (Xi,j +X−i,j)] + ψi · bj ·Xi,j + λm ⊥ xm,j ≥ 0, ∀i,m ∈Mi, j
0 ≤ cap0m + ym −
∑
j
xm,j ⊥ λm ≥ 0, ∀i,m ∈Mi
as well as the long-term KKT conditions
0 ≤ km − λm + θm ⊥ ym ≥ 0, ∀i,m ∈Mi
0 ≤ ymaxm − ym ⊥ θm ≥ 0, ∀i,m ∈Mi.
53The perfect competition model also follows from this specification by setting ψi = 0 for all i.
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In equilibrium, the KKT conditions of both the Cournot players and the competitive
fringe have to hold simultaneously. As in the perfect competition case, uniqueness of the
solution is guaranteed due to the quasi-concave objective function and the convexity of
the restrictions. The derived KKT conditions are therefore again necessary and sufficient
for obtaining the solution.
4.2.4 Model 3: The Closed-Loop Model
In the closed-loop model, producers play a two-stage game: In the first stage, oligopolis-
tic producers l (l ∈ L ⊂ I) decide on their investment levels. In the second stage, they
choose, based on observed investment decisions of the other oligopolistic producers, their
production and supply levels. In addition, in the second stage, a further player, the com-
petitive fringe (F ), makes his supply decisions. The competitive fringe is not allowed
to invest in either stage.54 As opposed to the oligopolistic producers, the competitive
fringe is a price taker.
4.2.4.1 The Second Stage Problem
For a given investment vector (yl, y−l) of the oligopolistic producers, let the second stage
problem of producer i be given by
max
xm,j :m∈Mi
∑
m∈Mi
(∑
j∈J
Pj · xm,j − Cvarm (xm)
)
subject to
Pj = aj − bj · (Xi,j +X−i,j), ∀j
cap0m + ym −
∑
j
xm,j ≥ 0, ∀m ∈Mi (λm)
xm,j ≥ 0, ∀m ∈Mi, j.
As in the open-loop model, producer i decides on his supplies while taking the supplies
of the other producers (−i) as given. A producer’s influence on price is again assumed
to be represented by a conjectural variation parameter ψi, which is equal to one for the
oligopolistic producers and zero for the competitive fringe. Note that the competitive
fringe may not invest and therefore ym = 0 for the fringe.
54In our application to the metallurgical coal market, this restriction also holds true for the player
in the perfect competition model corresponding to the competitive fringe in the closed-loop model as
well as for the competitive fringe in the Cournot open-loop model. For better readability, the model
descriptions in the preceding two subsections are slightly more general, i. e., allowing potentially all
players to invest.
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The corresponding KKT conditions to this problem are then given by
0 ≤ ∂C
var
m (xm)
∂xm,j
− [aj − bj · (Xi,j +X−i,j)] + ψi · bj ·Xi,j + λm ⊥ xm,j ≥ 0, ∀m ∈Mi, j
0 ≤ cap0m + ym −
∑
j
xm,j ⊥ λm ≥ 0, ∀m ∈Mi.
In the second stage equilibrium, the KKT conditions of all producers have to hold
simultaneously. In the following, let x˜m,j(yl, y−l) denote the second stage production
equilibrium for a given investment vector (yl, y−l).
4.2.4.2 The First Stage Problem
The first stage problem for oligopolistic producer l ∈ L is given by
max
ym:m∈Ml
∑
m∈Ml
(∑
j∈J
P˜j · x˜m,j(yl, y−l)− Cvarm (x˜m(yl, y−l)
)− ∑
m∈Ml
Cinvm (ym)
subject to
P˜j = aj − bj · (X˜l,j(yl, y−l) + X˜−l,j(yl, y−l) + X˜F,j(yl, y−l)), ∀j
ymaxm − ym ≥ 0, ∀m ∈Ml
ym ≥ 0, ∀m ∈Ml,
i. e., producer l chooses his investment levels in order to maximize profits for a given
investment strategy of the other oligopolistic producers (y−l) under consideration of the
resulting second stage equilibrium outcome.
Combining the second stage and the first stage problem, we obtain the following MPEC
for producer l, hereafter referred to as MPECl:
max
Ωl
∑
m∈Ml
(∑
j∈J
(aj − bj · (Xl,j +X−l,j +XF,j)) · xm,j − Cvarm (xm)
)− ∑
m∈Ml
Cinvm (ym)
subject to
ymaxm − ym ≥ 0, ∀m ∈Ml
ym ≥ 0, ∀m ∈Ml
0 ≤ ∂C
var
m (xm)
∂xm,j
− [aj − bj · (Xi,j +X−i,j)] + ψi · bj ·Xi,j + λm ⊥ xm,j ≥ 0, ∀i,m ∈Mi, j
0 ≤ cap0m + ym −
∑
j
xm,j ⊥ λm ≥ 0, ∀i,m ∈Mi
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given the investment vector (y−l) of the other oligopolistic producers. Here, Ωl is given
by:55
Ωl = {(ym)m∈Ml ; (xm,j , λm)m∈M,j∈J}.
An investment strategy (y˜l, y˜−l) is a closed-loop equilibrium if for all l ∈ L, y˜l solves l’s
MPEC problem MPECl given y˜−l. The problem of finding a closed-loop equilibrium is
hence of EPEC type (Gabriel et al., 2012), and therefore existence and uniqueness of
equilibria typically is non-trivial and parameter dependent.
4.2.5 Discussion of the Models and Equilibrium Concepts
Closed-loop strategies allow players to condition their actions on actions taken in pre-
vious stages; in open-loop strategies, this is not possible. Thus, equilibria in the closed-
loop model are by definition subgame perfect, whereas open-loop equilibria are typically
merely dynamically (time) consistent. The latter is a weaker equilibrium concept than
subgame perfection. It requires only that no player has an incentive at any time to devi-
ate from the strategy he announced at the beginning of the game, “given that no player
has deviated in the past and no agent expects a future deviation” (Karp and Newbery,
1992). Therefore, with subgame perfect equilibria requiring actions to be optimal in
every subgame of the game, i. e., requiring that no player has an incentive to deviate
from his strategy regardless of any deviation in the past, an equilibrium of the open-loop
model may fail to be an equilibrium in the closed-loop game.56
Fudenberg and Tirole (1991) and the literature cited therein generally address the issue of
diverging results of open-loop models in comparison to closed-loop models and provide
intuition for the divergence: In the closed-loop model, in contrast to the open-loop
model, a player’s influence via its own actions in the first stage on the other players’
actions in the second stage is taken into account. Applying this intuition to the special
case of the capacity expansion problem, Murphy and Smeers (2005) show that in the
closed-loop equilibrium, marginal investment costs may be higher than the sum of the
short-term marginal value implied by the KKT conditions. In particular, they note that
“the difference between the two characterizes the value for the player of being able to
manipulate the short-term market by its first stage investments.” This may lead to higher
investments and supplies and hence lower prices in the closed-loop model compared to
the open-loop model.
55Note that the first stage decision variable is separated from the second stage decision variables by a
semicolon. The latter are indirectly determined by the choice of the first stage decision variable.
56See Selten (1965) for the first formalization of the concept of subgame perfect equilibria and, e. g.,
Karp and Newbery (1989) for a general account on dynamic consistency.
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The existing literature on the subject, in particular the above mentioned Murphy and
Smeers (2005) as well as Wogrin et al. (2013b), provides general properties of closed-loop
and open-loop models and conditions for diverging and non-diverging results between
the two models, assuming simplified settings (e. g., ignoring existing capacities). We
conjecture that in a spatial application with non-generic data and existing capacities
available to the players, equilibria are likely to deviate between the two modeling ap-
proaches, which is confirmed by our application to the metallurgical coal market (see
Sections 4.4 and 4.5). Analytical analysis is no longer available in this setting due to
increased complexity and thus makes a numerical analysis necessary. The numerical
approach is also suitable to address an issue which to our knowledge has not yet been
comprehensively touched upon in previous literature: a quantification of the magnitude
of the divergence between closed-loop and open-loop model results.
4.3 Implementation
4.3.1 Model 1: The Open-Loop Model
Both open-loop models introduced in Section 2, i. e., the open-loop perfect competi-
tion model and the open-loop Cournot competition model with competitive fringe, are
implemented as mixed complementarity problems (MCP).
4.3.2 Model 2: The Closed-Loop Model
We solve the closed-loop model using diagonalization (see for instance Gabriel et al.,
2012):
1. Set starting values for the investment decisions y0l of all oligopolistic producers
l ∈ L, a convergence criterion , a maximum number of iterations N and a learning
rate R
2. n = 1
3. Set ynl = y
n−1
l
4. Do for all l ∈ L
(a) Fix the investment decisions yn−l of −l
(b) Solve player l’s MPEC problem MPECl to obtain an optimal investment level
yl
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(c) Set ynl equal to R · yl + (1−R) · ynl
5. If |ynl − yn−1l | <  for all producers l ∈ L: quit
6. If n = N : quit
7. n = n+ 1 and go back to step 3
Diagonalization thus reduces the closed-loop problem to a series of MPEC problems.
Concerning the solution of the MPECs, we implement two procedures: grid search along
the investment decision yl and a reformulation of the MPEC as a Mixed Integer Linear
Program (MILP).
Both approaches differ with respect to the simplification of the decision variables: With
grid search we discretize the investment decision which is reasonable for many investment
choices in real life. Thus, solving the MPEC problem reduces to solving a series of MCP
problems with the choice of production volumes remaining continuous. On the contrary,
in the MILP approach we discretize the production decisions but retain a continuous
choice of investments in new capacity. The discretization may result in missing the global
optimal solution.57 As both approaches result in very similar outcomes (see Section 4.6)
we are confident that our obtained results are valid.
Implementing both the grid search and MILP reformulation allows for the comparison
of the computer run-times of the two models, with grid search typically being faster for
reasonable grid sizes (see Section 4.6 for details on this issue).
4.3.2.1 Grid Search
When applying grid search along the investment decision yl, MPECl simplifies to a
sequence of complementarity problems. In our implementation, the grid width in the
grid search is the same for all producers; the number of steps for a producer is thus
dependent on his capacity expansion limit.
4.3.2.2 MILP Reformulation
In addition to grid search, we implement a MILP reformulation of the MPEC. Non-
linearities arise in the MPEC due to the complementarity constraints and the non-linear
term in the objective function.
57A third way of approaching the non-linearities in the model might be using the strong duality
theorem to linearize the original MPEC as described in Ruiz and Conejo (2009).
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The former are replaced by their corresponding disjunctive constraints (see Fortuny-
Amat and McCarl, 1981), e. g., we replace
0 ≤ cap0m + ym −
∑
j
xm,j ⊥ λm ≥ 0
by
Mλbλm ≥ λm
Mλ(1− bλm) ≥ cap0m + ym −
∑
j
xm,j
for some suitably large constant Mλ and binary variables bλm.
For the discretization of the non-linear term in the objective function, we proceed fol-
lowing Pereira et al. (2005) using a binary expansion of the supply variable. The binary
expansion of xm,j is given by
xm,j = x+ ∆x
∑
k
2kbxk,m,j ,
where x is the lower bound, ∆x the stepsize, k the number of discretization intervals
and bxk,m,j binary variables. Substituting Pj · x + ∆x
∑
k 2
kzxk,m,j for Pj · xm,j , we have
to impose the additional constraints
0 ≤ zxk,m,j ≤Mxbxk,m,j
0 ≤ Pj − zxk,m,j ≤Mx(1− bxk,m,j)
for some suitably large constant Mx.
4.4 Data Set
The models are parametrized with data for the international metallurgical coal market
(see Table 4.1 and Appendix A). Yet, as the structure of the international metallurgical
coal trade is (from a modeling perspective) similar to that of other commodities, the
model could easily be calibrated with data for other markets.
Metallurgical coal is used in steel-making to produce the coke needed for steel production
in blast furnaces and as a source of energy in the process of steel-making. Metallurgical
coal is distinct from thermal coal, which is typically used to generate electricity or heat.
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Currently around 70 % of the global steel production crucially relies on metallurgical
coal as an input.58
International trade of metallurgical coal amounted to 250 million tonnes (Mt) in 2012.59
International trade is predominantly seaborne, using dry bulk vessels. Up until 2010,
metallurgical coal was almost exclusively traded through long-term contracts. Since
then, the market has begun to move away from this system towards more spot market-
based trading. While the share of spot market activity has increased rapidly, a substan-
tial amount of metallurgical coal is still traded through long-term contracts.
Key players in this market are large mining companies such as BHP-Billiton, Anglo-
American, Glencore and Rio Tinto. These companies produce mainly in Australia and,
together with Peabody Energy’s Australian operations, control more than 50 % of the
global export capacity. In addition, adding to this the market share of the Canadian
Teck consortium and the two key metallurgical coal exporters from the United States,
Walter Energy and Xcoal, results in almost three quarters of the global export capacity,
marketed by an oligopoly of eight companies. For the sake of simplicity and computa-
tional tractability, we aggregate these players’ existing mines into one mining operation
per player. Smaller exporters from Australia, the United States, Russia, New Zealand,
Indonesia and South Africa are aggregated into three players: one Cournot player from
Australia (AUS6), one Cournot player from the United States (USA1) and one com-
petitive fringe player that comprises all other regions (Fringe). This results in eleven
asymmetric players who differ with respect to their existing production capacity and the
associated production and transport costs (see Table 4.2).60
Table 4.2: Existing Capacity, Variable and Investment Costs
Players Existing
Capacity
[Mtpa]
Variable
Costs
[US$/t]
Investment
Costs
[US$/tpa]
Max. Invest-
ment [Mtpa]
USA1 38 122.0 - -
USA2 9 122.1 98.2 50
USA3 11 141.0 98.0 50
AUS1 54 118.3 218.1 50
AUS2 11 118.4 218.0 50
AUS3 17 118.5 217.9 50
AUS4 10 118.6 217.8 50
AUS5 12 118.0 218.2 50
AUS6 18 118.1 - -
CAN 26 105.0 161.0 20
Fringe 26 78.0 - -
58See WCA (2011).
59See IEA (2013).
60Data on capacities and costs are taken from Tru¨by (2013).
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We assume that the three players representing the smaller exporters, i. e., USA1, AUS6
and Fringe, cannot invest in additional capacity. Hence, only the largest eight companies
can endogenously expand their supply capacity. The investment decision, made in stage
one, is based on the players’ capacities and costs in 2011. We consider one investment
cycle with capacities becoming available after six years serving one demand period.
Investment costs per tonne of annual production capacity (tons per annum) are broken
down into equal annual payments based on an annuity calculation using an interest
rate of 10 % and a depreciation time of 10 years. The profitability of investments is
evaluated based on the comparison of annuity and profits in the considered production
stage. We therefore assume that returns are constant over the years of production. Note
that production cost of new mines correspond to the production cost of the respective
player’s existing mine.
The two largest importers of metallurgical coal are Europe and Japan, followed by India,
China and Korea. These key importers account for more than 80 % of the trade. We
aggregate these and the remaining smaller countries into two demand regions: Europe-
Atlantic and Asia-Pacific.61 The former also includes the Mediterranean’s neighboring
countries and importers from the Atlantic shores of the Americas. The latter includes
importers with coastlines on the Pacific or the Indian Ocean. Exporters from the United
States have a transport cost advantage in the Europe-Atlantic region, while Canadian
and Australian exporters are located closer to the consumers in the Asia-Pacific region
(see Table 4.5 in the Appendix). We assume the inverse import demand function for
metallurgical coal to be linear. The function can be specified using a reference price and
a corresponding reference quantity in combination with a point-elasticity eta.
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Figure 4.1: Demand functions for Europe-Atlantic (left) and Asia-Pacific regions
(right) with varying elasticity
61Our approach covers 100 % of the global seaborne metallurgical coal imports and exports (based on
data from 2011).
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4.5 Results
In practice, investors in production capacity face demand evolution as a key uncertainty.
Accounting for this uncertainty, we run sensitivities in which we vary the point-elasticity
parameter eta across the range -0.2 to -0.5 (see Figure 4.1).62 This bandwidth is gen-
erally considered reasonable in the metallurgical coal market (see Tru¨by, 2013, and the
literature cited therein). Furthermore, we vary the reference demand quantity (see Ta-
ble 4.6 in Appendix A) from 60 % to 140 % to account for different demand evolution
trajectories. The presentation of the results is structured around the variation of these
demand parameters followed by a general discussion of the findings.
4.5.1 Variation of Demand Elasticity
Decreasing the point elasticity parameter eta results in a flatter gradient of the linear
demand function (see Figure 4.1). A decreasing eta (i. e., a more negative eta) expresses
an increasing price responsiveness of consumers which, ceteris paribus, limits the extent
to which the oligopolists can exploit their market power. Consequently, with decreasing
eta, average prices achieved in the imperfect competition cases (open-loop and closed-
loop) are decreasing while total production is increasing (Figure 4.2). Note that in the
perfect competition case, the aggregate supply and the aggregate demand curves inter-
sect below the reference point resulting in an increase in production with decreasing eta
and, correspondingly, with increasing marginal costs, an increase in production results
in an increase in price. In the two Cournot models with imperfect competition the
oligopolistic mark-up on marginal costs leads to market prices exceeding the reference
price.
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Figure 4.2: Total production (left) and average market price (right) for varying de-
mand elasticity
62For eta smaller than -0.4, closed-loop model runs did not converge. Therefore, the results presented
in this section only comprise the range -0.2 to -0.4. For a discussion on computational issues, see Section
4.6.
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A variation of eta impacts the investment trends differently in the three cases (Figure
4.3). However, the capacity expansion investments need to be interpreted in concert
with the corresponding utilization of the existing capacity. Intuitively, one would expect
investment into additional capacity to be highest in the perfect competition case. Yet,
in our setup, the investment level in the perfectly competitive case falls between the
two cases with imperfect competition. This effect stems from the significant amount of
existing capacities which – with the exception of some very high-cost capacities – are
utilized before additional production capacity is built. Murphy and Smeers (2005) show
that in their model which does not account for existing capacities, investment levels are
indeed highest under perfect competition.
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Figure 4.3: Capacity investments (left) and idle capacity (right) for varying demand
elasticity
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
Australia United States Canada
In
ve
st
m
en
t [
M
tp
a]
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
Australia United States Canada
In
ve
st
m
en
t [
M
tp
a]
AUS1
AUS2
AUS3
AUS4
AUS5
USA2
USA3
CAN
Figure 4.4: Capacity investments for the closed-loop (left) and open-loop model
(right) (eta = −0.3)
Of particular interest is the ranking of the closed-loop and open-loop case in terms of
capacity expansion and capacity withholding. Note that withholding (or idle capacity),
here and in the following, concerns only exiting capacities. Each player exhausts existing
capacities before investing in additional capacities. Newly built capacities are always
fully utilized in equilibrium as otherwise players could increase their profit by reducing
investments. Investments in the open-loop case are strictly lower than in the closed-loop
case independent of the elasticity while less capacity is withheld in the open-loop case.
However, the investment behavior of individual players may differ from the aggregate
industry behavior; as can be seen in Figure 4.4 two players from the United States invest
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more in the open-loop model than in the closed-loop model contrary to what the rest of
the industry does.
The investment level is higher in the closed-loop case compared to the open-loop case as
the capacity expansion in the first stage can be used strategically to influence the supply
decisions of the other players in the second stage. In the closed-loop case, the two-stage
structure introduces, informally speaking, an additional element of competition that
does not exist in the open-loop case. The open-loop result is a stable Nash-equilibrium
of the one-stage game in which players decide simultaneously on capacity investments
and production. In the closed-loop case, the sequential form of the game leads to an
interaction between the capacity choice of the first stage and the production decision
of the second stage which may alter players’ decisions compared to the open-loop case.
However, asymmetries play a critical role for the divergence of open-loop and closed-loop
equilibria: Wogrin et al. (2013b) demonstrate that for symmetric players (under certain
mild conditions) open-loop and closed-loop equilibria are identical.
To get an intuition for the difference between the open-loop and the closed-loop game,
suppose for a moment that there are two players, an incumbent with infinite existing
capacity and an entrant without any capacity. Both players face the same production
costs while the entrant faces additional (non-zero) investment costs. It is important
to note that in both games the production decision of each player depends on his own
costs and the costs of the other player: higher own costs result in lower own production
and higher output of rivals – higher costs of rivals result in higher own output as the
production of the rivals is lower.
In the open-loop case, the incumbent decides on his output, knowing about the total costs
of the entrant (investment and production costs), which are featuring in his first-order
condition. In equilibrium the entrant produces and invests so that marginal revenue
equals the sum of marginal production and investment costs. Since the entrant’s total
costs are higher, he produces less than the incumbent in equilibrium. The incumbent’s
profits are higher than the entrant’s as he produces more and does not have to pay for
capacity.
Contrarily, in the closed-loop case, the choice of capacity and production is sequential.
Solving the problem by backward-induction, assume that the entrant has built more
capacity than in the open-loop case. With the production decision now being based on
the incumbent’s and the entrant’s production costs, the entrant will now produce more
and the incumbent less than in the open-loop case as in the latter both, investment
and production costs, appear in the entrant’s (and with reversed sign the incumbent’s)
first-order condition. But when would the entrant build more capacity in the closed-loop
case than in the open-loop case? Only if the potential gains in the second stage (the
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spot market) exceed the increased investment cost from building more capacity in the
first stage. The entrant anticipates in the first stage that by increasing his capacity he
can reduce the incumbent’s production in the second stage. Knowing this, the entrant
decides on his optimal capacity investment while anticipating his influence on the incum-
bent’s level of production. The interaction between the decisions taken in the different
stages is not present in the open-loop model. In the asymmetric entrant/incumbent
case considered in this intuition, it is indeed profitable for the entrant to deviate from
his open-loop outcome and to invest more. As a result, the incumbent’s profits are still
higher than the entrant’s (as he does not have to pay for capacity) but are lower than
in the open-loop case while the entrant can raise his profits compared to the open-loop
case.63
An analytical solution of this game becomes non-trivial when more than one player
makes subsequent investment and supply decisions as these decisions mutually influence
each other. Yet, this little example is useful to provide a better understanding of why
the closed-loop case features higher investment levels but also higher withholding of
existing capacities than the open-loop case.
In our application to the metallurgical coal market, capacity is exclusively withheld
by the two largest players (one producing in Australia and the other in the United
States), in both models of imperfect competition. Capacity expansion and withholding
are following opposing trends in our models of imperfect competition, i. e., the open-
loop model exhibits a lower level of investment but also a lower level of unused capacity
while the higher investment levels in the closed-loop model come with a higher level of
idle capacity. Thus, it is a-priori unclear how the two models would rank in terms of
total supply and market prices. A numerical solution of our models yields that supply is
higher in the closed-loop case than in the open-loop case. Consequently, market prices
are lower in the closed-loop case. This result is in line with the findings of Murphy and
Smeers (2005).
Industry profits, consumer rent and social welfare are depicted in Figure 4.5. Indus-
try profits decrease with decreasing eta and so does consumer rent (a higher price-
responsiveness of consumers limits market power exploitation but also potential con-
sumer rent). The existence of profits in the perfect competition model is due to capacity
restrictions of existing mines and limited expansion potential for new mines. Social wel-
fare is similar in all three models: in a perfectly competitive market welfare is slightly
higher than in the Cournot models. Welfare is lowest in the open-loop case (Figure 4.6).
Thus, the different underlying assumptions concerning the prevailing market structure
in the international metallurgical coal trade (long-term contracts versus spot market)
63See calculations in the Appendix for a more formal statement of this analysis.
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primarily influences the surplus distribution rather than its sum: in the open-loop case
in which the product is traded through long-term contracts, companies can earn higher
profits, while consumer surplus is higher in markets with spot market-based trade.
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Figure 4.5: Accumulated profits (left) and consumer rent (right) with varying demand
elasticity
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Figure 4.6: Overall welfare (left) and welfare differences (right)
4.5.2 Variation of Reference Demand
For the variation of reference demand, the point elasticity eta has been fixed to a value
of -0.3; thus the case of 100 % reference demand corresponds to the depicted results of
the previous subsection with the same demand elasticity. Variations of the reference
demand results in a shift of the demand curve to the right for values larger than 100 %
and a shift to the left for values lower than 100 %.
As in the previous subsection, supply is highest under perfect competition and lowest
in the open-loop case for any demand variation (Figure 4.7). Accordingly, prices are
highest in the open-loop case followed by the closed-loop and the perfect competition
cases. As one would expect, supply and average prices increase with increasing demand.
For low reference demand levels, the existing capacities of small players are almost
sufficiently high to produce the quantities needed for their best-supply response in stage
two. Therefore, the results in the open-loop and closed-loop cases almost coincide at 60 %
reference demand as investment activity is low. Investments in additional production
capacity are increasing monotonously with growing reference demand (Figure 4.8). As
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Figure 4.7: Total production (left) and average market price (right) for varying ref-
erence demand
with the variation of the demand elasticity, investments are consistently lower in the
open-loop case than in the closed-loop case. For low demand levels, investments in the
competitive model are below those in the models with imperfect competition as existing
capacities are sufficient to serve demand rendering investments unprofitable. In the
Cournot models, investment into additional production capacity is still profitable for
small players as they can count on players with large existing capacities to withhold
some output.
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Figure 4.8: Capacity investments (left) and idle capacity (right) for varying reference
demand
For high demand levels, investments under perfectly competitive conduct exceed those
even in the closed-loop model. The order of idle capacity is similar to the case of varying
demand elasticity: idle capacity is highest in the closed-loop model followed by the open-
loop case (both due to strategic considerations) and the perfect competition model (due
to market prices below the marginal costs of costlier capacities).
With increasing demand, profits as well as consumer rents increase (Figure 4.9). Again,
results for the open-loop and closed-loop cases almost coincide if reference demand is
very low as investments play a minor role. In the case of high reference demand, profits
in the open-loop model exceed those in the closed-loop model. Results for consumer
rents are vice versa. Total welfare turns out to be quite similar for all three models
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with the highest welfare occurring in the perfectly competitive model followed by the
closed-loop and open-loop models (Figure 4.10).
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Figure 4.9: Accumulated profits (left) and consumer rent (right) with varying refer-
ence demand
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Figure 4.10: Overall welfare (left) and welfare difference (right, open-loop minus
closed-loop)
4.5.3 Summary
Asymmetric existing capacities are an important driver of our results. While welfare is
highest in the perfect competition case, investment levels in this case fall between the
two Cournot models as existing capacities are sufficient to absorb additional demand.
Profits are highest in the open-loop case followed by the closed-loop and perfect com-
petition models. Moving away from long-term contracts towards a spot market-based
trade reduces profits of all players, however, companies with large existing capacities
are affected to a larger degree: the two large firms (one from Australia and one from
the United States) who are responsible for the withholding of capacity in the Cournot
models together receive 23 % of the industry profits in the open-loop case but see their
share of profits diminished to 17 % in the closed-loop case.
In our modeling setup the competitive fringe has no strategic relevance. Fringe players
neither invest nor withhold, i. e., they always produce to capacity. In essence, the fringe
determines the residual demand that the oligopolists optimize against but it does not
introduce any sort of first-mover vs. follower relationship.
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The magnitude of result deviations between the different models, and thus the implica-
tions for market participants are quite significant. The models of imperfect competition
differ, for instance, in capacity expansions between 19 % and up to 33 % (low and high
demand elasticity, respectively).
Even though social welfare differs only slightly between the open-loop and closed-loop
models in our calculations for the metallurgical coal market, the difference may be higher
for other markets with different model parameters. In addition, the surplus distribution
between consumer rent and profits differs significantly and has policy implications since
– in natural resource markets – production and consumption take place in different
countries.
4.6 Computational Issues
Equilibria in a closed-loop model, if any exist, do not necessarily have to be unique.
Therefore, we perform a robustness check for our closed-loop results by using different
starting values for capacity investments. Starting values are randomly drawn from a
reasonable range of possible investments, with the maximum investment of each player
as given in Table 4.2. Limiting the range of possible investments drastically reduces
computer run-times and increases the probability of finding equilibria. In addition,
calculations are made with starting values set to zero and to the open-loop results. The
algorithm terminates if overall adjustments of investments δ are less than  = 0.1 million
tons per annum compared to the previous iteration. We use a learning rate parameter
R for the adoption rate of new investments in order to avoid cycling behavior. The
learning rate parameter is randomly set between 0.6 and 1.0 (see Gabriel et al., 2012).
Calculations have been done on a 16 core server with 96 GB RAM and 2.67 GHz using
CPLEX 12.2.
Table 4.3 shows calculation statistics when using the MILP version of our model (see
Subsection 4.3.2.2). We perform six runs per parameter setting using random starting
values. Most runs converged to an equilibrium before the maximum number of itera-
tions was reached. With increasing demand elasticity, the algorithm had difficulties to
converge. In the case of eta = −0.4, only every third run converged to an equilibrium;
for eta < −0.4, no equilibrium could be found at all. Using either zero investments
or open-loop results as starting values, a closed-loop equilibrium was found, except for
eta < −0.4.
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Table 4.3: Computation time and convergence to equilibrium - MILP version (ran-
dom, zero, open-loop starting values)
Scenario Convergence
(max. 10 itera-
tions)
Iterations until
convergence (only con-
verged runs, max. 10)
Calculation time
(only converged runs) [h]
reference case
(eta -0.3, dem 1.0)
6/6, yes, yes 6-7 (avg. 6.8), 7, 6 10.7-13.7 (avg. 12.4), 7.1, 5.2
eta -0.2 6/6, yes, yes 7-8 (avg. 7.3), 6, 6 9.2-14.1 (avg. 11.0), 5.7, 4.1
eta -0.25 6/6, yes, yes 7-10 (avg. 8.2), 7, 6 11.4-14.9 (avg. 12.8), 6.9, 5.5
eta -0.35 6/6, yes, yes 6-8 (avg. 7.2), 6, 6 11.3-15.8 (avg. 12.7), 5.1, 5.6
eta -0.4 2/6, yes, yes 7-8 (avg. 7.5), 9, 7 12.2-12.7 (avg. 12.4), 5.6, 7.8
eta -0.45 0/6, no, no -, -, - -, -, -.
eta -0.5 0/6, no, no -, -, - -, -, -
dem 0.6 5/6, yes, yes 7-9 (avg. 7.4), 7, 7 1.9-3.5 (avg. 2.2), 0.1, 0.2
dem 0.8 6/6, yes, yes 7-8 (avg. 7.5), 6, 5 3.6-8.8 (avg. 7.1), 2.0, 2.3
dem 1.2 6/6, yes, yes 6-9 (avg. 7.8), 7, 6 9.8-13.9 (avg. 11.9), 8.3, 6.0
dem 1.4 6/6, yes, yes 6-10 (avg. 8.3), 7, 6 7.7-11.2 (avg. 8.7), 9.7, 5.7
Figure 4.11 illustrates the iterative solution process for a single model run for eta = −0.5
using random starting values. The model run did not converge to an equilibrium.64 After
initial adjustments of investments in the first iterations, investments start to cycle in a
rather small range. Total investments from iteration 5 to 10 vary between 89 million tons
per annum and 97 million tons per annum. This range is typical for all runs regardless
of the starting values. The maximum range for a single player’s investment deviations
is 3 Mtpa. Thus, even if no equilibrium is reached, analyzing the solution process may
hint to possible market developments.
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Figure 4.11: Course of investments of single players during solution process (eta =
−0.5)
Using zero investments or open-loop equilibrium results as starting values led to a sig-
nificant reduction of computer run-times compared to random starting values. This is
probably due to the rather large range of random starting values and the (comparably)
rather small equilibrium investments. Thus, starting from zero investments in most
cases is closer to the equilibrium values than starting with random values. In summary,
using reasonable starting values can support the solution process significantly.
64In our iterative approach, convergence depends on the choice of (an arbitrarily small) .
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If the algorithm converged, model results were identical for all runs with the same
parameters concerning demand level and demand elasticity. Thus, even if the existence
of multiple equilibria cannot be excluded, equilibria appear to be stable.
Calculations using the MILP version of our model usually took several hours to converge
to an equilibrium. Applying the grid search approach (see Section 4.3.2.1) reduced
computer run-times significantly. The conceptional difference between both approaches
lies in the simplification of the decision variables: With grid search we discretize the
investment decision. On the contrary, in the MILP approach we discretize the production
decisions but retain a continuous choice of investments in new capacity.
The same calculations as in the MILP version have been done using grid search with
investment steps of 0.1 million tons per annum and the same convergence criterion as
in the MILP version ( = 0.1 million tons per annum). The model was implemented in
GAMS using GUSS (see Bussieck et al., 2012).
Table 4.4: Computation time and convergence to equilibrium - Grid Search (random,
zero, open-loop starting values)
Scenario Convergence
(max. 10
iterations)
Iterations until
convergence (only
converged runs,
max. 10)
Calculation time
(only converged runs) [min]
Accumulated ab-
solute difference
between investments
in MILP and grid
version [%]
reference case
(eta -0.3, dem
1.0)
6/6, yes, yes 6-7 (avg. 6.3), 7, 6 2.8-15.7 (avg. 9.3), 2.2, 2.4 0.7-0.9, 0.8, 0.8
eta -0.2 6/6, yes, yes 5-7 (avg. 6.3), 7, 5 3.5-16.7 (avg. 10.2), 2.3, 2.0 1.0, 1.0, 1.0
eta -0.25 6/6, yes, yes 6-7 (avg. 6.7), 7, 6 2.4-16.5 (avg. 9.4), 2.2, 2.4 0.8, 0.7, 0.8
eta -0.35 6/6, yes, yes 6-8 (avg. 7.0), 7, 6 2.8-17.5 (avg. 10.4), 2.2, 2.4 0.8-1.2, 1.2, 0.8
eta -0.4 6/6, yes, yes 6-7 (avg. 6.5), 7, 6 2.5-16.2 (avg. 9.3), 2.2, 2.4 1.2-1.5, 1.5, 1.5
eta -0.45 0/6, no, no -, -, - -, -, -. -, -, -
eta -0.5 0/6, no, no -, -, - -, -, - -, -, -
dem 0.6 6/6, yes, yes 6-8 (avg. 7.0), 5, 5 3.2-16.9 (avg. 9.7), 2.0, 2.0 2.5-3.7, 3.1, 3.3
dem 0.8 6/6, yes, yes 6-7 (avg. 6.7), 6, 6 2.8-16.2 (avg. 9.6), 2.6, 2.4 0.9, 1.0, 0.9
dem 1.2 6/6, yes, yes 5-7 (avg. 6.8), 7, 6 2.9-17.2 (avg. 10.1), 2.3, 2.5 0.3, 0.3, 0.3
dem 1.4 6/6, yes, yes 5-6 (avg. 6.3), 7, 6 2.9-16.1 (avg. 9.7), 2.3, 2.5 0.3-0.4, 0.4, 0.4
Applying grid search, the solution process took only several minutes to converge. Thus,
reducing the optimization process from a series of computationally challenging MPECs
to comparably easy-to-solve complementarity problems reduced overall computer run-
times significantly. As for the MILP version, all model runs converged to the same
equilibrium (for eta ≥ −0.4) or did not converge at all (for eta < −0.4). Aggregated
absolute deviations of investments between the MILP and the grid search version of
our model vary between 0.3 % and 3.7 %. Thus, in our parameter setting, only minor
differences in the results occurred.
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We presented three investment models for oligopolistic spatial markets. Our approach
accounts for different degrees of competition and as to whether the product is sold
through long-term contracts or on spot markets. The models are particularly suited for
the analysis of investments in markets for natural resources and minerals. We applied
the models to the international metallurgical coal trade, which features characteristics
similar to those of other commodity markets.
Results may differ substantially between the different models. The closed-loop model,
which is computationally challenging, is particularly well suited for when the product is
traded on a spot market and the investment expenditure is large compared to produc-
tion costs. The open-loop model is appropriate for markets with perfect competition
or imperfectly competitive markets on which the product is traded through long-term
contracts. Moreover, the open-loop model approximates the closed-loop outcome when
investment costs are minor.
Over the last several years, progress has been made in the metallurgical coal and iron
ore markets to move away from long-term contracts and introduce spot markets in
commodity trade. Similarly, efforts are being made to introduce spot market-based
pricing between European natural gas importers and the Russian gas exporting giant
Gazprom. Our results suggest that moving away from long-term contracts in oligopolistic
markets is likely to stimulate additional investment and consequently reduce profits and
increase consumer rents. The overall effect on welfare is negligible. However, in natural
resource markets, export revenues and consumer rents from imports are typically accrued
in different legislations. Hence, policy makers from exporting and importing countries
are likely to have differing views on how commodity trade should be organized.
Further research is needed to improve methods for solving complex two-stage problems.
In addition, further research could apply the models presented here to other oligopolistic
mining industries such as the copper or iron ore trade. Given that static pricing models
tend to give unsatisfactory results for the oil market, in which variable costs are low
but capital expenditure is very high, the closed-loop approach may provide interesting
insights into oligopolistic pricing when accounting for investments in capacity.
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4.8.1 Appendix A: Input data
Table 4.5: Distance
from to distance [Nautical miles]
United States Europe-Atlantic 3,387
Asia-Pacific 10,978
Australia Europe-Atlantic 11,626
Asia-Pacific 3,731
Canada Europe-Atlantic 8,840
Asia-Pacific 4,227
Fringe Europe-Atlantic 5,018
Asia-Pacific 3,037
Table 4.6: Reference Demand and Reference Price
Market Reference Demand [Mt] Reference Price [US$/t]
Europe-Atlantic 96 180
Asia-Pacific 179 180
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4.8.2 Appendix B: Open- vs. closed-loop investments
We provide an intuition for the results presented in this paper by solving analytically a
simplified model consisting of one market and two players. Player I is the incumbent
in the market and has infinite existing capacity. Player E is the entrant to the market
owning no existing capacity. The entrant can invest at cost k per unit, whereas the
incumbent may not invest. Both players produce at variable production costs c and
there are no transportation costs to the market. There is only one time period and the
inverse residual demand curve for this period is given by P = a− (xI + xE).
We solve both the open-loop and the closed-loop model for this simplified setting and
show that there is an incentive for the players in the closed-loop model to deviate from
their open-loop equilibrium quantities.65
The open-loop model
In the open-loop model, the entrant’s optimization problem is given by
max
xE ,yE
P · xE − c · xE − k · yE
subject to
yE − xE ≥ 0 (λE),
xE ≥ 0,
yE ≥ 0.
From the corresponding KKT conditions, it is easy to see that in an open-loop equilib-
rium the capacity of the entrant is fully utilized, i. e., yE = xE . Therefore the optimiza-
tion problem may be simplified to
max
xE≥0
P · xE − (c+ k) · xE .
Taking the derivative with respect to xE , we obtain the first order condition
a− 2xE − xI − (c+ k) = 0
from which we obtain the entrant’s reaction curve
xE =
a− (c+ k)− xI
2
.
65We restrict our attention to parameter settings in which both players produce. This restriction is
adequate for the objective at hand, namely to provide intuition for the main results in the paper.
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The incumbent faces a different optimization problem, as he may not invest but has
infinite existing capacity. The incumbent’s optimization problem is hence given by
max
xI≥0
P · xI − c · xI
which yields, when taking the derivative with respect to xI , the first order condition
a− 2xI − xE − c = 0.
The first order condition can be solved for xI to obtain the incumbent’s reaction curve
xI =
a− c− xE
2
.
Solving the system of equations consisting of the two reaction curves for the players’
supply quantities, we obtain
xI =
a− c+ k
3
and
xE =
a− c− 2k
3
,
which is the solution to the open-loop model if the non-negativity conditions for xI and
xE are fulfilled.
The closed-loop model
In order to solve the closed-loop model we use backward induction. For this let yE
denote the first stage investment volume of the entrant. The entrant’s second stage
optimization problem is then given by
max
xE≥0
P · xE − c · xE
subject to
yE − xE ≥ 0 (λE).
The Lagrangian to this optimization problem is given by
L = P · xE − c · xE + λE · (yE − xE)
from which the KKT conditions follow:
xE =
a− (c+ λE)− xI
2
,
0 ≤ λE ⊥ yE − xE ≥ 0.
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The incumbent faces the optimization problem
max
xI≥0
P · xI − c · xI
which yields, as in the open-loop model, the reaction curve
xI =
a− c− xE
2
.
By inserting this in the above KKT condition we obtain the expression
xE =
a− c− 2λE
3
.
The first stage optimization problem of the entrant is then given by
max
yE≥0
P · xE − c · xE − k · yE
subject to
xE =
a− c− 2λE
3
0 ≤ λE ⊥ yE − xE ≥ 0,
xI =
a− c− xE
2
.
Consider the case in which the capacity of the entrant is fully utilized, i. e., xE = yE . In
this case the optimization problem may be simplified to
max
yE≥0
P · yE − (c+ k) · yE
subject to
a− c
3
− yE ≥ 0 (µE),
xI =
a− c− yE
2
.
The Lagrangian to this optimization problem is given by
L =
[
a−
(
yE +
a− c− yE
2
)]
· yE − (c+ k) · yE + µE ·
(
a− c
3
− yE
)
from which the KKT conditions follow:
yE =
a− c− 2k − 2µE
2
,
0 ≤ µE ⊥ a− c
3
− yE ≥ 0.
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In case of µE > 0, we obtain
yE = xE = xI =
a− c
3
and λE = 0.
66
This is indeed a solution in case
µE =
a− c− 2k − 2yE
2
=
a− c
6
− k > 0.
In case of µE = 0, we obtain
yE = xE =
a− c− 2k
2
and
xI =
a− c+ 2k
4
.
which is a solution if
λE =
a− c− 3yE
2
≥ 0
and
yE ≤ a− c
3
.
Conclusion
The above calculations show that the investment in the closed-loop model is higher than
in the open-loop model for the entrant as
a− c− 2k
2
≥ a− c− 2k
3
and
a− c
3
≥ a− c− 2k
3
.
We conclude that there is an incentive for the players in the closed-loop game to deviate
from the open-loop equilibrium. Further investigation of the above considered cases also
shows that the total supply is higher and prices are lower in the closed-loop model than
in the open-loop model.
66This is also the limiting case for xE < yE .
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